


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* * * The JOURNAL will for the time being be issued in two double numbers yearly.

ORIGINAL PAPERS

IDENTIFICATION

By ALICE BÁLINT

[This is a translation of the fourth chapter of the late Mrs. Bálint's book *A Gyermekszoba Pszichológiája* (The Psychology of the Nursery) published in Budapest in 1931.]¹

I. THE CONQUEST OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

So far we have been mainly concerned with the content of the conflicts of childhood and we have said very little of the ways in which those conflicts are dealt with. And, now that we are approaching that side of the problem, we must for the time being leave the firm ground of direct observation and turn to a more theoretical consideration of the means adopted by children for the solution of their conflicts. I have already referred in passing to a few of these methods: repression, for instance, and displacement, and (something that is akin to the latter) sublimation. Repression enables us to blot out of our consciousness any wishes that have proved incapable of fulfilment, while displacement and sublimation enable some of our instincts to pursue their existence in a new and legitimate sphere. In the course of my remarks upon displacement I hinted at the existence of another method—namely, identificatory thought. I mentioned that displacement is closely related to this peculiarity of primitive thought, to the fact, that is, that children from the very first get to know the external world by means of 'identifications'². For instance, a small child will regard any thick mass of material as faeces, and any liquid as urine, because faeces and urine are things that are already familiar to him. One advantage of these identifications is that they enable the child to find substitutes for primitive sources of pleasure that have to be given up under the pressure of education. Thus identificatory thinking is employed for the purpose of avoiding what is unpleasurable and obtaining what is pleasurable, and it aims at transforming a strange and consequently frightening external world into one that is familiar and enjoyable. This is the only way (apart from direct gratification) in which we can approach the external world. And since the relation between the ego and the

external world is after all the main problem of all educative measures, it is worth while examining the phenomenon of identificatory thought in all its details.

The ego, and more particularly the primitive 'pleasure ego', plays the principal part in identificatory thinking to a much greater degree than it does subsequently, after the development of what is called 'objective' thinking. For the basis for the earliest identifications is not resemblance to the object (though naturally this plays its part) but the manner in which the object in question enters into relation with the child's instincts. Indeed this is self-evident: since whatever does not belong to our ego is alien to us, and thus the starting-point for identification must necessarily be our own body or our own instincts.³

Thus, for instance, a piece of brown paper will remind a four-year-old boy not of a parcel or of anything connected with paper, but of faeces—which is bound to strike an adult as an exceedingly forced comparison. In the same way a running tap usually reminds children of micturating. I have already [in an earlier chapter] given the instance of a four-year-old boy who identified a soldier's sabre with a penis. So, too, the very widespread infantile theory of birth through the anus is essentially an identification of the process of birth with the familiar process of defaecation. (This explains how it is that this theory so often makes its appearance even when children have been given precise information upon the facts.)

It is obvious that an external world that has been discovered and conquered in such a fashion will be to the last degree egocentric. And this remarkable picture of the world, with the pleasure-ego as its centre, persists in our unconscious all through our lives and constitutes the basis of the anthropomorphism which always lurks in the

¹ [The present version is mainly based upon a German translation which appeared in *Z. Psychoanal. Pädag.*, 6 (1932), 49; use has also been made of a translation by Miss Mary Seal from a French version, *La vie intime de l'enfant*, Paris, 1937.]

² [The editor of the German translation points out that the author uses the word 'identification' in a wider sense than has been customary in psycho-analytical literature.]

³ After we have taken mental possession of a portion of

the external world by means of identification, mental material which has thus been assimilated can itself serve as a basis for further identifications. So there would seem to be no essential distinction between ego-identification [i.e. identification of the ego with an object] and object-identification [i.e. identification of one object with another]. For it is only objects which have already been identified with ourselves that can become the starting-point for further identifications.

background even of the most objective and scientific thought.

It is by means of identification that a child makes the acquaintance even of his own body. Here the basis for the identification is afforded by those organs or parts of the body which are at the moment playing the largest part in the attainment of pleasure, either because some particular stage of development has been reached or because some external influences have been at work.

A four-year-old girl, for instance, had formerly derived her greatest pleasure from sucking her fingers. She then experimented with genital masturbation, and had recently practised it more frequently. She explained it with the words: 'I'm feeding my bottom.' This strange explanation shows that, even in the case of a pleasurable, and therefore self-explanatory, activity like masturbation, the process requires to be made more familiar by means of identification. (It seems likely that behind the equation of masturbation with feeding, or eating, there lay an earlier comparison between sexual tension and hunger.) It is of course possible that the sense of guilt involved in masturbation also played a part in the child's explanation. If so, she would have been using the identification to pacify not so much herself as her enquiring elders, as though she were saying: 'There's nothing in it really, it's only the same sort of thing as eating.' A very similar, though simpler, example is provided by the little boy who, as was appropriate to his age, was, like her, devoted to sucking his fingers, and called his penis a 'little finger'. On the other hand, a girl used to call the genitals of a boy she played with a 'little nose', and was thus comparing it with an organ that she herself also possessed. In this case the girl was using identificatory thinking to try to soothe the unpleasurable feelings caused by her lack of a penis.

From all of this it seems as though identificatory thinking were in its nature allied to narcissism. But, whereas narcissism never extends beyond the subject's own ego, identification constitutes the bridge that leads across from naked self-love to getting to love reality.

Nevertheless, identification is not yet object-love. The attachment that we form with the external world by means of identification is far better described as a kind of incorporation or assimilation or, inversely, as an extension of the ego. This can be demonstrated very clearly from a child's relation to his toys. It is a remarkable fact, for instance, that the essence of a small child's play consists in him himself becoming a dog or a motor-car or a railway-train though the corresponding toys are close at hand. Until this mental incorporation has been achieved, the toy remains something alien and frightening. The preference felt by children for a piece of paper or wood, for an empty box or a bit of string, is easily

explained by the fact that these things can assume a greater diversity of shape and consequently afford wider possibilities for identification.

A boy I know was positively terrified of toys that have to be wound up and that then move automatically. He only enjoyed playing with them if he himself moved his whole body in unison with the toy. Most instructive in this connection was the way in which a child of about two and a half came to be on friendly terms with a new toy. He was presented with a red india-rubber elephant, but received it with violent dislike and pushed it away with screams and tears. The function of an elephant's trunk was then demonstrated to him by the use of his own arm; he was shown how the end of the trunk worked like his own fingers; and was told how the elephant could squirt water with its trunk, put food into its mouth, and so on. Not until he himself had imitated these various movements for some time could he at last be prevailed upon to look at the toy and take it in his hands. It is worth trying to find the meaning of the various details of this everyday episode. The boy's throwing away of the toy and refusal to look at it may without any exaggeration be regarded as the destruction of a strange and troublesome object. Next followed the game with his own arm and fingers, which opened the way to an identification. After this process of mental 'digestion' had been successfully achieved, the object that had been so repellent only a short time before could now be held in the child's hands and felt as something friendly and familiar.

Processes of an exactly similar kind are taking place in an adult when he says that he must 'digest' a new idea before he can 'get on to friendly terms' with it; and to 'explain' something means in fact to facilitate this process of digestion. The game which the child was shown with his arm was an explanation of the elephant's body given in a form appropriate to a child's understanding. But the 'appropriate' form of this explanation lay, as we have seen, in the fact that it made possible an identification with the child's ego. Thus, on the one hand, children's play can be regarded partly as a summation of primitive explanations; and, on the other hand, the intellectual working over of a problem would seem probably always to be a process of identification. This would constitute the inevitable libidinal foundation of knowledge or understanding in general. If this close connection between knowledge and identification in fact holds, it implies that knowing is always *re-knowing*, that is, that we are able to know the external world only as something akin to the ego.

Thus, as we have seen, in the last resort a child wishes to meet only his own beloved self.

A story of a three-year-old boy will serve to exemplify this. He was afraid of thunderstorms; and one morning after a thundery night it was

found that he had wetted his bed. Since he had been trained for some time, this event required a special explanation. The child told his mother what had happened in these words: 'I didn't want to do it. But the sun said I *was* to do it in the bed. I said I wouldn't. But the sun said it does it too.' 'How's that?' asked his mother. 'When it rains, of course.' Here the little boy was trying to get on to friendly terms with the frightening rain-storm by identifying the rain with micturition, which at the same time allowed him to indulge in a pleasure which had long been forbidden.

A child can only get on to friendly terms with toys, with animals, with natural phenomena, as well as with the grown-up people living with him, if he can succeed in identifying himself with them. Identification can accordingly be regarded as a flight from the external world—this flight being carried out by means of our making a larger and larger portion of the external world into a portion of our ego. The further a child advances along this path, with the more things must he become acquainted which were at first disagreeable. This is an instructive instance of the way in which the pleasure principle itself leads to adaptation to reality. A child's one aim is to feel contented. But he is hindered in this by the external world which, by means of constant stimuli, is constantly confronting him with new problems. His way out is identification, by the help of which he takes the external world into himself, or, as we may say, assimilates it.

All this leads us to what will undoubtedly seem a paradoxical conclusion, namely that a child is driven to have recourse to identification above all when he is overcome by painful impressions from which he has no other means of escape. And since running away or getting rid of a disturbing phenomenon is the least practicable method of defence in earliest childhood, identification is incomparably more important at that period of development than at any other time of life. If, therefore, we wish to be quite accurate, we must say, not that a child gets on to friendly terms with something because it reminds him of something else of which he is already fond or which he already knows, but that a child can only become fond of something unknown if he can succeed, by the help of one of his instincts, in identifying it with something known. The common basis of loving and of understanding is identification, and without it both would be impossible.

Loving is not, of course, merely synonymous with identification; on the one hand it is the result of direct instinctual satisfaction, while on the other hand it presupposes a certain degree of sense of reality, which makes it possible to distinguish the ego from the external world. But what does that mean? We must above all not forget that the separation of ego from non-ego is

originally effected by the help of painful experiences. We are taught, for instance, that our mother's breast is not a part of our own body by the painful experience that it is not always there when we need it. Loving is thus preceded by anger or, more precisely, by the discovery that what gives us satisfaction is an alien and hostile object belonging to the external world. This means that when a child is hungry he is not fond of his mother's breast but angry with it. In order to love it, the child must be able to remember the pleasure which the breast was the means of giving him. Thus loving is essentially gratitude, that is, the maintenance of affectionate feelings even at a time at which direct gratification has ceased.

A good example of a contrary state of things is afforded by the following anecdote, of which the hero is a boy of about six. He was out somewhere on a visit and had been playing very happily with a small dog, so that finally he could not bear the idea of parting with it. When he saw that all was in vain and that he *must* go home without it, he suddenly said: 'Horrid dog! I don't love you!' Here we can see plainly that the child was angry with the bad dog that was the cause of his sorrow at parting.

It commonly happens that on such occasions a child will console himself with the help of identification. He will, for instance, turn himself into a dog and to such good effect that he no longer has the smallest need of the real animal. Thus identification can not only promote the development of loving but can just as easily hinder it: for if we are scared at the suffering which is involved in loving we can turn back to identification, as though to a more primitive form of relationship. But in setting up this secondary identification we have to fight not only against the alien nature of the object but also against an especially evil characteristic that it possesses, namely the fact that it is not invariably or unconditionally at our disposal. In this case the aim of identification is no longer getting to know something that is unknown but replacing something that is missing. I no longer need the bad dog which I had to part with, if I can myself become a dog and so get satisfaction from myself.

The capital distinction between loving and identification lies in the fact that identification is the transforming of a painful, disturbing state of affairs into a pleasurable one, whereas loving is linked to gratification (that is, to something pleasurable) and in such a way that from the gratification we can find strength to tolerate the suffering that is bound up with it. The greater the direct gratification, the less need there is for identification. The other great distinction between identification and loving is that identification tends to do away with the separation between the ego and the external world, while it is a necessary condition of loving that we should recognize

the fact that something else exists outside ourselves.

The first important gratification which we obtain through the agency of another person is sucking. Sucking comprises three different kinds of relation: first, an actual incorporation of a portion of the external world; secondly, narcissistic pleasure (since the process occurs at an age at which the separation of ego from non-ego has not yet been completely effected); and, finally, it contains the germ of the first love-relation. During sucking complete peace still reigns between the ego and the external world, between narcissism and object-love. It is the prototype of complete happiness. When we reflect, therefore, that it is precisely in the sphere of oral erotism that a child experiences not only its first great happiness but also its first great shocks (such, for instance, as weaning, teething and—last but not least—hunger), we shall more readily understand the great importance of the part played in mental life by identification, which is so closely related to the impulse of oral incorporation. It is common knowledge that small children seek to allay every pain, whether mental or physical, in one and the same way: by taking something into their mouth. The prototype of this mechanism of consolation is the assuaging of hunger—that is to say, sucking. If milk is not in a child's mouth when he becomes hungry, he has a high degree of unpleasurable feeling; and this painful event leads to a sharp differentiation between his ego and the external world. If milk then enters his mouth, this disharmony ceases and the integrity of his ego is re-established. This process, which is in part physiological, is a complete counterpart to the purely mental process which we term identification. Thus identification serves the pleasure principle in two sorts of way: on the one hand, it removes the tension between the ego and the external world, and, on the other hand, its mechanism brings a recollection of the happiness which we enjoyed as sucklings.

Our relation with our own self develops in a manner precisely similar to what we have already described in the case of the ego and the external world. Let us take as our starting-point those cases in which a child feels as something alien to him a part of his body which is causing him pain. We see children holding an injured finger far away from them, being angry with it and not wanting to look at it. Or they talk about the organ that is tormenting them in the third person—'that naughty tummy'—and wish someone would buy them another one, and so on. It is as though this behaviour meant: 'I'm fond of myself; but what hurts me is naughty and I don't like it; that's not me at all.' On the one hand, therefore, everything that is not part of the ego is, to begin with, bad and alien, while, on the other hand, there is an inclination to project into the external world everything in the ego that is disturbing. Here, too,

in other words, the separation of the ego from the external world proceeds according to the rule: what is good is ego, what is bad is non-ego.

Children will endeavour to get rid of disturbing effects in the same way by means of projection. For instance, a child of four said to his playmate: 'If you don't leave my toy alone, a man'll come out and be angry.' The child was asked why he did not simply say that he himself would be angry. His answer was: 'Because I don't want to be angry any more.'

Since in the case of physical pains being angry or repudiating the aching part does not, of course, lead to the desired end, the child is once more obliged to take refuge in identification. The result of this process of identification is that he nurses and caresses the aching part. But to this we shall return later.

A similar situation also occurs in the case of psychological injuries. We have already mentioned in connection with the castration complex how easily small children feel insulted, precisely because of their narcissism. After narcissistic injuries of this kind it may happen that a child will so to speak abandon his own self, since he no longer feels any pleasure in his ego. A very common sign of this is that the child assumes a new name and declares that his old ego is dead and exists no longer. If after this we call him by his old name the result is usually a bitter outburst of crying or a fit of rage; so that I have found as a rule that people give way to 'strange whims' of this kind on the part of a child. We often find, for instance, that little girls, as soon as they have noticed that they lack something that little boys possess, want to stop being girls. The effect of this is intensified by remarks which they often hear preferring boys to girls. A snub or a sign of dislike may entirely take away a little girl's pleasure in herself. And the same thing may happen to a little boy if he is too bluntly reminded of his weakness and smallness compared with grown-up people. The impenetrable armour which we also call narcissism and which affords the individual his most effective protection against the opinion of others is already something secondary and is already in its essentials the product of a process of identification. When a child finds that he cannot get free from his own imperfect ego, he identifies himself with the people who are fond of him in spite of his imperfections. This origin of secondary self-love gives us a satisfactory explanation of the invulnerability of those who are protected by its armour.

The child's original attitude to the external world may be formulated in these words: 'if you are fond of me, then make me as perfect as I myself feel I am.' At first, for instance, a little girl will be angry because people are fond of her as a little girl and endeavour to use that as a means of inducing her to submit to her lot. Strange as it

may seem, she feels this love as hostility. (We frequently come across this same conflict in the pages of modern love stories, where the main-spring of the plot consists in a woman feeling her self-respect injured because she is loved 'merely as a woman' and 'not as a human being'.)

Something precisely similar is to be observed in physical suffering. A man who is ill abandons himself in just the same way as a child whose self-respect has been injured. It is as though he were surrendering his now worthless ego to his environment: 'I don't need it any more; please do whatever you like with it.' For the sick adult is, like the child, angry with his environment, as though he were making it responsible for his suffering. Just as a child is angry because it has been brought into the world so small, or because it has been made a girl and not a boy, so does the sick man (or child) nourish a hostile feeling against his environment because it has made him fall ill. This anger is a direct derivative of the mechanism of projection of which I have already spoken in connection with physical pain. We are unwilling to regard as part of our ego anything that is painful or imperfect—anything of which we must feel ashamed; and we therefore do our best to locate either the evil itself, or at least its causes, outside ourselves.

The following anecdote offers an amusing example of this. A small boy of five fell down off a piece of furniture. He burst into sobs and tears and complained that his grandfather, who happened to be in another corner of the room, had pushed him over. Instead of admitting his own clumsiness, he looked for a scapegoat with whom he could be heartily angry, whereas, if he had had an understanding of the situation, he would have had to be angry with himself.

Anger with the environment is, as we can see, a protection against abandoning the self, or, more

correctly, against the narcissistic injury which would be the consequence of understanding. This anger with the environment, on the one hand, and the inclination to self-abandonment, on the other, are the justification for special spoiling in case of illness or other mischance. For it is only by the help of identification with his environment that a person can contrive to love himself even though he is small or ill or humiliated.

Of course we must not forget that the impulse to self-abandonment is counteracted most strongly by—what is the actual basis of primary narcissism—the gratification which a person obtains from his own body: from masturbation in the widest sense of the word. From this point of view masturbation must be regarded as a positively life-saving agency. We shall also understand why it is that masturbation increases at the period at which children have to go through a series of disappointments and humiliations in connection with the Oedipus and castration complexes. Masturbation prevents complete self-abandonment; it assures us, even in times of need, of our love for ourselves, which, like all other love, is built up upon gratification.

Thus we see that, in the process of establishing the relation between an individual and the external world, the decisive part is played by identification and love. Loving stands furthest away from the original aim. It demands the greatest possible adaptation to the external world and at the same time makes the greatest breach in primary narcissism. Identification is the most primitive method of recognizing external reality; it is, in fact, nothing less than mental mimicry. Its necessary preconditions are an unbroken narcissism, which cannot bear that anything should exist outside itself, and the weakness of the individual, which makes him unable either to annihilate his environment or to take flight from it.

II. THE CHILD AND HIS EDUCATORS

From a practical point of view there is one exceedingly important special case of the relation between an individual and the external world, namely the relation between a child and his educators. For small children their parents and educators represent an immense power, the loss of whose love and goodwill is almost the same thing as the gravest mortal danger. It is easy to see why this is so, for it is a self-evident implication of children's complete physical and mental dependence. If a child were not helpless, he might, for instance, if his parents refused to give him something he wanted, say to himself: 'I'm going away: I don't like it here.' Since this solution is impossible for him, anger becomes a forbidden luxury, and he is obliged instead to resort to the same method in relation to his prohibiting and hence disagreeable parents as he has previously

been able to use against the hostile and mighty external world—namely to the method of identification. On the other hand, however, we know that these same parents are also a source of intense gratification for him and for that very reason are his first and most important love objects. Thus it is that parents come to bear the weight of the most vital, because the strongest and most permanent, attachments. We love them because they bring us pleasure and we identify ourselves with them as being the powerful representatives of the frustrating external world. Accordingly, in relation to parents, love and identification are so much intermingled that any clear differentiation between the two seems hopeless. And the position is made still more difficult by the fact that these two types of relation, which are so fundamentally different in their essence, make use for the most

part of the same forms of expression. Love towards parents is not only something that is felt spontaneously but also something that is strictly forbidden. An educator is as a rule very little concerned as to the manner in which a child is attached to him ; it is enough for him to know that such an attachment exists and is utilizable for the purposes of education. And yet, as we shall see presently, even from the practical point of view the distinction between the two forms of relation is not a matter of indifference. But I will first endeavour to draw a rough outline picture of the way in which love and identification are intermixed and of how they alternate in the course of a child's development.

According to the schematic formula of the Oedipus complex, a small boy should love his mother and identify himself with his father. And this is in general the case. The boy's mother is after all the source of gratification and his father is the powerful rival against whom he cannot defend himself successfully either by attack or by flight, so that he is eventually obliged to resort to identification. The most familiar form taken by this identification is where the boy tries to do whatever his father is doing, imitates his father's movements and little habits, etc. It is true, of course, that the repressed Oedipus wish also re-emerges in this identification : the little boy is becoming his father—that is, he is becoming his mother's husband. The hostile intention which was the precursor of the identification finds its expression in such remarks as : ' if I was Daddy, Daddy 'd be a baby and I'd push him in the pram.' What I have said applies also, *mutatis mutandis*, to little girls. A girl is happy if she can imitate her mother in respect of her clothes or in the way she wears her hair ; and it appears too that she would like to have a husband just like Mummy's. I once heard a young woman doctor say of her parents : ' Getting married wasn't much of a job for M mmy, she got married to Daddy.'

Differences in family circumstances, in the character of the parents, in their educational methods and in the possibilities of gratification open to a child can of course lead to the most various consequences. But, besides these, there are other factors of a much more general nature that can alter the picture to a greater or less extent. For instance, the mother or nurse is the chief source of pleasure for children of *both* sexes in their earliest years. Yet during the processes of weaning and of training in cleanliness the same person becomes a most disagreeable creature from the child's standpoint. At that period the child withdraws its love from her and directs it instead to its father, who as a rule has no share in this early education. One often hears a mother complaining of her baby's ingratitude because it prefers its father, although he only spares an occasional leisure moment to it, whereas it has not the least regard

for its mother, who devotes the whole day to it. For older children, on the contrary, their father as a rule once again becomes the representative of harsh reality, while their mother is affectionate and indulgent. Alterations of this kind in the part played by parents bring about now an intensification, now a diminution in the effect of the Oedipus and castration complexes. These two complexes, moreover, do not operate entirely in the same sense. As we have seen, for instance, a little boy will usually associate his father with prohibition but his mother with failure. This applies equally to little girls. Her mother appears as a prohibiting force, but, since she has been disappointed by her father, she has no alternative but to turn away, to a greater or lesser extent, from *both* her parents. And in fact we find that after the climax of the Oedipus complex there follows a calming-down of the feelings that have been raging around the parents. Under the pressure of its various disappointments the child withdraws its love in part from its parents and turns to the external world—in a wider sense of the word. Then follows the period in which friendships begin, the desire for knowledge increases and the personality develops.

The child's ' psychological emigration ' from its parents' house is occasionally expressed in attempts at an actual emigration. I myself once witnessed something of the sort in the case of a boy of three. The child lived near me and I only knew him by sight. One night his mother gave birth to a baby. Next morning the little boy came across from the neighbouring garden and spent the whole day with me, as though we had always been old friends. His parents were especially astonished because he was a rather nervous child and they had never before known him do anything like it. But, when we consider that the appearance of a new rival was far from being an agreeable event in the child's life, we shall understand his bold attempt at flight.

Another observation showed me that ' going for a walk by oneself ' means for a child ' going away from Mummy '. A six-year-old boy went into the street by himself for the first time because he was angry with his mother for refusing him something he wanted. A few weeks later a strange little episode occurred in connection with the same child, who in the meantime had gone for a number of short walks by himself without any particular excitement. As he was going out, his mother saw him out of the window and called out a friendly word to him. The little boy stopped, answered, made a lot of nonsensical remarks, danced about impatiently where he was standing, and finally shouted angrily : ' I want to go off now ! ' ' Well, go off then ! ' said his mother. To which he replied : ' But I can't so long as I see you ! ' And it was not until his mother had gone away from the window that he was able to start for his walk.

The fact that towards the beginning of school-age parents are thrown into the background by no means implies any diminution of their influence upon the development of a child's character. Physical, mental and social ties continue to bind him to his parents and so it is that the 'psychological emigration' that I have just mentioned takes place for the most part along paths prescribed or sanctioned by the parents (as, for instance, when a child is sent to school). This means that the climax of the Oedipus complex is succeeded by the period of educability. The stormy and contradictory feelings are replaced by identification with the parents. We know from what has gone before that identification disposes of an aggressive, rebellious feeling and does so by making a powerful external impression into a part of our own ego. That is precisely what a child does with commands and prohibitions which he is obliged to obey, so that he ends by being able to believe that he is following his own will. This procedure can easily be observed in quite small children. A child who cries bitterly if an attempt is made to carry him forcibly out of the room will calm down if he is given an opportunity of going out 'of his own accord'. It is possible in this way to get most children to want things that are the exact opposite of what they wanted originally. The protest which children raise against orders comes clearly to light in a number of very common childish habits. For instance, everyone knows that children are more inclined to obey if we tell them to do the opposite of what we want. Indeed, they will often say straight out: 'Tell me not to do it and I'll do it.'⁴ The meaning is much the same, too, when a child amuses himself by using words in the sense opposite to their real one and says 'yes' instead of 'no', etc.

All these games are in reality attempts at preserving self-esteem in the face of superior power; and it becomes clear from this that giving way is painful to a child, irrespective of what it is that he is ordered to do. He even dislikes doing under orders something that he would otherwise be glad to do. This violent protest is in the end the cause of the child's defeat. Since his narcissism is incapable of tolerating a command, he becomes prepared at last, rather than obey, to will the same thing that the adults require him to do. The child who goes out of the room 'of his own accord' is giving up his own will for the sake of preserving a fictitious 'free will'.

The outcome of the struggle round an individual's narcissism is one of the most important events of his development. As a result of identification with the various commands and prohibitions, his ego undergoes a decisive transformation. Since

obedience takes place not through understanding but through identification, the command becomes a part of the child's ego, which he defends henceforward just as much as his own will. This is the explanation of the remarkable, rigid conservatism with which a child clings to regulations when he has once accepted them. To be sure, we must not forget at this point that, just as repression is unable to destroy the instinct from which a forbidden wish arises, so identification with the will of the adults does not do away with the wishes that are in contradiction to that will. The consequence is a splitting of the ego into two parts, of which one is the vehicle of the original instinctual wishes while the other is the vehicle of the wishes that have been incorporated by means of identification. This second, transformed part of the ego is called by Freud the 'super-ego'. The super-ego behaves towards the instinctual ego precisely as a child's educators originally behaved to the child. The child feels the educatory origin of the super-ego as his conscience. Yet conscience, however disagreeable it may be upon occasion, is no longer an external but an internal compulsion, in obeying which the child can feel as though he were acting in accordance with a wish of his own. We may often observe that it is precisely the most self-willed children who become the most conscientious. Those children who can least tolerate punishment are inclined to anticipate it with remorse or even with self-punishment. In such a case a child is behaving like a hero who, rather than fall into the hands of his enemies, puts an end to his own life or who (as we know from historical instances), if he is to be executed, will not let himself be bound but ascends the scaffold 'free' and as though the decision to do so were his own. In moments of critical danger adults are themselves in the same situation as a child in relation to his parents: in both cases the sense of complete surrender leads to similar measures of defence.

Some people will certainly think it exaggerated to compare a child who is undergoing his education with a man in mortal danger. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the instinctual ego, the comparison comes very close to reality. The coming into existence of the super-ego can be regarded as a sentence of death upon the primitive life of the instincts. We can see this most clearly in children's behaviour. In any nursery a child who is asked who did this or that forbidden act may be heard answering that *he* was not the guilty one but some other, naughtier person. This other person is often given a name and becomes a permanent guest in the nursery. Many suppose that this is merely a lie and that the child simply wants to deny his misdemeanour for fear of being

⁴ Among the North American Indian tribes there used to be societies whose members were young warriors who, according to their rules, always did the opposite of what

they were told. During a battle, for instance, if someone⁶ called out to them 'Retire!', they would advance even if it meant certain death.

punished. But there is something in the form taken by the denial that catches our attention. The child does not deny the misdemeanour but only that it was he who committed it. He is trying to regard the part of his mind that has become disagreeable to him owing to the threats (or merely prohibitions) of his educators as something alien and outside himself. And he is perfectly ready to join with the adults in jeering at this naughty other person or in beating him or even in destroying him. Of course we also learn from time to time that this other person is very powerful and clever, so that it is not so easy to get rid of him. But if on an occasion like this we try to make it clear to the child that this naughty other person is himself, then the understanding between us breaks down and violent protests ensue. The child's behaviour in this connection is exactly like his behaviour towards physical pains: he attempts by means of projection to get rid of the disturbing portion of his ego.

Rasmussen, in his *Child Psychology*, writes: 'At the age of 4 years and 1 month Ruth used occasionally to vomit a little after her mid-day meal. I corrected her and told her it was not nice. By way of excuse Ruth remarked: "Yes, but I didn't do it; I didn't want to, but my tummy did it."—A fortnight later she wanted to be naughty and began to stamp her foot. But she soon stopped, stamped once more very gently and said: "One of my legs is rather naughty." In the second of these examples the splitting of the ego takes place before our very eyes. The first angry stamping still shows the individual undivided: then comes the recollection of the prohibition and the repudiation of the naughty portion of the ego.

Thus in the splitting of the ego two forces play a part, forces which are closely interrelated but which are clearly to be distinguished: one of these is identification with the behaviour of the environment and the other is projection of the portion of the ego which has become disagreeable precisely owing to that identification. It is probably only later, in connection with the development of the sense of reality, that there sets in repression—that is, a complete elimination from consciousness—of the affects and wishes which were in the first instance projected. For to begin with a child makes no distinction between his world of phantasy and reality. At that stage of development he is quite content with the fiction that the guilty foot does not belong to him. It is not until this notion becomes untenable that he is obliged to have recourse to repression. For something of which I know nothing can surely not be 'I': even the grown-ups must see that. Accordingly,

it would be a necessary precondition of repression that we should have identified ourselves with the adult idea of reality.

The process of super-ego formation discovered by Freud, which I have been so far discussing, is in general represented as a method of adaptation to the prohibitions and commands of the environment. That, however, is only one side of this immensely important psychological phenomenon. Ferenczi's experiences in adult analyses, and particularly in character analyses, show that super-ego formation, though originally a form of adaptation to external reality, can none the less become an obstacle to subsequent adaptations. According to Ferenczi, the splitting of the ego as a result of identification with a prohibition involves serious damage to the ego. The first sign that a splitting of the ego is setting in is a child's protest against the assumption that he himself is 'the guilty person'. The disadvantage of this method of dealing with the situation is obvious. It is true that it may lead to the child (taking the last example) no longer stamping her foot; but we can no longer discuss with the child *why* she stamped. Henceforward she will always put us off by saying that it was her foot and not she herself that was 'naughty'. The fact that the 'why' remained hidden in Rasmussen's instance as well is shown by the typical way in which the account of the whole episode is worded: 'one day she wanted to be naughty.' The educators lay the stress upon the rule of conduct: 'you must not stamp your foot at your parents.' Any impulses that cause the emergence of a wish to stamp are therefore to be dreaded, and the child will have nothing to do with them. In this way, however, after the super-ego formation has been effected, both parts of the ego cease to be susceptible to influence: one because it is split off and no longer recognized as a portion of our self, and the other, which has already been made rigid by identification with the prohibition, because it only admits of a strictly circumscribed method of behaviour. Any lifting of the rigid regulation is guarded against by the anxiety which made the identification (the splitting of the ego) necessary. Thus we see that every adaptation by means of identification is at the same time a limitation upon the free and elastic capacity for adaptation which rests upon an understanding judgement of the situation. In place of that capacity we only too often find a rigid, automatic character which, though it is a product of practical acts of adaptation, can nevertheless find itself in gross conflict with the demands of reality.⁵ In what follows I shall return to the consideration of how educational methods can be adapted so as to reduce to

⁵ Ferenczi calls the automatic character a kind of psychosis, which is curable by means of psycho-analysis. The removal of the splitting of the ego by recollecting its causative experiences can enable a person to submit his automatisms to conscious control. Such conscious

control and the accompanying reduction of anxiety is of course not the same thing as a reduction of the inhibitions of instinct that are necessary to civilization. What happens is simply that anxiety is replaced as the basis for the restriction of instinct by love and reason.

a minimum the development of automatisms of character.

This discussion must inevitably raise the question of how the part played by identification can be reconciled with the domination of the pleasure principle in mental life. It is true that, as we have seen, identification always operates in the interest of narcissism and does what it can to defend narcissism; yet it may well seem that the price paid for that defence is far too high. The child takes over the adults' desires and tastes and makes them his own; following their example, he is ready to condemn what has previously been pleasurable to him and ultimately he goes so far as to remove the forbidden feelings and thoughts entirely from his consciousness.

Children will not infrequently tell us how hard it is for them to fulfil these requirements. A little girl of seven once said to me: 'I'm not allowed to do anything nice and I have to do everything nasty.' And here is the heart-rending complaint made to his mother by a six-year-old boy: 'I'd no idea when I was born that I should have such a bad time.' When his mother asked him in astonishment what had happened to him that was so terrible, he enumerated all those apparently trivial prohibitions and restrictions which we scarcely notice but which embitter a child's life.

And in this connection we must not forget that complaints of this kind are only made by children who are in a relatively good state, that is to say, who retain some degree of freedom of thought. The most tactful education cannot protect a child from the sufferings necessarily involved in the process of putting a rein upon the instincts—partly because education begins at an age at which it is too early for us to be able to count on understanding and partly because the measures in question are not always of a kind where understanding is possible. For the requirements imposed upon small children are to a great extent a matter of convention and the only ground for obeying them is fear of losing the parents' love. Yet it follows from the narcissistic nature of young children that the love which they receive from their environment, essential though it is to them, cannot compensate them for the loss of their primitive instinctual gratifications. A child depends upon us to a high degree, but he does not love us enough to be able to make so great a sacrifice for our sake. That is to say, we can only force him to make the renunciation, without being in a position to offer him a full compensation for it. But against all this there is the fact that a human being is only able to make a renunciation in return for some substitute gratification, which, indeed, follows from our inability to extinguish the instincts by any defensive measures. But it is in the very nature of an instinct to strive to find its way by some path or other to its inevitable discharge. The question thus arises in what manner

a child gratifies the instincts with which, on the basis of his identification with his educators, he has repudiated any kind of association.

When I was speaking of the education of the instincts, I mentioned that the various inhibitions divert an instinct from its original direction. It is true, of course, that a diversion of this kind is not possible in the case of every instinct: for instance, hunger can only be satisfied by eating. Susceptibility to diversion is primarily a quality of the sexual instincts. This peculiarity, coupled with identificatory thinking, affords them an almost unlimited possibility of making their way through. And in this, the opportunities for gratification that are offered by identification with adults play a particularly important part, since they facilitate considerably a child's social adaptation.

At a first glance this assertion may seem strange: for identification with his elders brings a child little else than a restriction of his instincts. But the apparent contradiction can be explained by an example. Let us take an event that occurs in the life of every child. Uncle Doctor arrives and looks down the child's throat with a spoon. On the first such occasion most children react violently against the assault and make it absolutely clear that the whole thing is very far indeed from pleasing them. But, strange to say, instead of forgetting the unpleasant business as quickly as possible, they almost without exception begin soon afterwards to play at Doctor. Thus the child behaves after the doctor's visit just as he does after parting from an object that he likes. (Cf. the example of the dog on page 99.) This is all the more peculiar because, according to what we have hitherto found, a child identifies himself with an absent object in order to replace it and so get rid of his longing for it. But children do not long for the doctor: so what can be the meaning of the identification here? The child dislikes what the doctor does to him but he is compelled to submit to it. Then, afterwards, the child becomes the doctor, looks down everyone's throat, applies compresses, gives medicine, and so on. Thus he does actively what he suffered passively. We know how much it injures a child's narcissism if he is obliged to put up with something against his will. By means of the identification, he brings about the interchange of rôles which he so much desires. Moreover, in playing at Doctor the child is able to express his anger. This is shown by the fact that the whole procedure is as a rule repeated in the game in a more merciless fashion than the child himself actually experienced. We find the same thing happen when children play at Mummy and Daddy or at School. Children who have never been hit will beat their dolls black and blue for the sort of offences that they themselves commit. The splitting of the ego, which I spoke of above, makes

it possible for a child to abreact his aggressiveness not only upon his dolls or upon other objects but also upon himself. The severity towards our own self which we call conscience is indeed nothing but a turning back of our sadism upon our own ego.

We have already discussed the narcissistic pleasure which a child obtains from its identification with a command. To this we may now add that by falling in with the command the child becomes more like the adult and that anything that diminishes the gap between the two of them soothes the injury suffered by the child's narcissism. In order to be like adults, children will put up with the boredom of being good, will consent to dress in uncomfortable clothes—in short, will think anything in the world desirable merely because it forms part of the adults' system of life. This narcissistic advantage still further increases the conservative way in which, as I have already remarked, a child clings to a command when once he has obeyed it. Incidentally, this conservatism is also a good method by which to abreact his aggressiveness. In every nursery we can see the way in which from time to time the adults become the slaves of their own commands. There is no one more critical than a child: he perceives the slightest inconsistencies in his parents' behaviour and makes them pay for it.

For instance, a little boy was promised by his father that he would take him for a walk on Sunday. Some visitors came, however, and the promise was forgotten. In the middle of lunch the child suddenly declared in deadly serious tones: 'Daddy tells lies too!' Since obedience (in the present instance the love of truth) is not the result of understanding but of identification, the child knows neither compromise nor consideration. So it can come about that by means of identification a code of laws is established in the child which brings him into a growing opposition to his own parents and that he turns against his parents the commands which he took over from them.

A good example of this is offered by daughters. We may often find that, if a daughter who has been brought up on extremely moral lines discovers that her mother is in fact living in sexual relations with a man, she will either feel a profound contempt for her or pity her as a poor, weak woman who is compelled to humiliate herself. For the severe daughter, by identification with her educative prohibitions, has long ago blotted out of her mind the fact that she herself once had longings for a sexual life and that at all her wishes took the direction of wanting, like her mummy, to be loved by her daddy, to have children and to feed them. Along with all the rest of the commands, she has obeyed the one which told her that a girl must not have such thoughts; but her old grudge reappears in the severity with which she now condemns her mother. In this highly typical case the

mother's behaviour intensifies the child's impulse to identify herself with her commands instead of loving and comprehending. Love is made more difficult by the fact that the mother permits herself what she forbids to the child; and comprehension is wrecked by the contradictory discovery that an adult is quite free to do what in a child is regarded as a piece of naughtiness or even as a sin.

The educational methods adopted determine whether a child identifies itself with the command or with the real parents. In either case the result may be an estrangement between parents and children. If the education is strict, then the child (as in the previous example) will identify himself with the commands and, from the height of his superior self-control, will look down with contemptuous condemnation upon his parents and the whole of adult society. If the pressure of education is less severe, then the child will identify himself with the parents, will do what they do and will come into conflict with the prohibitions and commands which will be constantly insisted upon—even though unsuccessfully—by his wider environment. In that case it will be made impossible for the child to be 'good'. He does everything like his parents and none the less is met with nothing but reproofs. The uncertainty in which such a child finds himself makes love for his parents no less difficult than in a straightforward character formation based upon identification. Here too the final result will be estrangement. A person who has remained under the sway of his instincts will come into conflict with his parents, who preach morality but have given him neither the strength for self-control nor a true freedom.

In this way, then, it comes about that identification itself may in the long run separate children from their parents. The most effective counter-measure is that, in educating a child, we should seek from the very first to work as much as possible upon his reason—in other words, to replace identification, so far as we possibly can, by understanding. This can be achieved in a variety of ways. In the first place, we must give up any attempt at producing records in the direction of early training. For what we gain by that means in rapid adaptation we lose in flexibility of thought. Thus many things which a child of one or two can only accomplish by means of identification can without too much trouble be made intelligible to a child of three or four. Of course we must not imagine that by measures of this kind we can get rid of identification altogether. To begin with, it sets in at a stage long before explanations of any sort are possible, and, in the second place, as we are already aware 'understanding' and 'explaining' are also based upon identification. Nevertheless, we can avoid producing too great a rigidity in identification, too gross a subjugation of the child's ego. If he is not obliged to condemn his

own wish in addition to obeying the educatory command, much less of his aggressiveness towards his parents will be worked into the identification.

Another effective way in which it is possible to avoid blind adaptation based upon identification lies in adults being ready openly to admit, even to quite small children, any occasional mistakes of their own.⁶ We mean, of course, such mistakes as the child himself might make and can himself as a rule detect. Admitting a mistake encourages him to use his powers of criticism and to dare to think for himself. It is instructive to watch a child when a mistake or a piece of ignorance has been admitted to him by his parents. On the one hand he is delighted by the event since it brings him closer to them, but on the other hand he protests against it and insists that they should not make mistakes but should remain omniscient and omnipotent. For if parents too can make mistakes, there is a risk of losing the substitute gratification which the child has tried to achieve by means of identification. A child begins by regarding himself as omnipotent; then, when he is compelled to obey a command, he abandons this omnipotence, but at the same time attributes it to his parents whom, by means of identification, he seeks to resemble.

Numbers of children's sayings prove that in their phantasy nothing is impossible to their parents. Here is one example out of many. A girl of six was refused something she wanted on the ground that her father had no money. The child: 'Then, why don't you make some, Daddy?' The father: 'Only the King can do that.' The child (greatly disappointed): 'But aren't you a King?' The following episode shows how deeply a child's narcissism is injured when it turns out that someone (his father, for instance) with whom he has identified himself is not the most important person in the world. The father was mountaineer-

ing, and the little boy heard on this occasion that someone else and not his father was acting as leader. He found the fact quite incredible and it was hardly possible to make him understand that his father was not always first—the one position that he himself wanted to occupy.

What children so often sigh for—'when I'm grown up'—means, as we all know, 'when I can do everything I want to'. Thus identification is a means by which they seek to recapture their old position of autocracy; and this hope is increased by parents who, while being strict with their children, allow themselves every sort of indulgence. Most parents believe that they are educating their children for the tasks of life by exacting unquestioning obedience and limitless faith from them. But the facts are just the other way, and children are brought into closer contact with reality if they learn that even their parents are neither omnipotent nor infallible.

By way of summary, it may be said that identification never fails to reveal itself as a direct derivative of narcissism. Even though it sometimes looks as though it were a means towards doing without something and making an adaptation, it turns out in the end that it is clinging obstinately to its original aim, the defence of narcissism. In contrast to narcissism, love and understanding are the two factors by whose help we enter into a true relation with reality. From this it follows that in education we must attach the greatest importance to these two motive forces. Capacity to love and understanding (or reason) are the two genuine weapons for the conquest of the external world. For, while through identification we yield to external force by way of a kind of mimicry, love and reason enable us to influence the external world in the direction of our wishes.

⁶ This way of behaving to children agrees precisely with Ferenczi's advice upon the behaviour of analysts in character analyses. He recommends the admission by the analyst of any occasional slips or errors that he may

make as being one of the most valuable helps in the difficult work of demolishing what has become an automatic method of behaving on the part of the patient.

RESULTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC THERAPY¹

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The aim of medical psycho-analysis is the cure of disturbing mental conditions. Most analysts, having in mind the limitless difficulties in estimating human reactions, are sufficiently cautious and honest to promise patients seeking their aid nothing beyond the hope that the method of psycho-analysis and their own skill in applying it will eventually benefit the sufferer. Physicians usually state at the outset that the procedure of psycho-analysis is lengthy and often tedious and

painful and many of them adopt the custom of accepting a patient only conditionally for a week or two in order that they may test the reaction of the patient to the method and probe the depth and complexity of the problem presented. Notwithstanding such protective circumspection the question of results usually attainable through psycho-analytic procedure in the hands of credited psycho-analysts has not been approached until recently with candour or on a wide scale.

¹ Read before the American Psychoanalytic Association, Detroit, May 10, 1943.

Freud, never too optimistic on the topic of therapeusis, in his paper, 'Analyses Terminable and Interminable' (1), published in 1937, has critically examined the factors which are prejudicial to analysis and may cause it to be 'so long drawn out as to be really interminable'. Among recent contributors to the subject of results have been Hinsie (2), Knight (3), Wall and Hamilton (4), and myself (5). The book of Glover, *The Technique of Psycho-Analysis* (6), also based on questionnaire replies, is concerned more with problems implied in its title. It considers principally such topics as the timing, depth and amount of interpretation, the handling of anxiety, the reconstruction and recovery of memories, forced phantasy, methods of dealing with transference, etc., which only by implication involve results. The results of orthodox psycho-analytic procedure and its more or less formal derivatives are also frequently mentioned, challenged and compared with other psychotherapeutic measures in the recent report of the Council on Brief Psychotherapy (7).

Many truly gratifying results have been achieved by formal psycho-analysis in cases where no other method of approach has succeeded and where sustained effort over many years has been finally rewarded by cure. There are other instances where the formal psycho-analytic method, although applied only over brief periods of time, produced rapid and stable therapeutic alleviation beyond the expectations ever claimed for the method. Within the past year such an extraordinary success has fallen to my lot in a case where gastro-intestinal symptoms for which the patient had been on a strict and limited diet for twenty years and persistent insomnia after coitus during his eighteen years of marriage, etc., disappeared after five months of strictly formal (according to my conceptions) psycho-analysis.

Nevertheless a certain discomfiture in my own experiences, certain doubts about continuing analyses from year to year over many years and certain reflections of cynicism concerning results, gathered from conversations with fellow analysts whom I respected greatly, have kept this aspect of therapy continuously alive in my mind for over twenty-five years. Moreover certain disasters of a psychic nature have befallen my own patients as well as those of others. Similar tragic experiences have not spared analysts themselves either during or subsequent to their own analyses.

The only way to gather information which might throw greater light on the subject and lead to helpful formulations seemed a direct appeal to experienced practising psycho-analysts. Therefore a questionnaire was sent to about twenty-four physicians in all parts of the United States who have had over twenty years' experience in the active practice of psycho-analysis, in the hope that their combined opinions and experience might

prove of value to all. Eighteen replies have been received from this group of older analysts. In addition there were seven replies from younger analysts whose names were chosen at random from the directory of the American Psychoanalytic Association. These latter replies have not been analysed for this presentation but a careful reading does not reveal any great variation in the attitude on all questions from those here presented.

The questions were so framed as to allow great latitude and the replies have been extremely gratifying. Many of the respondents expressed a personal satisfaction which they themselves had gained from preparing their replies, because for the first time many of them actually devoted themselves to an estimate of their own results and to an examination of ideas concerning therapy of which they had been vaguely cognizant for many years. The replies to questions varied from being categorically negative or positive to long, carefully considered reflections which in some cases developed into short papers on certain topics.

In order to reflect the views expressed as accurately as possible I shall report each under the heading of the original question.

QUESTION I. *Roughly what percentage of your patients in the last two years have been treated previously by psycho-analysis? By other psychiatric therapy?*

It has been the experience of many psychoanalysts to be the second, third or fourth physician to attempt to cure a patient whose problem validly seemed to fall within the province of psycho-analysis. Certainly there could be no better criterion that the patient was considered suitable for analysis than the fact that competent analysts had successively undertaken to treat him. The replies to this question varied widely from only 5 per cent. of previously treated patients to 80 per cent. reported by three analysts.

One of the analysts giving a high percentage is recognized as one of the leading exponents of psycho-analysis and may well have been chosen as a final resort by persons who had been disappointed with previous results. Another figure of 80 per cent. came from a physician who conducts a sanatorium where patients who had had unsatisfactory results with psycho-analysis were finally admitted. One reply listed 80 per cent. of patients who had been treated by 'physicians who think they know something of psychotherapy'. This latter physician, however, reported that only 10 per cent. of his cases had been 'actually psycho-analysed' in the sense in which he regards psycho-analysis.

Apparently the psychogenic nature of the disorders had been frequently recognized and as high as 30 per cent. of the patients previously treated with psychotherapeutic methods is reported by one physician. Another states that in 20 per cent. of

his cases the patients had had treatment for their illnesses by non-psychotherapeutic methods.

It is quite possible that the high percentage of cases previously treated by analysis, averaging about 30 per cent. for all the replies, may be due to the age and experience of the analysts. This is indicated in one instance where the physician believes that his total of 70 per cent. previously treated by psycho-analysts principally, but also by other psychiatric methods, is due to his long experience and a predilection he has for treating psychoses.

While these data indicate roughly the extent to which previous treatment has been undertaken, they do not reveal how long or how deep the psycho-analytic therapy had been. However, repeated and successive analyses must have the effect of weakening the hope and faith of the patient, his family and the general public in the treatment, and perhaps by reflection affect the confidence of the analyst himself in the method as such. Sometimes at the beginning of the second or third analysis the current analyst may entertain flattering conceptions regarding his own skill as compared with that of his predecessor but sooner or later he is apt to meet the same insurmountable obstacles. These usually concern a locked balance between drives and cultural patterns and ideals, an inveterate, even if unconscious, feeling of security in the gain through illness, or external situations so inextricably interwoven with the psychic structure that a situation of stagnation repeats itself in each subsequent analysis. Such situations involve a proportion of chronic psycho-analytic patients. Eventually preoccupation with and indulgence in analytic dynamics, sanctioned by the analysis, replace less acceptable forms of previous auto-erotic and auto-plastic activities.

QUESTION II. *What percentage of cases in the past two years have discontinued analysis after two months of treatment when you would have preferred to have continued the treatment? Reasons for discontinuation.*

The group of re-analysed patients just mentioned must come, in the main, from those discontinuing treatment for one reason or another when the physician thought that the patient would profit from further analysis. To be sure, a patient may from time to time discontinue because of purely external reasons, such as moving to another locality, the death of the analyst, lack of funds for treatment, or because of the opposition of a person who is paying for the treatment rather than the primary resistances of the patient. While such reasons may at times be realistic, they are usually also rationalistic and the physician recognizes them as a manifestation of a negative, defensive transference or one in which the positive transference of the patient had been extremely painful and difficult for the patient to bear. The physician

may have been long aware of such conscious dissatisfactions and the unconscious resistances but may have been entirely powerless to change them before they achieved their aims.

An interesting discrepancy seemed to be apparent between the replies just mentioned of the percentage of cases which had been previously analysed and the percentage of cases who discontinued analysis within the past two years. While, as we have seen in some cases, the patients who had been previously analysed reached as high as 80 per cent. in the practice of several analysts, the number who were reported as discontinued was so low that they were not worked out in percentage terms.

Three out of eighteen analysts reported no patients as having discontinued; six reported one patient; others did not know or thought that whenever their patients discontinued they were forced to do so by external circumstances; one physician reported three patients (two for external reasons) and another recorded four. Possibly some cases which ceased treatment with the consent of the analyst sought additional treatment elsewhere. Obviously most of the cases which needed re-analysis or further analysis came from other analysts than those answering the questionnaire.

One reason mentioned, really inherent in the method of psycho-analysis, which may have been responsible for cessation of treatment, was the excitation of excessive anxiety which then became too uncomfortable for the patient, or the emphasis which the analyst allowed to fall too quickly on anxiety-laden problems. Occasionally discontinuation is reported as occurring at the suggestion of the analyst or when the analyst 'did not regret it'. Among examples of patients reported who did discontinue was one of the 'orally demanding' type and another was a case of drug addiction.

One of the participants recorded in detail four cases who had discontinued analysis contrary to his hopes. He mentions specifically one instance of a physician with an extremely rigid personality and feelings of unreality. He had been in analysis for four years because of a severe compulsion neurosis associated with marked depression and feelings of inadequacy. Some softening of the patient's extremely stern and bitter attitude towards life did occur, but he became discouraged by the extremely slow progress and discontinued treatment.

The second case concerned a woman of thirty-five who had attempted analysis with this analyst previously during her first marriage and ceased after about six months. She subsequently divorced her first husband and married again. In her second marriage the same set of neurotic symptoms recurred. When the second analysis had reached the point where she saw quite clearly what the abandonment of certain hysterical conversions would mean in her adaptation to life, especially in its economic aspects in relation to her father,

who supported her family, she discontinued abruptly.

The third instance was that of a lawyer who had had analysis by three previous analysts, one of which contacts lasted over two years. The clinical picture presented was a mixed one with marked feelings of depression, many compulsions and phobias, conversion symptoms and a tangled matrimonial history. The patient found himself unable to meet the situation of a separation from his dependence on his mother and invested much of his anxiety on an annoying, intercurrent, mildly crippling physical injury to one of his eyes.

The fourth case was a young woman of twenty who had had two very casual contacts with analysis before she attempted suicide at college. She had come from a disrupted home and had been considerably buffeted about during her childhood. She was suspicious and vacillating, antagonistic to her parents, who both wished her to be treated by psycho-analysis, notwithstanding their own personal differences. The patient, by refusing further analysis, found a way of thwarting both her parents by throwing their worry, that is herself, straight back into their hands.

The above types of discontinuation probably represent situations which have occurred in the practice of every analyst and present problems which the method of psycho-analysis itself may not be in a position to solve to-day, if ever.

QUESTION III. *What percentage of borderline cases treated by psycho-analytic methods, in which maximum results have not been achieved, have avoided hospitalization in mental hospitals?*

Most analysts have treated patients sufficiently ill to give the impression that had they not been treated analytically, hospitalization in a mental hospital might have been necessary. This is particularly true in the so-called borderline cases where the insight of the patient is not too certain, where transference is vacillating, where the neurotic symptom is not well crystallized, where the intelligence is not too keen. It seems likely that this type of patient will come increasingly under the care of psycho-analytically trained psychiatrists, for clear-cut compulsions, phobias and anxiety states are not sufficiently numerous to occupy the time of the ever-increasing number of psycho-analysts. This has been apparent in psycho-analytic institutes for some time where students were often compelled to wait for a considerable period before a case suitable for a control analysis could be found for them.

These borderline cases cannot endure and will not subject themselves to treatment five times a week. However, the psycho-analyst does now and in the future will to an even greater extent care for such disorders and probably will be forced to modify his procedure. Apparently the so-called borderline cases, such as schizoid personality,

persons with mild paranoid trends, mild depressions, constitutional inferiors, at the present time make up the majority of patients in this group avoiding hospitalization. Here again we find wide variations in the number. While one physician reported 66 per cent. might have entered hospitals but for analysis, several physicians had no such cases in their practice. One analyst replied that quite a few had escaped hospitalization but that on the other hand in some patients the 'need for hospitalization had been facilitated through psycho-analysis'.

QUESTION IV. *Do you think that, if the patient has been under psycho-analysis for more than three hundred hours, the treatment should be discontinued or the case submitted to review by another disinterested psycho-analyst? Another psychiatrist?*

Certain personal doubts have been partially responsible for the introduction of this topic, for I have continued to see patients for five years or more three times a week and have encountered cases treated equally long and intensively by other analysts. Many cases in psycho-analysis are seen five hours a week for a year or more. Three hundred hours devoted to a patient with the usual interruptions for vacations is apt to extend over a period of a year and a half. At the end of some such period, chosen arbitrarily as three hundred hours, it might seem well that the situation be reviewed with another physician with or without the knowledge of the patient.

However, it would seem from the replies that most analysts are not favourably disposed to such a proposition. One remarked that three hundred hours in some cases 'is barely enough to cover the diagnostic phase of the analysis' and two remarked that 'many months may be necessary to overcome anxiety'. Frequently it is felt that time is not the element which should determine the initiation of such a consultation but that a cloudiness of the clinical picture or 'disturbing changes not readily accounted for or therapeutically amenable' might warrant reviewing the situation. Many analysts expressed the opinion that it is not so much a question of time as it is of what is being accomplished.

Notwithstanding the preponderance of opinion against submitting a case for review at the end of three hundred hours, some men are not unfavourably disposed to this principle. For instance, one comments that treatment should not be discontinued but that it would be well if both the doctor and the patient consulted a disinterested psycho-analyst. Two others believe that it depends on the nature of the case and on whether the analyst feels that no progress has been made. It seems to me that this attitude begs the question for it leaves the interested analyst as the judge of his own work. The analyst's opinion in regard to progress may

have become focussed in a specific direction or on a particular problem to the neglect of equally or more important phases which another physician might readily detect. Other analysts are favourably disposed to consultation for 'considerations other than number of hours' and that 'discontinuation and change of analyst might be advantageous after two hundred hours' and that there 'may of course be definite reasons for initiating a review'.

One contributor thought that a change of analyst always made it difficult for the second analyst—a possibility already mentioned in the discussion of repeated analyses (Question I). This analyst felt that the 'threat of a change has a similar effect' to actual change on the analytic situation. Nevertheless such predicaments continue to occur with the most recent and carefully trained analysts.

For example, about five years ago the family of a very intelligent young woman insisted that her recently graduated woman analyst should consult with me because the patient had grown definitely worse after five months of treatment. Because of the transference situation and the family's opposition to the female analyst, I suggested a change. By this time the patient required hospitalization and spent several months in a psychiatric hospital. On her discharge she was referred to one of the most competent of the recently graduated analysts. After three years of treatment (four times a week) the family again requested a consultation and I again saw the mother and spoke with the analyst. After reviewing the situation I recommended that the patient should continue analysis. About a month ago I inquired of the analyst how the case, now in its fifth year, was progressing. He replied that they had reached the point where sexuality could be discussed without arousing overwhelming anxiety in the patient. The analyst thought that in this instance the review of the case rather benefited than harmed the analytic as well as the external situation.

One of the obvious obstacles to the estimate of a psycho-analyst's work is the fact that he necessarily treats his patient without the presence of any outside observer. Another point still undetermined is the advantage of very intensive analysis in all cases. I have previously pointed out that it has never been definitely investigated whether long continued and deep analyses are more productive of permanent cure than those of shorter duration and perhaps not quite so penetrating (). In case a review is instituted, the consultant would have the alternatives of advising a complete cessation of analysis, a change of analysts, continuation with the same analyst or a temporary interruption and subsequent continuation with the same analyst.

If the concept of review became accepted and customary, it could certainly not be considered as a reflection on the capacity of the analyst and it

seems quite likely that little harm to the analytic situation would result. Indeed the adoption of the custom that the analyst himself should be analysed has reflected favourably upon the analyst and his efforts rather than created the impression that the analyst himself is untrustworthy because he may have suffered from a neurosis or even more serious mental illness.

QUESTION V. *Do you believe in tapering off treatment?*

In most therapeutic procedures, including psychiatric, it is the practice for the physician to see his patient frequently during the acute phase of illness and gradually to decrease the number of visits or treatments as the disorder comes under control. By prolonging and at the same time diminishing the contact with his patient the physician is in a position to determine how thoroughly his therapy has taken effect, how well the patient appears and cares for himself independently of his aid. Having entered psycho-analytic therapy some thirty years ago with no other pattern as a guide than that of general medicine and psychiatry, I adopted this procedure of decreasing gradually the number of hours per week I saw a patient and have seen no good reason to change. It seemed a logical safeguard for testing the rapidity and strength with which resistances re-formed, the anxiety reappeared and transference varied.

However, it has been the practice of many analysts to see patients five times a week for two or three hundred hours and then terminate abruptly and decisively. The replies are almost equally divided on this point also. One of the objections mentioned is that the free intervals allow resistance to form again. On the other hand an equal number of men state that they 'always diminish the number of visits as the patient is adjusting better'. One recommends tapering off especially in borderline cases such as mild schizophrenia. Another says 'preferably' and another follows the practice 'unless the patient chooses otherwise'.

QUESTION VI. *What are your criteria for terminating a psycho-analysis?*

Here we have relatively more complete agreement than on other questions. The most frequently and consistently expressed criteria were that the patient must be able to accept freely his sexuality, become free in his social relations and not be disturbed in his work. Very much in this same class of satisfactory adjustment to the reality situation are such criteria as that the patient must be able to do 'what he could not do before—anything less is not a cure', and be 'able to stand on his feet with a growing sense of independence and security'. This general concept is expressed by one of the contributors in a triad—

understanding of the factors, especially the unconscious ones, accountable for the presenting symptoms or situation; the disappearance of the incapacitating presenting symptom; and an acceptance, physiological and psychological, of heterosexuality. One analyst leaves the termination to the patient.

Only one reply mentions specifically the term 'analytic solution', although it is implied by many in such expressions as 'the solution of the internal conflict'. One of the respondents, formulating his reply in dynamic terms, feels that the childhood transference relationship recedes into the background and unless this has occurred permanent success is doubtful and also that there must have been substantial working through of the Oedipus constellation.

QUESTION VII. *Do you distinguish in estimating your results between theoretical success (satisfactory analytic solution of the patient's difficulties) and a satisfactory adjustment of the patient to his disturbing reality situation?*

Generally speaking contributors were equally divided on this question. One man stated 'positively' and several others 'yes', because not every ego is able to perform the dynamic changes required by the treatment—that is, to overcome the conservative tendencies of the drives. Those who make no distinction maintain that in a theoretical solution where a patient has an intellectual grasp but has not acquired the necessary wherewithal for dealing with it, the case must be considered a complete failure. Others feel that it is not possible to imagine a theoretical success without practical results, for the two are so intimately related. Others feel that the only criterion is the ability of the patient to adjust himself to the situation—'a better adjustment, so that the patient recognizes it as such, gives the analyst the right to call the treatment successful'.

A quotation which seems to cover many phases of this question is the following: 'I make a distinction between the degree in which the patient is satisfied and the degree in which I myself am satisfied. In the minority of the cases the treatment is finished after two to three years of analysis with both the patient and myself being satisfied.'

Yet it must occur in many analyses that a patient has achieved a practical success—that is, has been relieved of his most distressing symptoms—but that the structure of the disorder with recovery of infantile memories has not been worked out, to say nothing of being worked through.

QUESTION VIII. *With which type of case have you achieved the most satisfactory results (cure of basic conflict through psycho-analytic treatment)?*

On none of the questions did the opinions vary as widely as on this one. Indeed among all of the

eighteen replies no two were very similar, which indicates that individual men must have special talents or predilections for dealing with certain types of cases. Practically every form of mental deviation, short of full-fledged psychoses, is mentioned as being best suited for psycho-analytic success.

To start with, one man states that his success lies mainly with compulsion neuroses and two others mention that they have had rather good results with some compulsion neurotics. Another has fared 'better with symptom neuroses than character neuroses, with hysterical types than with compulsion or psychotic types, with regressive types rather than with disturbances in development types'. Another replies that 'it depends not upon the type of case but upon the strength of the ego'. Still another succeeds best in 'acute neuroses from actual social circumstances'.

Another physician mentions phobias and hysterics as favourable for the best cures, but at the same time indicates that 'borderline cases as a group have shown gratifying improvement'. Another feels that the best prospects are 'patients whom the average man or woman would consider, to begin with, decent human beings—clinically, patients with a good ego'. Another's success lies with 'reactive expressions of depression, fear, panic and suspicion'.

In direct contradiction to the experience of a colleague already quoted, another states that 'chronic compulsives have a bad outlook but phobias may be helped'. However, this same man has had satisfactory and unsatisfactory results in all types of cases and he has come to the conclusion that 'he does not know' which type of case will do well. Another, who says that he has had his best results with anxiety neuroses and anxiety hysterics, feels 'that patients with unescapable anxiety are in the best situation for successful analyses'. Another has had greater success with homosexuality and certain types of perversion and another with 'the transference neuroses'.

On the other hand one analyst feels that it depends on the ego, the plasticity of the individual and environmental conditions, rather than on the diagnosis. Another specifically mentions that he can see no tangible effects after eighteen months with one homosexual and one criminal psychopath. Finally one man asserts that 'all neuroses are alike and all are mixed, therefore his practice is limited to mixed neuroses'.

This seems to me to have a good deal of merit, for I have seldom seen a clear-cut case of any form of neurosis and in most of the conditions which apply for treatment one finds a mixture of symptoms and the labelling of the condition would often depend on the particular phase, depressive, compulsive, conversion, schizoid, which is accentuated by the physician. At times I am inclined to think that classification has little value except as a means

for superficially conveying the general scope of the patient's disorder.

Aside from the tremendous variation and disagreement in estimates of these eighteen experienced analysts, all members of the American Psychoanalytic Association, in the chances for effective treatment in various types of neurotic illness, it has seemed to me that at certain periods of their careers analysts prefer to treat different types of patients. This is either because their interests change or because temporarily they have more success with certain types because of their changing interest. This may be the clue to the wide divergence in some of the successful combinations reported above.

Retrospectively it seems to me that in the earlier days of my work I treated far more young people between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five than in later years when my practice has consisted to a large extent of middle-aged persons. Unconsciously the analyst chooses his patients as the patient chooses the analyst.

SUMMARY

(1) About 30 per cent. of all cases at present under active treatment by experienced analysts have had previous analyses.

(2) Except in the practice of two contributors, very few cases are reported as discontinuing analyses against the wish of the analyst.

(3) Hospitalization has been avoided by many patients through psycho-analytic treatment, but the percentage seems to depend very largely upon the character of the individual analyst's practice. One physician whose practice consisted largely of borderline cases places this percentage as high as 66 per cent.

(4) The majority of physicians do not approve of review of the analytic situation on the basis of time alone but a strong minority approve the principle of review for manifold reasons.

(5) About half do not approve of tapering off treatment but the other half practise it, especially in the so-called borderline cases.

(6) Most agreement existed in the criteria for terminating analyses. The principal points mentioned were the capacity of the patient to accept sexuality, better social adjustment and understanding of the mechanisms responsible for the development of the presenting situation.

(7) The contributors were equally divided between distinguishing theoretical success and a satisfactory practical result. Here the replies were vague and often coloured by the analyst's theoretical inclinations.

(8) In the question of the type of case with which the individual analyst had achieved the greatest success there was practically no unison.

This summary may disclose nothing new or unexpected to many analysts. It may merely

confirm what they have long suspected—namely, great disagreement, dissimilarity and disparity of thought on really critical questions among matured psycho-analysts who have been more or less sobered and subdued by countless experiences with the struggles and dilemmas peculiar to psycho-analytic treatment. Still, the extraordinary degree of individualism of analysts in procedure and results may exceed previous supposition. The great divergence exposed may be taken as an indication that the psycho-analytic method can have no fixed application, as pointed out by Dr. Alexander in the concluding remarks of a report of the Council on Brief Psychotherapy. (7)

Dissatisfaction with attempts to apply psycho-analysis inflexibly may account for the endless modifications in technique and theory which are continuously proposed. Sometimes these changes appear to be so slight as to represent a mere shift of emphasis to certain points which seem to have best met the subjective needs and slants of their proponents. Among these may be mentioned Jung, Adler, Stekel and Rank in the earlier period of psycho-analysis and later Ferenczi, after years of close association and harmony with Freud's theory and practice. It may also account for the many deflections which have occurred since Freud's death in the formation of new groups. Each of these innovators seems to be striving unconsciously to attain a personal reassurance, which he seeks to make universal, in modified approaches for what may be a fundamental if still undeterminable weakness in psycho-analytic therapeutic potentialities.

A second type of inference may be gathered from the replies affecting the question of the preparatory instruction of the students in the practice of psycho-analysis. We may well inquire whether a too restricted preparation in psycho-analytic theory is desirable—whether a thorough acquaintance not only with Freud's theories but with their modifications should not be imperative in our institutes. In this way the student may be placed in a position subsequently to develop along lines which may not be in accord with strict Freudian theory and practice. Unconsciously he will favour certain deviations in technique or philosophy because they are well adapted to his personality and psychological leanings.

In response to a questionnaire on the point of quoting the participants by name, the replies showed the same wide variation as on all other points. In deference to those opposing the use of their names, all quotations have been anonymous. In conclusion, may I express my thanks to these unnamed analysts who have supplied the basic material contained in this presentation? Here I am sure is one point in which this psycho-analytic audience will be unanimous and join me in an expression of appreciation to these colleagues for their joint contribution to this critique of intricate,

still moot, issues of psycho-analytic practice and its results.

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WORK AND THE INSTINCTS¹

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In our analytical practice disturbances of working capacity come next in importance to disturbances of sexuality. Although we have to deal extensively with disturbances of work, the question of what work is is not treated as a problem. We look upon work as an obvious necessity, the mastering of which is a proof of perfect adaptation to reality, whereas disturbances are considered as disorders of the libidinal economy.

Yet it has often proved useful to investigate established concepts as though they were unsolved questions. In our case the question is: What does work mean? In order to find an answer we may first ask: What do we work for?—to which the simplest reply is: In order to earn our living. If this is the case, can we call work a necessity? As a rule, yes. The fact that some people have an independent income as a result of their own former work or of the work of others does not contradict this rule; and the same applies to those who depend on the work of relatives or friends. Thus we may truly say that man is forced to work.

It is further generally accepted that the concept of work can only be used in connection with adults. This may be a hint that it would be well worth while to analyse the concept. The chief part of an adult's activity is undoubtedly directed towards his work. A child is not concerned with what a grown-up regards as his most important activity—although the child is in no way less active than the adult. How, then, do children use their activity?

Let us take as an example one of the first and most important activities of the toddler: learning to walk. At a stage which is physiologically determined by a certain development of its bones, muscles and nerves, the child begins spontaneously to try its first steps. Encouragement and support from those around it do not play a decisive part. The miracle takes place in accordance with the formula: the existence of an organ determines its function.

Let us examine the process. Once the child manages to stand on its feet, it begins to make

unco-ordinated movements—without definite aim or purpose—trying to keep its balance. After it has succeeded in learning this, it begins to rush about in a wild and hasty manner, and whoever is looking after it may find it difficult to keep pace. But soon it learns to master its movements on its own, and is able to reach the outstretched arms of its mother or some other goal. Thus a new stage is reached. With triumphant satisfaction the child lands safely at whatever port it may be bound for.

If we watch the first efforts at walking, we can distinguish two definitely different elements: pleasure in the movement itself, given and terminated by it, and in addition pleasure obtained from fulfilling a set task, the joy that, through motion, something else, completely independent of the spirit of the movement, is being reached. What we have just described as pleasure in moving as such is already known to us from Freud's *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* as auto-erotic pleasure. Every organ is an erotogenic zone, every function is coupled with auto-erotic pleasure. The sucking child shows us the erotogenic quality of the lip zone and the auto-erotic pleasure of sucking—apart from the usual association of that zone with the nutritional instinct. The child learning to walk shows us that one of the most important ego-functions is originally a game, dominated by auto-erotism. The meaning of walking as an ego-function, however, is recognizable in the pleasure of the child in reaching port—a pleasure definitely different in its quality from the auto-erotic one.

In the life of the adult walking mainly serves a purpose—we walk in order to reach a destination—while walking for pleasure plays only a minor part. The reverse is the case in the child's life. For instance, any walk towards a destination will be transformed by the child into mere play. It runs to and fro, backwards and forwards, like a puppy, and this game will protect it from getting bored or tired. It may be that it would be possible to find some interpretation for this game; but the important fact for our present investigation is that an

¹ First read, in German, before the Fifteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Paris, 1938.

activity which serves a purpose is transformed into a game yielding auto-erotic pleasure.

What we have tried to show by this example applies to all infantile occupations: their aim is—much more than with adults—the occupation itself. Infantile activity is subject to the pleasure principle, whereas that of the adult has to obey the reality principle. We call play what children do in order to enjoy themselves, we call work what adults do in order to earn their living—though this statement may seem rather banal. But to return to our problem. Walking is not play, but an ego-activity, important for both child and adult. In studying it we have found two different qualities, belonging to both child and adult although the proportions in the two cases are different. The first is the pleasure in the activity itself, an auto-erotic impulse and its gratification. The second is the joy of achievement, which lies outside the activity itself. This second quality is related to the main feature of an adult's work. The adult's work does not take place merely for the sake of the activity itself, but in order to obtain something else. Here also the gratification lies outside the activity itself.

If we examine infantile activities up to school age, we shall find that all of them have the character of playing. Eating, walking, looking, talking—all these important ego-activities are performed as pleasurable games much more than is the case with adults. But, in spite of all this, we must not overlook the fact that the child already feels an impulse to perform useful, purposeful activities, as, for instance, to help with the housework. It is the deep desire of every small child to assist with the cleaning, washing or nursing of other children, and the child obviously takes its part quite seriously. It is true, indeed, that in doing so, the child follows its impulse of imitation, identifying itself with the adult and thus building up its personality; but this explanation is not exhaustive. It is quite clear that what matters is not simply the pleasure in the activity but the fact of achievement.

It may seem strange that the child should not mind taking pains and putting up with trouble and even small injuries, and should voluntarily forgo the pleasure principle. The force of reality or the acceptance of real necessities, which, we may presume, urge adults to work, do not exist for the child. The outside world is merely concerned with the manner in which the child is occupied or with prohibiting certain activities, but is not concerned with encouraging it to work. This brings us to the conclusion that there must be a hidden instinct behind work. I only want to mention this here, but I shall discuss the question at greater length later on. Let us return meanwhile to the child's activities.

We have to ask ourselves whether the child's play has not an unconscious meaning, which must be interpreted first of all. Before answering this

question we should study the different kinds of play. Of certain games we may say that they are merely auto-erotic activities with no content at all. At three months the baby begins to play about with its hands, laughing and enjoying itself. This is a wonderful game with no content. There are many such games, and they are kept up all through life. Very often they become over-determined, built into more complex structures, but the prevalence of the auto-erotic nucleus will always be recognized by its resistance to any therapeutic influence. Smoking, for instance, is a typical example. We have thus recognized one important category of games as an expression of auto-erotic satisfactions. Another category of games may be regarded as the gratification and discharge of component instincts. This second category forms the most important part of the child's play, starting approximately in the second year and serving to act out in an imitative and identificatory manner everything that appeals to the child's instincts. All the events of every-day life will be reproduced: repetition of nursery or street scenes alternating with building and constructing games or with games of destruction. The latter are generally the main topics of this period. Starting with the simple production of loud noises (drumming, knocking, etc.), a complicated system of all kinds of aggressive games (such as games of shooting, of hunting, of soldiers and of policemen) will gradually be developed. All these games have content and objects. The manifest content may cover all that is meant by these games; the objects are chosen incidentally as they may turn up any day at haphazard, sometimes as representatives of a whole category: a brave hunter, a postman, a policeman. A little boy may play quite happily at driving a car; he may make one person into a traffic-policeman, and may run over someone else. This game may be repeated again and again, or interrupted in favour of another. It may have been one of those games that need or admit of no further interpretation. The fact that the child while playing obtains auto-erotic pleasure from moving, that in the policeman it copies the admired homosexual ideal, that in running over someone it is acting out its aggressive tendencies, disguising them by means of an accident, explains the function of the game but is not an interpretation of its unconscious content. But the same little boy may one day play at cutting up bits of paper. He is eagerly absorbed in this rather poor game, which is not of a kind usual to this vivacious and active boy. He says: 'It is getting smaller and smaller', and repeats the game on the following day. The auto-erotic pleasure in this game is not substantial nor can we talk of a discharge of aggressive impulses towards the paper. But the game is easily explained by the fact that the boy had seen his father in the bathroom that morning, had watched his father's penis and asked questions. I deliber-

ately choose an uncomplicated example of a game that needs interpretation. Most games of this third category however are more complicated, full both of aggression and of material from the Œdipus complex, and they are most interesting and important in relation to infantile neuroses.

This same child may extend the game of driving cars to the doctor and hospital game. By asking questions he picks up a good deal of knowledge, and learns one day how to dress a wound. He achieves some ability, so that eventually he can help a play-fellow who has cut his finger while the teacher is absent. The compensation of being needed and useful makes up for the disappointment of the interrupted game. To be praised for what he has done is an additional stimulus, not the actual motive. Can this still be called play? It may look like play, but that is not the essential factor, which is the wish to be useful: the satisfaction is gained from the successful attempt at self-preservation.

It is apparent that the motive of training plays an increasing part in further development. A similar motive is the desire to learn something. This motive will be the dominating principle throughout school and adolescence—under certain conditions even longer. Training and learning are a preparation for future work. The principal difference between learning and play is the fact that learning is not done for its own sake, but is devoted to another purpose. That purpose is the development of an ability to cope with reality. Direction and content are supplied by the outside world, while in play it is instinct that gives the direction and supplies the content. These instincts, to put the matter clearly, are the pregenital ones. Play is built up on pregenital erotism, i.e. on auto-erotic and component instincts, and it serves: (1) to express objectless auto-erotism, (2) to gratify or discharge component instincts that are already directed towards objects and the outside world, such as the scopophilic instinct, exhibitionism, sadism, possessiveness, curiosity, or the instinct to know, (3) to represent and discharge all those instincts and impulses which in ordinary circumstances will not come into consciousness in their essential forms. Thus by means of play the child deals with its pregenital instincts, and eventually learns to master portions of reality. To deal with the instinct is the moving impulse also in those games which serve the purpose of defence against instincts: for instance, when a dirty little boy, who was soiling walls yesterday, to-day starts anxiously tidying up the disorder caused by pussy. Both gratifications and defence against instincts, or rather, adaptation of the instincts to the different ways of expressing and discharging them, searching for possibilities of carrying them into action—that is the essence of the game. The fundamental feature of play is, that it is gratifying in itself, without serving any other purpose than that of instinctual gratification.

We may say that the pregenital organization of the sexual instincts has its parallel in the play organization of the ego-activities.

During the climax of infantile sexuality, genital sexuality will appear in the phallic organization, only to be repressed in due course. At the same time the component instincts will be tamed and sublimated. Supported by a 'Hinterland' of sexual instincts that have in this way been pacified, the child turns towards the outside world to an increasing extent, led by identifications, encouraged by rewards in the form of love, but obviously obeying an internal urge. Abilities which had been acquired during the playing age as an incidental by-product are now deliberately trained, in order to cope with a task, with a competition or with an examination. Knowledge—acquired by a whim or by chance in the pregenital phase of infantile sexual exploration—is now acquired systematically and painstakingly even at the expense of the pleasure principle. Playing, of course, will not be given up altogether. It will be retained, on the one hand, for its own sake—even adults play at chess, tennis, etc.—while, on the other hand, it will remain the best and most helpful form and method of learning. The discovery that has been made by modern education of making children learn by playing means that pregenital instinctual gratifications are used instead of force as a means of learning. The more instinctual gratification is permitted—such as enjoyment of movement, rhythm, shapes and colours, or of answers given to spontaneous questions prompted by the knowledge-instinct—the less force will be needed. This means that pregenital instinctual gratification and ego effort form, so to say, a complementary series.

It follows from the very nature of learning, however, that even in the best education not everything can be done without effort. The playing child is directed by its instincts, which are expressed by the ego in play. Reality, as far as it is enjoyable, is used as an imitable pattern. The learning child has to acknowledge reality in its true meaning as a dynamic opponent, has to accept its lead wherever the way goes, and this is not always towards pleasure. Thus learning is undertaken not merely as pleasure in itself, but for a purpose; and that purpose is to acquire knowledge and to enlarge the ego by the introjection of the outside world, a process partly pleasurable, partly strenuous. Since it is learning that constitutes the essential activity of the school-child, we are justified in saying that the latency period of the sexual instincts has a parallel in the learning organization of the ego activities.

Everyone will acknowledge the fact that a child often takes great pains over doing its school-work. We sometimes say of the learning child that it is working very hard, but this expression will always be used in a metaphorical sense. To learn—however hard it may be done—is not to work. As I

have said before, to learn means to introject the outside world. To work is the active effort of the ego, enriched during the period of learning, to get from the outside world whatever is needed for self-preservation. In the period of learning the playing child develops into the adult who works for his living. This development is characteristic of human beings, a new feature in the animal kingdom. Food will be captured or collected by the animal in a way which is essentially a form of playing. The component instincts, enjoyment of movement and cruelty, sometimes with the addition of the collecting impulse, are sufficient for the mastery of this task. The activity of finding food is pleasurable in itself. (Let me recall a cat playing with a mouse.) But man has to find the necessities of life in a way which need not be pleasurable in itself but which is undertaken for the purpose of self-preservation.

Freud has drawn our attention to the fact that human sexual development—unlike that of other animals—falls into two periods. The animal reaches its adult stage without the interpolation of a latency period. Nor is there any essential change in its ego-activities. The baby animal learns to run, to jump, to fly in play, in the same way in which the grown-up animal will capture or collect its food. The higher and more complicated development of the apparatus of consciousness, which enables man to transform the outside world for his aims, finds its complement in the arrest of genital development, the latency period being interpolated between the phallic phase and full genital organization. During latency the sexual instincts, and particularly the component instincts, are transformed in a way which allows an activity of the ego essentially different from the purely impulsive ones.

Just as the various pregenital instincts seek to find pleasure independently of each other, so the different kinds of play will be performed on independent lines. The same applies to learning. The child who has just pretended to be the kind Father Christmas will play at bloodthirsty Indians with equal intensity. Peaceful building games will alternate with fits of destructive games. In the same way the different subjects of learning and knowledge will be introjected independently of each other, without contradiction; mythology as well as science, geometry as well as poetry.

Not until the adult stage is reached do the component instincts and auto-erotism converge in genital primacy and in object choice. In the same way and at the same time the different ego-activities converge in the primacy of work and in the choice of a profession. It is a criterion of a man's being grown-up that work shall be his most important activity—and work includes everything that serves the end of self-preservation. Work can even bring about enjoyment derived from sublimated auto-erotisms and component instincts, just as can playing and learning. But indirectly—

acting by means of the conscious mind—another force, that of self-preservation, will be added to them. Play is an aim in itself, work is the agent of self-preservation. Component instincts and auto-erotic activities seek pleasure with no ulterior consequences; genital activity is the agent of procreation. The genital organization of the sexual instincts has a parallel in the work-organization of the ego-instincts.

The complementary series which we found in the case of learning is of course also applicable to working. The ego effort will be the less, the more pregenital instinctual energies are being used. The more these now sublimated forces succeed in ranging themselves in the purposeful structure of work, the stronger will be the basis of work in the adult's life. During childhood the search for finding pleasure plays the same part which in adult life is taken by ability, talent or inclination. It is all the more important to bear this in mind when choosing a profession, since a good chance for sublimation in work gives a better resistance against frustrations in love, such as occur in the life of everyone. This draws our attention to the question whether increased achievement is effected by the sublimation of sexuality in the sense of genital sexuality. One is tempted to regard the creative impulse as a sublimation of genital sexuality, but it would seem rather to be the phenomenon which corresponds, in the field of the ego-instincts, to the instinct of procreation. The impulse to create is in reality a synonym for working, but, as is usually the case with synonyms, one which is full of information as to its deeper meaning. We may say that in the animal the component instincts fulfil the tasks of self-preservation and preservation of the species without the formation of a work primacy or genital primacy; whereas in man the component instincts, sublimated during latency, are subsumed, on the one hand, into the productive impulse of creation and, on the other hand, into the productive instinct of procreation—which are only other terms for work primacy and genital primacy.

It seems to me to be problematical whether genital sexuality can be sublimated directly so as to serve as a dynamic force for other activities. It certainly acts as a promoting force to work: in the ideal case work and genital sexuality have a stimulating influence on each other, healthy sexual life increases the enjoyment of work, successful work encourages sexual life. Whereas if there is a displacement of repressed genital energies, as happens when work is cathected with unconscious genital phantasies, these energies threaten to grow into disturbances of production. But these considerations are already leading us to the problem of disturbances of working capacity, which I hope to deal with in a separate paper.

I should like now to deal with a few practical questions. In accordance with what has been said

before, we have to differentiate three principles of activity: the principle of playing, the principle of learning and the principle of working. The principle of playing means that what is done, is done for its own sake: gratification lies in the activity itself. The principle of working means that an action is not undertaken for its own sake, but for some other purpose, serving the ends of self-preservation: gratification lies not in the action as such, but in obtaining something by means of it. Between these two we find the principle of learning, which means that the activity does not serve self-preservation directly, but is a means of acquiring the ability for it.

For the normal adult the principle of working is the primary motive for any activity. This does not mean that the adult does nothing but work, nor does the child of school-age restrict its activity exclusively to learning. Sports, travelling, hobbies of all kinds, reading, enjoyment of art, play an important part in the life of the normal adult. Though these occupations differ enough between themselves, they yet have one trait in common: they give pleasure and are done for the sake of this pleasure. They are subject to the principle of playing. Pleasure in movement, exhibitionism, curiosity, the instinct to know, joy in colours, shapes and sounds, the pleasure taken in collecting and possessing, are gratified by these activities. Instinctual energies are thus discharged which are not used up by work and sexual activity. These energies we recognize as the pregenital forces—with their help the ego builds up the hobbies of the adult. Some of these hobbies, it may be said, serve the purpose of keeping fit—like sport for instance—or improve education—like travelling—and are therefore in the service of self-preservation. But these benefits, if they are not merely rationalizations, are only by-products. If travelling is actually devoted to collecting scientific material, or sport to correcting physical deficiency, then they can no longer be called hobbies. They have become training or work in our sense of the words.

This shows us that it is the purpose and not the content which marks an activity as play or as work. Nor is the effort which is needed the decisive factor. Mountaineering may be more exhausting than the climber's ordinary work—but we call it a sport or a hobby and range it in the category of playing. The guide's activity, though it is identical or even less exhausting, must be called work. The tennis professional or the stamp-dealer makes a profession out of what is usually a hobby. In the same way, hard work can be done for the sake of physical exercise, as wood-cutting, gardening and so on.

A question of particular interest is artistic production. In the individual case it is easy to decide whether it is hobby or work. But, beyond this, there is the great problem of what art in general is. It is not devoted to self-preservation and yet it is

one of the most important interests of mankind. With this question of artistic production, however, I hope to deal on some other occasion.

My thesis that work is devoted to self-preservation must not be applied too narrowly. The explorer who publishes the result of his efforts is entitled to talk of work, even if he has not gained any financial benefit—but if he were to keep his wonderful results to himself, his efforts would remain chiefly a study, if not merely a hobby. Charitable work, if serving a true need, is work, even when it is done voluntarily. We see that the point is not necessarily to serve one's individual preservation. It is work as long as it is done for the benefit of a certain number of people, or of a group joined in a common aim, or of mankind generally. It is striking how human beings long for work, even if there is no financial necessity for it. They will look for some task—for welfare work, for instance, or anything that is regarded as useful work by the community.

It is not always easy to find such work. We therefore often observe that people who are not forced to work for their living suffer from discontent, boredom and lack of confidence in their own powers. The best-known examples are the children of wealthy parents. The feeling of freedom, independence and security depends on the ability to guarantee one's existence by one's own achievements. Wherever the dynamic force of the instinct of self-preservation is not transformed into life-supporting work, it will be turned into fear. To put it shortly, relief from fear is a consequence of the natural and essential function of work.

In early childhood the instinct of self-preservation shows itself in protective and adjusting mechanisms, besides the vegetative ones. Active functions meant to guarantee self-preservation are not needed by the child. They are not needed because of the care taken by its parents. We may say that the child's instinct of self-preservation is represented by the child's efforts to keep its parents' love: the sexual instincts and the ego instincts are closely interwoven. Man begins his life under the domain of the pleasure-seeking instincts, tied to another human being. Very slowly and unwillingly he learns to acknowledge the fact of his individual isolation. The sexual instinct is, perhaps, the more powerful and everlasting principle, out of which the instinct of self-preservation is gradually differentiated—just as Freud has hinted at the possibility of regarding the individual as an appendage to its germ-plasm, the mortal bearer of a—possibly—immortal substance. The differentiation begins early, passes through the storms of puberty, and is completed in the adult. Work, through the formation of the super-ego, takes over the inheritance of parental care.

An adult who is deprived of his work, his profession, loses the essential condition of being an

adult. He is made dependent on others once again, as he was in early childhood. But the loving parents who were at his willing service are there no longer. In their place he finds a hostile reality, refusing milk and protection, indifferent at the

best. If the loss of work or profession leads to the outbreak of a serious neurosis, this happens along the path of a forced regression, wholly in accordance with the libidinal ætiology of neurosis.

THEORY, PRACTICE AND PUBLIC RELATIONS¹

By MARJORIE BRIERLEY, READING

The formulation of psycho-analytic theory and the practice of therapy began together. A reciprocal relationship continues to exist between them because the consulting-room remains our principal laboratory. This close association has many advantages, but it is not by any means easy to keep the partners on a footing of equality.

Most of us earn our living by practice and this fact of itself tends to overweight our interest in problems of technique and therapy. The result is that we too often think of theory chiefly as a necessary background and adjuvant to practice. The number of Members spontaneously interested in theory is limited by comparison with those primarily interested in its therapeutic or other practical application. Probably many of us regard the current series of Special Scientific Discussions² as an unfortunate necessity in more than one sense. Nevertheless, we are by constitution a scientific society and not merely a trade union of practitioners. If we wish to further the science of psycho-analysis, to increase our knowledge of mental life so as continually to widen the range of its potential application, we must recognize that the development and advance of sound theory is as important as the maintenance and extension of sound practice. We cannot afford to give one aim preference over the other but must pursue them concurrently.

There will, inevitably, always be a certain division of labour amongst us. The chief means of verification employed in other sciences are not available to us because we cannot perform controlled experiments and the analytic situation can only be standardized to a point far short of uniformity. We cannot repeat experiments with any degree of precision, and intensive examination offers no immunity from error due to individual bias. An important method of checking error due to subjective bias that we can use is the comparative method. What we can do and should do more continuously is to compare our own clinical findings with those of other analysts. We should also make a habit of checking theory, old and new, by our own experience. Such comparative methods as these offer the most hope of controlling errors due to individual subjective bias.

It is not easy to combine research with therapeutic practice, and it may take years to come to a conclusion on any given issue. Individual testing is a communal responsibility to which, as a group, we are not sufficiently alive and which we do not stress enough in our training of Candidates. We shoulder our therapeutic responsibilities but sometimes ignore our research tasks, individual responsibility for research not being generally recognized. Our notions about theory, its nature and functions, are often confused and inaccurate.

What then is theory? How do research and therapy differ and how are they related? Theory is, in essence, simply intelligent explanation. A scientific theory is an explanation based upon adequate evidence which indicates the relationships existing among the data it covers. A science is an organization of knowledge covering a particular range of facts with their most probable explanations, so far as these have been arrived at. Scientific research is the orderly pursuit of knowledge. Scientific methods are simply rigorous procedures of reality-testing, designed to ensure the maximum of probability and the minimum of error.

In our own case, technique began as a method of therapy and has proved to be an instrument of psychological research. Theory began as psychopathology—strictly speaking, as a psychopathology of hysteria. Apart from its ramifications into other special fields, psycho-analytic theory has become a general psychology, a theory of mental life as a whole.

Although our sphere of interest is mental life and our methods are adapted to this sphere, the thinking which issues in psycho-analytic knowledge is the same kind of mental activity as the thinking about chemical data which issues in knowledge of chemistry. The principles of cognition work in the same way and produce a similar result whatever the data to which they are applied. The result of their working is that mental construction we call knowledge.

For the thinker, the activity of thinking is a mode of living; the conclusions he reaches form part of his experience and modify his future thinking. But, objectively considered, knowledge

¹ Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, January 19, 1944.

² [Now being held in the British Psycho-Analytical

Society, for the consideration of theoretical differences of opinion.]

is not life, it is only a system of information about something, e.g. about mental life. Theorizing is intellectual creation, but a theory is a work of science in the same sense that a picture is a work of art. Knowledge is as much a mental tool as the array of physical tools man has been so prolific in devising to further his human ends.

The subjective and objective functions of knowledge are apparent in clinical practice. The process of analysis is not primarily a process of instruction; it is a process of mental reorganization. Interpretations are not voiced with the aim of teaching but of enabling the patient to become aware of his own subjective problems and to deal with them in such a way that he becomes capable of more tolerable and more effective living. The acquisition of insight is a part of the total process of reorganization, and such objective knowledge about himself as the patient gains he can, thereafter, use to greater or lesser advantage. The analyst's theoretical preconceptions will help to determine the way in which he apprehends his patient's situation. He will, also, deliberately use his knowledge in assessing his impressions and in formulating his interpretations.

The ultimate aim of analysis as a therapeutic process is to enable the patient to live more satisfactorily. As a process of research, the ultimate aim of analysis is different. It is simply the acquisition of knowledge about mental life, the fashioning and improvement of a tool which can then be used to promote living.

Therapy and research have in common the proximate aim of understanding the patient. The term understanding can be used in a purely intellectual sense, as of understanding a problem in mathematics. When we talk of understanding a patient, however, we generally mean something more than intellectual apprehension of what he is saying. We imply that we are capable not only of thinking about the patient but of thinking and feeling with him enough to enter, at least partially, into his emotional attitudes. This situation we describe as empathy and we think it comes about when our own unconscious and that of the patient are *en rapport*.

We have, as yet, little exact knowledge about empathy or *rappor*t, but it is evident that feeling with the patient implies a type of relationship more akin to identification than to object-relationship. Thinking about the patient is clearly object-relationship. I imagine that we vary greatly in the degree to which we individually combine identification and object-relationship in our work, but I do not see how any of us can avoid sustaining both these relationships in some proportion. It is this combination or alternation of relationship to our patients that is all too often reflected in confused thinking about theory.

The two kinds of relationship underlie the distinction I recently ventured to draw between

subjective and objective theory. Both alike are formulated from the data of experience. Subjective theory deals with the data from the standpoint of the living person and should, therefore, express itself in terms belonging to experience. For subjective theory 'I' is appropriately rendered 'self'. It is, in short, a psychology of meaning in the widest sense of that word. On the other hand, objective theory deals with the same data from the standpoint of a temporarily detached observer. Since its approach is essentially impersonal, it should express itself in impersonal language. For objective theory 'I' is the 'ego'. It is, in effect, a psychology of mental function. What is experienced as meaning can be objectively described as a functional integration of mental processes. There may be only one event, the psychological event, but there are very definitely two distinct methods of approaching and describing it. The results of both approaches have to be correlated, and can be used to correct each other. At our present stage of thinking development, the distinction between them is readily lost and we should gain by choosing words which help to keep the difference clear.

Subjective theory is of particular importance not only in therapy but in all forms of work that involve direct contact with individuals or groups. In these fields what is required is not primarily objective knowledge of the mental apparatus but understanding of the individual's personal situation. To be of real service in human affairs knowledge must be applied with personal understanding, and it would seem that this is a feature of that elusive characteristic we call wisdom.

If understanding is so important and generalization about personal experience so helpful in dealing with problems of everyday living, why should we trouble about pursuing objective knowledge with a view to establishing highly abstract general laws of mental function? Has the conception of mind as an apparatus for the regulation of instinct tension, or that of mental structure as organization, any practical as distinct from intellectual value? Is abstract thinking a luxury for those who like it, a flight into de-personalized phantasy, or is it a practical necessity and useful work?

In my opinion, abstract thinking is just as necessary in psychology as in any other branch of science. It could ultimately be just as fruitful in improving the psychological conditions as it has been in improving the physical conditions of human life. As we all know, the improvement in human living conditions that is now physically possible is jeopardized by psychological factors.

Advance in the natural sciences has come about in divers ways, sometimes almost by accident. It is a fact, however, that the application of science, e.g. in industry, has extended further and faster since the more fundamental laws of physics, chemistry and biology were recognized. Until general laws are established, suitable applications

cannot be predicted but must wait upon trial and error, a method which may be successful but is always wasteful. When fundamental laws are known, some probable applications can be deduced from these laws and others can be eliminated as impossible. The need for wasteful trial and error is at least diminished.

Let us take a simple example from our own practice. We do not advise an hysterical woman to marry in order to see if this may cure her. We know in advance that it cannot cure her because we have learned that hysteria is a psychological disorder, and that she can only profit fully by marriage as and when she becomes at least convalescent. This knowledge about hysteria derives in the first instance from Freud's discovery of the mental mechanism of repression. This he inferred, partly, from the nature of the patient's associations but, mainly, from observed alteration in behaviour, the retardation or cessation of associations, the first phenomena of resistance which he encountered. Phenomena connected with resistance are experienced and the results of repression can be felt in various ways. It is also true that the operation of repression can be indicated by means of what we usually term functional symbolism. A patient of mine who could hardly force herself to speak at all, dreamed about a door locked on the inside. But repression itself is never a part of experience; it is silent. I do not doubt that the locked door also had historical meaning; other evidence suggested that a 'primal scene' took place in a room locked from inside. But we should never have understood the dynamic effects of repressed memories if Freud had not first provided us with the objective concept of repression as an explanation of the phenomena of resistance.

If I may summarize this section of my paper I submit that, whether we like it or not, we all have research responsibilities. We evade these unless we pay due attention to the theoretical implications of our own clinical data. We are ill-advised, as scientists, if we concentrate exclusively on the treatment of our patients. I submit, also, that there is nothing intrinsically mysterious or alarming about theory which is only the system of probable explanations. Theory aims at stating the general laws which can be deduced from the specific clinical data. Correct observation of data is the first step. We have reason to think that, in our own case, accurate observation is not a purely intellectual process but also a matter of correct empathy. Once our observations are registered, objective or abstract thinking about their general implications has an indispensable rôle to play both in advancing knowledge itself and in facilitating its application.

Before considering the part which I think our general theory could already play in our public relations, particularly with other sciences, I should

like to try to make our notions of abstract thinking rather more precise by indicating something of what we surmise about its genesis. This will involve reference to the vexed question of psychological reality.

Abstract thinking is no less subjectively determined than perception and the risk that it will be dominated by unconscious preconceptions is, perhaps, even greater than in perceptual thinking. For this reason alone, constant reference to and checking of hypotheses by data is imperative. The form of any hypothesis is always influenced by unconscious determinants, since we can only apprehend things in ways permitted by the specific structure of our individual minds. The fact remains, however, that the objective truth of any hypothesis does not depend upon its subjective conditioning but upon its fitness to explain the facts it covers. Naturally, the more we become aware of the unconscious determinants of our own thinking the better chance we have of estimating how far our preferred conceptions are likely to correspond to the facts. We all have some coefficient of personal error which we cannot eliminate, and it is much safer to assume that one's own coefficient of error is high rather than low, and positively dangerous to forget that it exists.

We consider abstract thinking to be among the most recently evolved functions of the human mind. We assume that it has a long history behind it and that it is still far from fully matured. It is true, as Susan Isaacs reminded us, that words are all concepts in as much as they are all generalizations. But concepts vary in degree of abstraction, in much the same way as displacements of instinct vary in remoteness from its primary aims. The statement that apples fall to the ground is a true generalization, but it is a long way from this generalization from perceptual experience to Newton's concept of gravitation.

If we consider the development of human intelligence, in the individual or in the race, we think of an ascent from sensation through perception to imaginary and verbal thinking and all the various grades of generalization.

Cognition, however, does not develop independently: its growth is an integral part of mental development as a whole. We may disagree about subsequent chronology, but we agree, I think, in assuming that the infant's mental life is at first purely sensory-affective and that any discrimination it evinces is dictated solely by pleasure and pain. We also agree that primitive me-ness is bound up with pleasure identification and primitive not-me-ness with pain repudiation. Broadly speaking, functional phases in the mental development of the individual may represent stages in the evolution of mind. The transition described by Freud from the pleasure-pain to the reality principle is easier to understand if one thinks of it as perhaps representing a transition from an

archaic to a more modern type of mental adaptation. The transition appears to involve the advance from identification to object-relationship and from affective to cognitive discrimination.

Such a point of view indicates a genetic link between object-relationship and cognition. It emphasizes the primary rôle of cognition, i.e. the provision of more detailed information about the external world than is afforded by pleasure-pain discrimination. Most of this information is mediated to the adult by his long-distance receptors and, in consequence perhaps, we are inclined to overlook the part played by the other senses in the development of cognition. This genetic link forces the way of knowledge to be a way of detachment. When we bring our intelligence to bear on ourselves and our mental life, we are constrained to treat them as if they were temporarily external objects.

The transition to the reality principle is never complete and it is not only the sexual instinct which tends to remain under the sway of the pleasure principle. Cognition undoubtedly plays a highly significant part in ego development through the establishment of manifold relations with the outer world which are, in their turn, reflected in ego structure. The dynamics of ego organization nevertheless appear to be fundamentally the dynamics of pleasure-synthesis and pain-dissociation. Ego modification is, therefore, a consequence of feeling rather than of knowing. Repressed memories are recovered when the resistance to feeling their unpleasant affects is overcome.

The difference between knowing and being is the difference between intellectual knowledge and character structure. Ernest Jones (1) lately reminded us how often our behaviour is superstitious. Outgrown habits of thought that formerly had emotional value for the individual may continue to influence his conduct indefinitely, and the adult sceptic frequently behaves like a believer.

The direction of cognition to the scientific study of mental life is the newest and probably the most difficult use to which we have put our intelligence. It has become a truism that our own conscious experience is the only reality of which we have direct, first-hand awareness. This truism is accepted by us because our minds have attained the stage of development which allows us to appreciate that our perceptions are not identical with the sources which stimulate them through our sense organs. We can now recognize that perceptions are reports on the environment; they supply the kind of information about the external world we need to have in order to survive. This was not a truism to primitive man nor is it to the human infant. For primitive man it was presumably very much more important to distinguish correctly between friend and foe than to differentiate between his perception and the person of whose presence it informed him.

The distinction between perception and its external object has come to have potential survival value for civilized man. Perception, as experienced, retains its pristine subjective conviction that what we see is there as we see it. This self-evident character persists in spite of the fact that we know that information supplied by perception is highly selective and can, on occasion, be positively incorrect. By refusing to take perception at its face value and by devising means of correcting and supplementing the evidence of their senses the natural scientists have acquired an impressive amount of knowledge about the physical universe. To achieve an equivalent knowledge of mind we must take a critical attitude towards all the phenomena of subjective experience. Freud soon found that consciousness was as inadequate a guide to the structure of mind as perception is to the structure of matter. Clearly we must detach ourselves from experience and think objectively if we are to penetrate beyond its face value and form adequate conceptions about mind. When we try to think we find that emotional attachment constantly impedes intellectual detachment: in other words we discover the limitations imposed on us by the structure of our minds.

We must now go on to deal with the question of psychological reality. Instinct and perception are both border-line concepts. We do not accord psychological reality either to the instinct stimulus or to the sensory stimulus; we accord it to all the mental responses activated by these stimuli and to all the endopsychic determinants of these responses. We find, moreover, that the psyche is not chaotic but is an ordered cosmos whose structure and laws we endeavour to infer from the data of subjective experience.

Our criterion of psychological reality is essentially dynamic. Whether we think of the psyche subjectively as an integration of experience or, objectively, as an organization of component systems of mental processes, we maintain that everything which can be shown to modify experience or organization is psychologically real. We understand, for instance, that we must accord equal psychological reality to hallucinations and to perceptions. As far as the mind itself is concerned, these differ only in their *provenance*: hallucination is a response to current instinct and endopsychic stimuli, whereas perception is a response to a current sensory stimulus.

So far no difficulty arises. We tend to become confused when we realize that, in the face of these strictly psychological considerations, we remain convinced that there is a sense in which perception is more real than hallucination. We judge rightly that perception is more consonant with the actual situation of the individual in his immediate environment. What we accord to perception is the higher survival value of correct orientation

towards the outer world. We can only avoid mental confusion if we remember that the criterion by which we judge perception to be more valid than hallucination is a criterion, not of psychological dynamism, but of biological or psycho-biological adaptation.

In grading psychological realities by psycho-biological criteria we see mind in functional perspective. We agree that psychological theory should be expressed in strictly psychological terms, because, apart from all other considerations, this rule works. Nevertheless, as scientists, our approach to psychology is fundamentally biological. We consider mind to be a product of evolution and the human being to be a unity, a psycho-physical organism whose mental functions have come to be his chief instrument of adaptation. We regard mind as the mediator between instinct and environment. This rôle of mediation has led not merely to a vast increase in the range and plasticity of human motor responses, including the mental motility we call thinking, but to the progressive development of ways and means of endopsychic adaptation. The complexity of our mental organization is now so great that we may say that human beings have definite psychological in addition to basic organic needs. Man cannot live without bread but he can no longer live fully by bread alone. It seems not improbable that all those human needs frequently called spiritual will, in course of time, be generally recognized as psychological needs.

It was not too difficult for the rationalists to show that many religious beliefs and dogmas were not corroborated by the findings of natural science. In the first flush of pride in the achievements of human reason it never occurred to them that they were dealing only with the most superficial manifestations of profound needs which religion at least had appeased. We know more now about the intricate organization of the psyche. Although the argument from design does not convince us of the objective existence of God, it does induce in us a more becoming intellectual humility. We can appreciate that those who ascribe the modern chaos of human values to the break-down of religion are not without some justification. The remedy they suggest, however, a return to obsolete dogma and ritual, seems to us on a level with recommending a return to hand industry as a cure for the social evils of industrial civilization. We need to discover how to live without the comfort of illusion and how to create new systems of value based on more realistic conceptions of our psychological necessities.

The enquiring mind runs special risks in exploring the bases of animism and religion. This is the region in which the desire to know is at all times liable to be squeezed out by pressure from both id and super-ego directions, and to be replaced by quite other drives. After all, our

psychological reality sense is larval by comparison with our more efficient but still highly imperfect environmental reality sense.

We can use our psycho-biological criteria of adaptation or survival value as a measure of consonance not only with external reality but with instinctual and endopsychic demands. We can say, for instance, that endopsychic adaptation is the more biologically realistic, the more adequately it evaluates the relation of instinct to its object. By this standard, also, hallucination is unrealistic because it reports instinct satisfaction, although what actually exists is instinct deprivation. The method of resolving ambivalence by idealization and denigration is also biologically unrealistic because the idealized object is held to be far more satisfactory than it is in fact and the denigrated object far more dangerous and frustrating. This method is employed by all of us to some extent but is none the less archaic. It is a commonplace that a major source of difficulty in adaptation is the persistence of methods of defence which have outgrown their utility and ceased to have current survival value.

At the present day it is an open question whether the human race has not now lost more than it may originally have gained by super-ego differentiation. We cannot suddenly undo the consequences of numberless years of evolution, but we may hope to learn how to supplement the deficiencies in what we may call our psychological reality sense. The life value of any given endopsychic adaptation can only be determined by psycho-biological criteria. Happiness is a psychological aim which can be attained in pathological euphoria, but it can only be reached and maintained with any degree of security when psycho-biological adaptation is effective, i.e. when instinct is achieving adequate direct or indirect satisfaction in relation to the outer world.

Let me conclude with a brief reference to our public relations. The implications of psycho-analysis are so wide that these public relations are necessarily many-sided. Hitherto, we have concerned ourselves mainly with relations with the lay public and with 'applied' professional groups. These latter include medicine, in particular psychiatry and the other branches of medical psychology, education, and such mixed groups as child guidance and delinquency. We are dissatisfied with the present condition of these relations and are considering how to improve them. An aspect of public relations that has been comparatively neglected is that with other 'pure' sciences. This is a sphere that will become increasingly important to us as scientists; indeed, I am inclined to think the time has come when we should pay far more attention to this particular problem. The need for more adequate co-operation among all sciences bearing directly on human life problems is urgent,

and continued isolationism can only render them, individually and collectively, less effective than the older established sciences that have already profoundly influenced our environmental conditions.

In regard to the lay public we are in a similar position to any other specialists. We can disseminate knowledge of psycho-analysis in as simple a form as possible; we can also discuss the bearing of psycho-analytic findings on matters of current interest and indicate potential applications. One practical hint which works is probably more convincing to the layman than volumes of simplified theory. In many fields we do not yet possess the detailed knowledge which would enable us to give practical advice.

Relations with the lay public and with other professional groups involve a certain amount of general theory but, on the whole, they involve a much higher proportion of 'applied' as distinct from 'pure' science. Psychopathology is a kind of halfway house between 'applied' and 'pure' science although our psychopathology is even more closely interwoven with our general theory than medical pathology is with physiology. It is our 'pure' psychology, our general theory of mind, which is most likely to serve as a bridge between psycho-analysis and the 'pure' sciences and which has most to offer towards the eventual unification of scientific psychology.

To speak of the unification of psychology at this date may seem ironical and futile: nowhere is the infinite variety of the human mind better illustrated than in the multiplicity of current psychologies. But let us look for a moment at conditions in sciences such as physics or biology which have achieved some degree of coherence. How, and in what respect are they unified? As a rule we find general agreement about data. We also find agreement at the point farthest from the initial data, i.e. in the general principles which provide the most comprehensive cover for the data. In between the data and the general principles there are often differences of opinion and rival hypotheses. For instance, all physicists subscribe to that fundamental view of the universe which they call the energy concept. But there are two theories regarding the nature of light, the quantum and the wave theory. Each was deduced from experimental data and each provides an adequate explanation of its own data. I understand that there is, as yet, no overriding hypothesis which either reconciles the two or indicates which is the more correct. All biologists subscribe to the theory of evolution, but there are many and diverse views as to the mechanism of the process.

Such differences do not disturb the unity of the sciences as a whole, partly because there is agreement about data and general principles, but mainly because the differences resolve themselves as knowledge progresses. A striking example of

the reconciliation of previously rival concepts has just occurred in neuro-physiology. Hitherto, the transmission of impulses across synapses was held to be either a chemical or an electro-motive phenomenon. It has now been discovered that acetylcholine metabolism is intrinsically connected with the electrical changes occurring everywhere at the neuronal surface (2).

In Freud's dynamic and economic theories and in his view of mental life as progressive organization of mental processes, we already have concepts as general and as comprehensive as the energy concept in physics or the concept of evolution in biology. The importance of this to our public relations lies in the fact that notions of this kind are not limited to psycho-analysis. Fundamentally comparable ideas are present in brain physiology and in some other schools of psychology. To give only one or two examples. Progressive organization and integration are the key to all Sherrington's thinking about brain and mind. The concept of organization is central to the Gestalt school. Head's concept of a 'postural schema' seems to have had a stimulating influence on the thought of Bartlett and Wolters (3). Current views about mental schemata are, in some respects, very close indeed to our ideas of component mental systems.

In short, I am inclined to think that the basic principles which will some day unify psychology are already in being, though not yet recognized as such. This is, of course, only a personal judgement which may be wrong. What seems to me less open to doubt, and of more immediate importance, is the use we can make of those aspects of our theory which are not limited to us. In these general notions of organization of mental process and the correlated ideas of integration and differentiation, synthesis and dissociation, we have, in my opinion, our most likely and convenient means of improving our relations with other 'pure' sciences.

The language of our general theory is a language more familiar to other scientists than is the private jargon that serves us very well but is often both abhorrent and meaningless to them. The better they understand and appreciate the quality of our general theory, the more respect they are likely to acquire for our more detailed hypotheses and for the hitherto suspect research technique by which we have arrived at them. It is, perhaps, surprising how little the significance of modern psycho-analytic theory appears to be appreciated by non-analysts, however well-informed they may be of Freud's earlier work. For instance, the equation of the unconscious with the repressed is still widely current. Even Sherrington, who is so up-to-date in other respects and who recognizes Freud's work as a great advance in the study of mind, writes of 'the unconscious of Freud which is only temporarily unconscious and has been conscious once and may be again' (4).

I will end with a question. If unity in other

sciences permits and even fosters differences of opinion why has psycho-analysis a marked tendency to fission? No dilemma in science is potentially insoluble, because science does not create facts, it creates knowledge about pre-existent facts. All the facts are there but we only become aware of them by degrees as research uncovers them. Personal equations, however, do sometimes prove insoluble. It is certainly more difficult to retain a scientific attitude towards psychology than towards physics. This is more true of psycho-analysis than of any other branch of psychology, for the simple reason that the farther we penetrate into the maze of unconscious life the more likely we are to lose a strictly realistic approach. For example, it is easy to understand that one can scarcely recognize, much less assess, a type of anxiety of which one cannot tolerate awareness in oneself. It is much less easy to appreciate the persuasive influence that one's preferred method of dealing with a specific anxiety will exert upon one's apprehension of it. Inability to tolerate psychological realism is one reason among many others for the continued multiplication of psycho-analysis by fission. Persuasion by the structure of one's own mind is another incentive to turn a personal solution into a new school. Both these factors appear to have operated in the case of Jung,

Adler and Rank, down to Horney and Fromm. To my mind, there would have been room in psycho-analysis for every positive contribution that could have been made by any of these dissidents if they had retained their sense of proportion and adhered to a strictly scientific approach.

Should we not then relate our tendency to fission to the immaturity and present limitation of our psychological reality sense? May we not hope that it will tend to disappear as we become increasingly capable of maintaining a strictly scientific approach to the study of our mental life?

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ON THE CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS¹

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The words 'psychological health' and 'psychological illness' play a considerable rôle in both scientific and pre-scientific medical literature. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion at times that a much too vague and many-sided use is made of them. No special apology is therefore needed if we propose to submit these concepts to a logical examination. Such a proceeding may not be very customary in medical literature, but we may hope through an explicit conceptual analysis to remedy a deficiency and to make of scientific language an instrument better adapted to the purposes of research. In any case, the concepts of 'psychological health' and 'psychological illness' seem to me to need and to deserve special investigation.

THE CONCEPT OF ILLNESS AS USED IN GENETICS²

I believe that a considerable number of the concepts which we need for the description of bodily and psychological health and illness are to be found already minted in the science of genetics.

Students of the mechanisms of heredity have found themselves obliged to pay careful attention to the *variability* of the forms and functions of the organism. As they encountered specially pronounced variations from the average in hereditary illnesses, whose mode of inheritance could often be traced more clearly than that of less conspicuous variations, they evolved a concept of 'illness' which seems to me of use outside the range of their particular purposes.

For our purposes we need to introduce the concepts of the 'reaction norm' ['*Reaktionsnorm*'] and the 'phenotype'.

The sum total of the characters which an organism displays at any given time composes its phenotype.³ We should call two animals 'phenotypically identical' if they were identical in all their characters. Of course, we never have occasion to do so. Animals and men alike only resemble one another in a limited number of characteristics, whether that number is great or

¹ Translated by Vivian Ogilvie.

² I shall not interrupt the argument with many quotations and references. The literature which I have used or to which I want to refer the reader is given at the end of this paper.

³ It is obvious that this term can be used to cover the

behaviour of an animal at any given moment, as well as such things as its shape or colour. The course of an animal's reflex reactions in response to a stimulus is just as much a phenotypic character as the fact that its fur is thick or thin, its eyes blue or brown, and that its tear glands secrete a certain regular quantity of lachrymal fluid.

small. We have learnt to account for this, in part, by the varying *conditions* under which they live. For instance, a snapdragon blossoms red in one temperature and white in another; in other words, its colour phenotype changes with certain variations of temperature. *But which colour the flower takes on at a particular temperature is a fundamental characteristic of the species to which the plant belongs.* We can work out a formula which enables us to foretell what colour the flower will have in different circumstances. Such a formula obviously has the character of what is called a law of nature. This kind of biological law is what we call a *reaction norm*—in our example, the reaction norm of the snapdragon in respect of bloom colour. The researches of Gregor Mendel, and the science of genetics which he founded, have taught us that these reaction norms are passed on to later generations in any reproduction in a 'pure' line. We have also learnt to forecast the way in which the reaction norms will be inherited in cases of hybridization. For the purposes of the present study we can, I think, do without the concept of the 'genotype'. It will suffice to say that there is a close correlation between what is called in genetics the reaction norm and what is called in cytology the genotype, i.e. the characteristics of the cellular nuclear substance which determine the reaction norm. All we need to note here is the fact that every organism possesses a certain reaction norm for each of its characters (colour, size, etc.) and that its phenotype corresponds to its reaction to a certain environment.

(The correspondence between a plant's colour on the one hand and its colour reaction norm on the other may be of a complicated kind. For example, the flowers of two snapdragons may have the same colour because they have the same colour reaction norm and blossomed under the same environmental conditions. Or, while having the same colour reaction norm, they may produce differently coloured blooms, because they grew in different temperatures. Again, if their colour reaction norms are different, they may nevertheless produce blooms of the same colour, because they grew in different temperatures, but in such temperatures that each, following its own reaction norm, blossomed, shall we say, red. The plant with a reaction norm A might blossom white at 10° and red at 20°; the plant with a reaction norm B might blossom red at 10° and white at 20°. If I cultivated A at 20° and B at 10°, both would bear red flowers.)

The description of any kind of plant, animal or human being, when couched in this terminology, may sound peculiar against a background of everyday language. One would have much the same impression if, for the first time, one heard a physicist describing in his professional jargon what we commonly call a table: a certain number of varying terms (indicating, for instance, weight,

volume, index of refraction, electrical charge, etc.) would be assigned in a certain order to a certain spatio-temporal area. And these terms would have the character of 'functors', i.e. instead of qualitative expressions they would comprise numbers. For instance, the temperature centigrade at point 5 at time t is + 14. If one knows how to read these formulæ and also knows what a table is, one can deduce from the distribution of these terms when and where there was a table, what its characteristics were and how they have changed.

It is much the same when an animal is described in terms of the totality of its reaction norms. The description will be very different from one given in everyday language, such as the *Concise Oxford Dictionary's* definition of the word 'owl': 'kinds of large-headed small-faced hook-beaked large-eyed soft-plumaged nocturnal bird of prey', or of the word 'goat': 'hardy lively wanton strong-smelling usually horned and bearded ruminant quadruped.'

The completeness of a biological description of an organism, e.g. a human being, in the exact terminology of current biology will be measured by the exactness of the information about the reaction norms of its morphological, physiological and psychological characteristics. The information would be complete, were we in a position to state how the organism would look and behave if it grew and lived under such and such environmental conditions. We should have to be able to deduce from its known reaction norms what phenotype to expect at every point of time in a given environment.

(Here we must note a striking difference from the descriptions of bodies which are given in physics. Even in the exacter terminology of genetics the terms mainly used express quality and form. Numerical measurements are seldom given; they are not required at the stage we have reached in our knowledge of biological laws. In particular, the use made of words describing *Gestalten*—which, in fact, compose the principal vocabulary of morphology—shows that the biologist is more concerned with the constancy of proportions than with the absolute measurements themselves. On the whole, it is enough if we give an approximate description of the form, and there is no need to measure the exact volume, weight, spectral colour, etc.)

It is obviously only in exceptional cases that we can use one single adjective to describe some characteristic of a man throughout his whole life, e.g. 'blue' to describe his eyes. An extreme case of this kind occurs when the reaction norm ordains that, whatever the environmental conditions may be (within, of course, the range of conditions that may be practically expected), the eyes will be blue. In the case of some characters, the reaction norm ordains that they shall only make their appearance at a certain age. Pubic hair, for instance, appears

at a certain age, just as certain component instincts of sex make their first appearance at a certain age and then undergo vicissitudes which stand in a certain relationship to changing age.

The importance of the study of 'identical' twins in establishing how far certain characteristics are dependent on or independent of the environment, is well known. Since the idioplasms, and so the genotypes, of these twins are identical, it is certain that any differences they display result from differences in the circumstances of their lives. And we can therefore take stock of those reaction norms which give rise to the same phenotype however dissimilar the external conditions may be.

Naturally, special attention has been paid to twins with a 'hereditary' illness. For it is a striking fact that twins which have grown up under quite different circumstances have suffered from the same illness and have even begun to suffer at the same age (the 'age of manifestation' of the illness). When it has been said that they suffered from a hereditary illness, what was meant was that the reaction norm transmitted to them by their ancestors was such that, in consequence of it, they would react by developing the same diseased phenotype although the external circumstances were very different—circumstances, too, under which other members of the species with the usual, 'hereditarily healthy' reaction norm would not be disposed to illness of this kind.

An analogous case is that in which an individual, belonging to a species that is not as such immune to a particular infectious illness, exhibits an individual inherited immunity to it. This means that its reaction norm is such that, under circumstances in which its fellows would be infected and fall ill, it does not fall ill.

'Hereditary illness' and immunity are thus nothing more than limiting cases in the series of possible states of illness and health. Hereditary illness is the extreme form of a reaction norm which involves a considerable or general disposition to fall ill under the ordinary circumstances of life; and immunity (in its widest sense) is the extreme form of a reaction norm with little or no disposition to fall ill under these circumstances.

THE CONCEPTS 'ILL' AND 'HEALTHY' IN BIOLOGY AND GENERAL MEDICINE

We have used the word 'ill' a number of times. What exactly do we mean when we say that an organism is 'ill'?

Biologists have been inclined to define illness as a disturbance of the organism's adjustment to its environment.

Now, the concept of 'adjustment' is what is called in logic a concept of relation: 'A is adjusted to B'. Simply to say, 'A is adjusted', as though the word 'adjusted' denoted an attribute or quality, instead of a relation, is a linguistic inexactitude which may have tiresome consequences.

In biology and medicine the word is used in propositions where we say that an organism A appears as adjusted or adjustable to certain environmental conditions B. We then describe the *process* of adjustment in the terminology of our scheme of reaction norms. We say of a human being, for example, that he is adjustable to the variations of temperature which occur 'naturally': that is, his reaction norm is such that he reacts to changes of external temperature (within a given range) without 'illness', without a 'disturbance' of his 'state of health'.

If we now ask what we call the *healthy* state of an organism, and in what direction and what degree an organism must deviate from it if we are to say that it is 'ill', we shall receive several answers. And these answers are definitions or suggestions for a definition.

The number of answers need not surprise us. Words are not always used in the same sense, either in science or in everyday language. As the purpose of description changes, so very often do our verbal instruments of description; and if investigations with several different purposes are being conducted, a word is often used by different specialists to convey different meanings. This is no great misfortune, provided that they and their readers are aware of the differences of usage. It would be a misunderstanding of the 'austerity' which one is accustomed to demand of logic, if one interpreted it in our case as rigorously ruling out the use of words in more than one sense. It is not the business of logic to *prescribe* to language. What we are doing is to *describe*, to tabulate the uses of the words 'healthy' and 'ill'; and we are prepared to find several usages, standing in some relation—simple or complex—to one another.

One of the answers given is this: an organism is healthy if it represents the average type of its species, ill if it deviates from this average; and the degree of deviation takes no account of adjustment to the environment. I doubt whether anyone would be prepared to accept the consequences of this definition. To adopt it would mean that one could not say, 'This man is healthier than the average', for that would be a contradiction. And I for one should not like to surrender the possibility of making such a statement. Nor do I think that a definition of health and illness by reference to the average tallies with either everyday or scientific usage. We shall see, however, that the concept of the average has a certain bearing on other suggested definitions.

The most reasonable definition known to me is that given by F. Lenz. (Baur, Fischer and Lenz, 1931, 144–6.) He says that an organism is adjusted to its environment, 'if its structure and the consequent forms of behaviour secure the *maintenance of life* in that environment.' . . . 'The state of an organism which is living on the margin of its capacity for adjustment is what we mean by *ill*.'

... 'Deviations from the average of the population are unhealthy if they bring down the individual's probability of survival below the average probability.' ... 'Complete health is the state of complete adjustment.'

It is clear, according to this definition, that the average of an animal or human group is healthy; for the healthy individuals stand the best chance of survival and reproduction, and so form the majority.

But (it might be objected) is not the connection between Lenz's third sentence, in which he speaks of the average, and the sentences which precede and follow it, rather obscure? It looks as though the state 'on the margin of the capacity for adjustment' and the state of 'complete adjustment'—in other words, the states of illness and health—were the two ends of a scale, which could very well be established without specially marking the average. Then why is the average mentioned in the definition? On the other hand, since the average is as a rule healthy, the state of adjustment of the average commonly coincides with the state of being healthy. Besides, we are naturally interested in the average and want to mark its place on the scale, even if it were to fall below the level of adjustment of 'complete health'.

Now, what are we to understand by 'complete adjustment'?

It would be easy to answer: complete adjustment occurs when no environmental conditions can harm the life of the organism. Unfortunately we have no opportunity of observing any such impressive state of health on our planet. Organisms are more or less liable to disorder. They find themselves all too easily on the margin of their capacity for adjustment. They grow old and die. We can, of course, picture to ourselves, without any risk of contradiction, what such a state of complete adjustment would be like. Books appear with Utopian descriptions of life on Mars, whose authors manage it comfortably. But it does not seem to occur in our best of all worlds. However, the fact that we often measure an organism's degree of adjustment by this standard of 'complete health', is shown by the complaints many poets have uttered about the 'way of all flesh'. One notices at once how the usage of language has slipped unawares. Lenz—in conformity to scientific usage—means health to be understood as a *state* of the organism at a given time—the state of complete adjustment, complete functional adequacy, in a given environment. And this is something which can often be observed. (There is no need here to amplify the concept of complete functional adequacy. We should have to work out a full inventory of vital functions before we could define what is meant by

their being in unobstructed 'running order'—which is, after all, what Lenz's 'maintenance of life' amounts to.) The common usage of language, on the other hand, understands by 'health' a constitution—in our terminology, a reaction norm—such that 'nothing can happen' to its possessor. This would be more or less equivalent to complete immunity to all the ills of life. (The opposite, as is well known, does occur: a lethal combination of genes.) I do not want to say that this common conception of health is entirely without its uses. It plays a certain part, as an emotional background, in theoretical biology, when the question is discussed whether senescence and death lie in the very nature of life. The question is asked, whether it would utterly contradict the laws of biology for organisms to exist with such a reaction norm that under no environmental conditions would they react by growing old and dying, or at least with such a reaction norm that under a certain configuration of conditions they would not do so. Sometimes the wistful question is raised, whether man's reaction norm itself does not make it possible to create an environment or some sort of medicine, thanks to which he could escape growing old or dying; or at least postpone it and make it painless. People hope that perhaps an elixir of life may be found. Perhaps, they say, we never die a 'natural' death—like flies, which are killed epidemically by a fungus, the *empusa muscæ*, before the winter cold can carry them off. Perhaps it would be possible to remove the waste products of metabolism, which make us grow old and die, before they have caused irreparable damage. It is understandable that people would like to call our natural way of dying when we grow old 'unnatural', and would like to regard any unnatural way of preventing old age and abolishing death as 'in reality' the natural, healthy, dignified and appropriate way for man to live—only, unfortunately, nobody knows the trick.⁴

It is not surprising, therefore, that on the fringe of our language a concept of 'health' should be found which springs from these ideas. As this concept—the product of, so to speak, a pre-conscious stage of thought—is also to be found sometimes in scientific writings, it was worth mentioning here. (To let the point go with such a cursory mention is not easy. For the thought of death has had a profounder influence on the formation of biological concepts than one would like to admit—even in logic.)

I should like to emphasize the obvious fact that 'the' concept of health does not exist *a priori* or as the subject of a revelation. Science had to *choose* it, and we have to follow the usage of science. Like every concept, its introduction into science

⁴ Adjustment is also sometimes measured by comparison with modern technology and its possibilities, as for instance when we say that the normal human eye is very imperfectly adjusted to its tasks. What we mean is that optical

instruments function better in some respect or other. The functioning of the eye is measured against the degree of functional perfection reached by these instruments.

was a matter of decision. A decision of this kind is an act of volition, but it is not arbitrary. Its justification resides in its usefulness. That we define our concepts of health and illness by reference to the probability of survival finds its justification in the fundamental interest which biologists and doctors have in the question whether an organism stands in a state of adjustment in which its vital functions are unimpeded, impeded, or in part or wholly frustrated. This is their field of work, theoretical and practical. In short, they look at the organic world from a therapeutic point of view. And they have created their conceptual instruments accordingly. It is true, however, that they speak less often nowadays of a disturbance of the total adjustment than of a disturbed functioning of single organs.

This comes out clearly when we compare this concept of health with others that are also in everyday and scientific use. Lenz was quite right when he pointed out that childbirth is not usually regarded as a state of 'illness' of the organism, although it can lead to the very limits of the capacity for adjustment. The fact is, we sometimes consider the vital functions of the organism within the framework, not of the individual's state of adjustment, but of that of the species. And so we call a state like childbirth, which may endanger the individual life but helps to maintain the life of the species, healthy; and we call the state of sterility an 'illness' since, although it is not attended by any danger to the individual, it would cut off the life of the species. (All the same, one would feel a distinct uneasiness at hearing a sterile person described as 'ill'. But such a feeling of uneasiness arises from a conflict of concepts.) I should like to add that this interest in the perpetuation of the species calls for no religious or 'racialist' justification. We have very solid 'humane' reasons for being interested that our contemporaries and the next generation shall go on living and working to the benefit of us all—provided, of course, that our civilization is not seeking its own suicide. The perpetuation of the species is an immediate, vital concern of each individual human being and requires no external 'justification' by calling in any 'will of nature', alleged to be pursuing the same aim.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we should come across a concept of health and illness which measures an organism's state of adjustment according to whether it assures, endangers or annihilates the probability of the perpetuation of the species.

Yet another usage of the word 'healthy' and 'ill' can, I think, be identified. It occurs especially in the terminology of medical psychology. We often judge the health or illness of an organism according to whether that organism feels well or feels bad.

It is evident that such a concept of health is closely related to those already described. There exist certain causal relations, often quite simple, between an individual's ability to stand up to life and his sense of well-being. Pain is commonly an indication of illness, and feeling well of health. But, that this concept and the one previously defined are logically independent of each other, comes out clearly once again in certain situations where one has that feeling of uneasiness about the use of words. For example, is an extremely painful neuralgia of the trigeminal nerve a slight illness or a serious one? The patient will be inclined to have a different opinion from his doctor. He feels his well-being distinctly upset; he 'feels very ill'. His doctor is less likely to be disturbed. Now one can choose (after the neuralgia has passed off, I mean) whether to say 'I felt very ill, but wasn't really' or 'I was very ill, although my life was in no sort of danger.' Whichever we choose to say will imply a declaration in favour of a certain usage of the concepts. Again, is a hypochondriac as ill as he thinks? If, when he says he is ill, he means that his condition indicates a very poor chance of going on living, he is usually wrong and had better drop the terminology he is using. But if he means that he feels terrible (and that is what he understands by 'very ill'), who is going to dispute it?

It is clear that we must choose our words very carefully in medical psychology, if we are to make ourselves understood without ambiguity.

CONCERNING THE CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTION AND DYSFUNCTION

It is difficult to escape the impression that many of the authors who, after giving an exposition of biological facts, turn to a description of psychological matters, think that they are changing their subject in a very special way. They seldom recall the biological remarks with which they ushered in their psychological investigations.

A fundamental difference of an 'epistemological' kind is often thought to exist between the propositions of biology and those of psychology. The former are supposed to be objective, like the propositions of physics; the latter are thought to depend for their justification and verification on a special method of proof, usually described with the help of such words as 'subjective', 'empathy', 'direct apprehension'. But if, by the objectivity of a proposition, we mean the logical property of being verifiable in principle by different persons and by means of different senses (regardless of how it was hit upon in the first place), then objectivity must be attributed to the propositions of scientific psychology (and, with it, those of medical psychology).⁵ Or, to use the terminology of logic, the propositions of medical psychology are, in principle, interpersonally and intersensually verifiable and

⁵ I have dealt fully with this question in another paper (1939). I there attempted to prove what I can only assert here.

refutable. In this respect they do not differ from those of biology. In *this* sense, biology and psychology are speaking the same language when they use the words 'healthy' and 'ill'.

I think that, besides the terminological framework, we can also retain the methodological framework of genetics, within which we have conducted our discussion so far. If we think it over, what the theory of heredity has outlined is in fact the framework of *general biology*.

The *reflexological* exposition of the psychological behaviour of animals and men, which we are now going to give, fits perfectly into our scheme of reaction norms. It is also compatible with the views of most of the various schools of psychology, without, at the same time, prejudging any of the issues on which they differ from one another.

Every species has its own particular reactions to given environmental conditions. Among these are the reactions communicated through the central nervous system of mammals. (We shall confine ourselves to mammals here.) The central nervous system plays the part of an intermediary, whose task it is to pick up the stimuli of the external world, transmit them to certain parts of the organism, and release a reaction 'corresponding' to the stimulus: a motor, secretory, respiratory, vasomotor or other change, adjusting the organism to the environmental conditions from which the stimulus has arisen. This particular way of reacting is called a '*reflex*'. We come into the world with a certain number of 'unconditioned' reflexes—reflex reactions to certain external and internal (extero- and proprioceptive) stimuli, all of which are transmitted through the central nervous system. Certain other reflexes make their first appearance after birth, at a later age of manifestation. There is an almost incalculable multiplicity of reactions which are transmitted through the central nervous system and which develop out of the unconditioned reflex reactions through a process of 'conditioning'. This process of conditioning is constantly to be seen in both the natural and the civilized environment of human beings. It opens up a wealth of possibilities of reflex reactions.

Let us sketch a model of such a process. A dog is hungry. If we put some food into his mouth, his salivary glands will begin to secrete digestive juices. This is an unconditioned reflex. By which we mean that a hungry dog, if exposed to this stimulus, will react with this secretion.

If we were to show the same dog a shape, e.g. a triangle, painted on a card, we should see that he perceived it. This slight 'perceiving reaction' would be his only reaction. As far as releasing his salivary secretion is concerned, the triangle would be a completely indifferent stimulus.

But now, if over a considerable period we show the dog this triangle every time he eats, then, after

we have repeated the performance often enough, the sight of the triangle will release the same secretion of saliva that the act of eating released. By this process of 'conditioning' we have created in the dog a new conditioned secretory reflex.

In his natural environment a young dog sees the shape and colour of his food, and smells it as it touches the mucous membrane of his mouth in the act of eating. The appearance and smell thus 'associate' themselves with the taste, by means of a conditioned reflex, and the dog's mouth begins to water as soon as he sees and smells his breakfast. Before long he 'learns' to associate the sight of his master going to the larder with the bringing of food to him, and his appetite is at once excited. If he is very observant, he learns to associate certain words of his master's, or at least their intonation, with food. It is obvious what proportions and significance have been reached among human beings by the process of conditioning through speech sounds—that is to say, language. The formation of such 'secondary', 'tertiary' and further conditioned reflexes follows the same laws as the formation of primary ones. Animals learn to react to remote hints of an event in the same way as to the event itself. In cases like conditioned reflexes of seeking and of flight it is evident how important conditioned reflexes are to animals' and men's capacity for adjustment.

Nevertheless, conditioning does not always lead to favourable adjustment. In both natural and experimental conditioning processes, harmful conditioned reflexes are often developed, which lower the standard of adjustment and even endanger life. I will illustrate this with an example based on a series of experiments carried out by Jerofeewa at the Pavlov Institute. (The reader will be inclined, by the way, to react with pity to the description of the experimental situation in which the dog was placed.) The report of the experiment states:—

'The dog's skin is irritated by a strong electrical current, which evokes in him a violent defence reaction—energetic efforts to protect himself against the destructive effect of the current. He tears himself with all his strength out of the harness, bites into the mechanism through which the irritation is caused, attacks the experimenter, and altogether exhibits the greatest excitement. He does not in the least grow accustomed to the painful irritation. If it is repeated, his defence reaction is only the more violent.

'The painful irritation is next combined several times with the action of eating, an action which otherwise, of course, elicits a favourable reaction. We now observe that the dog's defence reaction gradually becomes weaker, till it finally disappears altogether. In the end, favourable behaviour emerges as his reaction to the destructive electrical stimulus, even when no food is offered. The dog licks the experimenter's hand, watches him impatiently, wags his tail and shows every sign of

contentment. His salivary glands produce a plentiful flow. The dog's behaviour is all the more remarkable because the mere sight of the electrical apparatus, which once evoked profound uneasiness and depression, now evokes pleasure and impatience. The dog's skin can now be irritated by so strong a current that whole patches are burnt. We can cause the "most painful" destruction and, in response, obtain an eminently favourable general reaction, accompanied by an abundant flow of saliva.

The dog has had a dirty trick played on him. One is tempted to say that the experimenters have made him 'masochistic'—as regards his food-seeking instinct, of course, not his sexual instinct. But it would be rash to press the analogy with human masochism too far.⁶ The experiment might well be cited, however, as a prolegomenon from animal psychology to an experimental study of masochism. In any case, it shows one thing clearly: the contest between two reactions. In this particular case, the food-seeking instinct triumphed over the defence reaction against electrical irritation. If it had been otherwise, eating would have become 'unpleasurably coloured', instead of burning becoming 'pleasurable'.

(In the meantime American behaviourist literature has made us familiar with the animal which, by way of experiment, was deprived of food and of the female. It was afterwards put in a place where it was equidistant from food and from the female. The experimenters were eager to discover whether it would prefer the female to the food, or the food to the female. The possibility that, like a latter-day Buridan's ass, it might stay put in unresolved conflict between hunger and love, and die an ascetic bachelor, does not seem to have occurred to the unphilosophical Americans. This experiment has been called 'an experiment on the strength of instincts'. At all events, it falls under the heading of instinct.)

We have now, I think, said enough for our purposes about the descriptive scheme of reflexology. It seems clear that the unconditioned and conditioned reflexes of animals (and men) fit naturally into the framework of the biological description of phenotypic reactions, with which organisms respond to their environmental conditions according to their reaction norms.

With our discussion of unconditioned and conditioned reflexes, have we in fact entered the territory of psychology, the territory on which we shall have to discuss the concepts of psychological illness and health?

The function of the central nervous system is undoubtedly of decisive importance to all psychological reactions. Nevertheless, it is patent that

not all reactions transmitted through the central nervous system belong to the subject-matter of psychology. (For this reason the range of questions dealt with by reflexology is not co-extensive with the range of questions dealt with by psychology.) There is another point. In earlier and less knowledgeable times, just as in contemporary everyday language, we find the distinction between 'psychological' and 'non-psychological' processes drawn without the least idea of the significance of the central nervous system. The words 'soul' or 'psyche' had the same meaning as to-day, or something very similar, although it was at one time believed that this 'soul' resided in the diaphragm and that when one had a cold, a 'catharsis', the brain ran out of the nose. Even to-day, when something is known about the way the central nervous system works, its function plays no greater rôle in the subject-matter of psychology than (shall we say?) the analysis of the electro-dynamic processes of the telephone network would play in a description of a telephone conversation. The search for the 'seat' of the soul need have no greater importance to the psychologist, it is true, than the search for the 'seat' of the telephone conversation has for the subscriber who is to react to what the man at the other end says to him. (The question 'Where is a telephone conversation "located"?' would generally be regarded as an ill-considered one. It seems to me that the quest for the 'seat of the soul' is just as unhappily formulated.) In short, as psychologists we are only interested in the way the central nervous system works because experience shows that it determines (or in part determines) the psychological processes. But the process which is being explained must obviously be defined independently of the process *by means of* which it is explained.

I think that proposed definitions which are derived less from our specialized knowledge than from our naïve everyday attitude may provide an easier approach to the delimitation of our subject-matter. Some of the most obvious of these naïve views are these: 'Psychology is concerned with experiences' or 'with consciousness' or 'with what is immediately given'. (These are, so to speak, alternative expressions.) Much may be said against these definitions. They are indefinite, they are vague. One may surmise that even if they were more precisely phrased they would still stand in need of correction. For, if psychology is defined in this way, there seems to be no room in it for the psycho-analytical theory of unconscious psychological processes. And, since that theory unquestionably belongs to psychology, if we follow the natural usage of language to any extent at all, these proposed definitions must certainly be too narrow, quite apart from their vagueness.

⁶ How chary one should be of such analogies is shown in the psycho-analytical study of masochism. The extreme complexity of these questions in the sphere of human

psychology was made clear to me by Mrs. Bibring-Lehner, who has recently published a paper on the subject.

Considerable difficulty arises if we try to find criteria for distinguishing between happenings that are experiences and happenings that are not. Yet only by doing so can we delimit the subject-matter of psychology. A concept has obviously not been understood if one cannot decide whether something or other falls under it or not.

For example, if we are going to define the subject-matter of ichthyology, we may find ourselves making the well-founded distinction: 'The carp is a fish'—'The whale is not a fish'. But can we say, in similar fashion: 'Anger is an experience'? or deny the truth of such a proposition as: 'The secretion of the gall-bladder is an experience'? I think one feels that there is a distinct difference between the propositions about fish and those about experiences. The proposition 'The carp is a fish' is true. All the same, one could perfectly well imagine that some day it might be established that the creatures which fishermen call 'carp' belong in fact to some other family, just as it was discovered that whales, which had previously been taken for fish, were not fish at all. I am not suggesting that this is likely; but it is *conceivable*. For the proposition 'The carp is not a fish' is untrue but not self-contradictory, and the proposition 'The carp is a fish' is true but not tautological.

The proposition 'Three is a number' has quite a different structure. The point is that if one has understood the meaning of the word 'three', one knows also that it is a number. This arises out of its definition and demands no fresh information. What is meant would be better formulated in the words 'Three is a number-word'. It would then be clear that the fact of being a number is involved in the definition of the word 'three', and that an assertion to the contrary would be self-contradictory and therefore 'inconceivable'.

It is the same with our propositions 'Anger is an experience' and 'The secretion of the gall-bladder is not an experience'. One would be at a loss to suggest what would have to be ascertained about anger or about the secretion of the gall-bladder to make these propositions untrue—in order, that is to say, that anger should not be an experience and that the secretion of the gall-bladder should. In short, the idea is nonsense, it is inconceivable. If we have once understood the word 'anger', we know that it is an 'experience-word' [*Erlebnis-Wort*]. This is involved in its definition. And the definition of the secretion of the gall-bladder involves the fact that it cannot be called an experience. It is only our manner of speaking that misleads us. If, instead of 'Anger is an experience'—Carnap calls such a proposition a 'pseudo-object-proposition'—we had said 'The concept of anger is an experience-concept', the purely verbal character of our statement would have been clear at once, and no one would have been misled into taking it for an empirical piece of information about anger.

What we are suggesting for the discussion of our problems is to recast the popular 'definition' of psychology, 'Psychology is concerned with experiences', to read 'The propositions used in psychology are experience-propositions' and 'The concepts of psychology are experience-concepts'. In this form our definition has the advantage, I think, of showing more clearly what the original definition meant. It has a further advantage: one sees immediately that it is unacceptable, if one is to cover even half the concept of psychology which corresponds to the actual extent of its field of interest. A psychological discussion does not consist only of 'propositions about experiences'. And I am assuming here that it is agreed that propositions in which I speak of my own experiences (in so far as they are used scientifically) are just as objective as those which I formulate about the experiences of others; or, to put it another way, that both kinds of experience-propositions, in so far as they are used scientifically, describe interpersonally observable verbal and non-verbal human behaviour. (Cf. Hollitscher, 1939.)

The usual examples of experience-propositions are propositions which speak of perceptions, presentations, memories, feelings, conations and thoughts. If we turn to the usual descriptions of disturbed psychological processes, we find a parallel inventory: we find them enumerated as disturbances of perception, memory, feeling, will and thought. This is certainly not a complete list of all the 'phenomena of consciousness' (or better, as F. Waismann of Oxford would say, of the 'concept-families of experience-words'). If we add to it the terminology of behaviourism and psycho-analysis, we get a good deal nearer to a tabulation of the psychological functions which, in their disturbed and their undisturbed activity, we shall have to describe as elements of psychological health and illness. (The 'behaviouristic' terminology of American behaviourism coincides so nearly with the language of reflexology that there is no need to speak of it specially here.)

Since the psychology of experience is commonly regarded as the central domain of psychology, the question naturally arises: how did it come about that we have to follow Freud in adding to psychology the new concepts introduced by psycho-analysis? (I believe that most reasonable psychologists agree that he was right to do so.) And how are the new analytical theories and the experience-propositions of pre-analytical psychology to be expressed in the language and methodological framework which have permitted us, in reflexology, to retain the biological modes of expression and which have led us to hope that we may be able to keep our concept of illness and health in medical psychology as well?

An example will make the point clear. It is not difficult to indicate how a proposition is to be

verified which asserts that someone has the undisturbed ability to see. If the person is in a certain position relative to the objects of the external world, if these objects are in a good light, and if his eyes are open, he will exhibit a certain 'perception behaviour'. He will fix his axis of vision in the direction of these objects; if he wishes to say something about them, he will utter certain 'perception propositions'; other people will 'confirm' or 'dispute' what he says in similar perception reactions. Further, his perception may release certain unconditioned or conditioned movements or actions; he may move towards an object or avoid it. And the way he acts will depend on whether the object represents an 'unconditioned aim' (if such there be) of certain instinctive actions or whether he has developed in the course of certain 'experiences' a 'conditioned reflex' towards objects of this kind. The observation of these various, mutually linked modes of behaviour leads us to utter the proposition: 'this person has perceived something.' The person's own statement of his experience is only one of the criteria by which we can justify this assertion, although of course it is one of the most important—easy to obtain and quite sufficient for the purposes of everyday life.

But very astonishing things can sometimes be observed. For instance, if a man under hypnosis is given the command not to see a certain object after he has woken up—say, an armchair in the middle of the room—then, if the command is effective, we shall see him behave very oddly when he comes out of the hypnotic state. He will, like anyone else, avoid the armchair as he moves about the room. And we shall be able to observe from the direction in which he looks, that it is by means of his eyes that he avoids bumping into it. If we got an eye specialist to examine his eyes and a neurologist to examine his central nervous system, neither of them would be able to detect any difference from what they found before the experiment. But if we ask the man what he sees in the middle of the room, he will answer with some surprise 'Nothing'. If we then start pressing him to recall what happened to him after he fell asleep, he will be able sooner or later, after some effort, to reproduce the hypnotic command. The command will at once lose its effect and the man will now answer that he sees the armchair.

What we diagnose is a peculiar case of temporary and partial disturbance of the power of perception, unaccompanied by those physiological circumstances which usually disturb the power of perception. The other elements of perception behaviour remain unchanged. We might put it this way: one item of behaviour has dropped out of the 'perception syndrome', namely, the utterance, by the subject, of the perception proposition. In addition, we know the cause of the disturbance—the hypnotic command. We should call it a 'psychological cause'. In so doing we do not

mean to assert that the nervous processes are in no way different from those of normal perception. We do not know these differences, nor do we need to know them for the purposes of the psychological description which we have given.

Ought we to say that the subject of our experiment perceived the armchair, but did not know that he perceived it, was unaware of doing so, and therefore his perception was an 'unconscious perception'? Or ought we to give his behaviour some other name than 'perception'? Psychology has, of course, chosen the former terminology for such cases. It has been led to do so by the extensive analogy between this unconscious behaviour and the normal behaviour of perception, and by the knowledge of the peculiar origin of this disturbance, which everybody would agree to call a *psychological* influence.

Disturbances of this kind are, by the way, not caused only by such artificial, experimental conditions. Clinical observations with hysterical visual disturbances, partial or complete—for instance, in the extreme case of hysterical blindness—can, for precisely similar reasons, be described in the terminology we have explained above—a terminology which expands the descriptive instruments of psychology by the addition of the terms that cover the field of the 'unconscious' in psycho-analytical theory.

It is understandable that one should wish the body of psychological concepts to be enriched by the addition of concepts which are formed by such a simple and transparent extension of those used in everyday language. And we cannot do without them if we wish to give an account of what medical psychology calls a psychological disorder.

We run the risk of repeating ourselves if we now go on to describe the evolution which the concepts of 'feeling', 'wish', 'will', 'instinct', 'thought', have undergone. For the process of expanding these concepts to cover their analytical use bears a considerable similarity to the extension of the word 'perception' to the phenomena of 'unconscious perception' which we have described.

What do we mean, for instance, when we say that a certain feeling springs from *unconscious motives*? Take the case of a man who has a hostile attitude to someone for whom otherwise his principal feeling is that of love. The hostility can only be detected by a keen observer. Or the man himself becomes aware of it from time to time with astonishment and looks upon it as an inexplicable irruption of feeling. Sometimes he will even offer reasons for it; but if his behaviour is put before him dispassionately, he can be persuaded that these reasons stand in no sort of proportion to the emotional energy he brings up, or that these feelings were already there at a time when there could be no question of the reasons which he has given. He then begins to see for

himself that his arguments (his 'rationalizations') are only put up, but he cannot trace the causes of his feeling with the ordinary methods of reflection. They are not conscious to him. Indeed, it is remarkable enough that he should need to reflect at all in order to discover why he hates.

The man, in short, acts like someone who has very cogent reasons for hating, reasons of which he is conscious and of which he can give an account; he, however, is unable to give an account of his motives. We could now start theorizing and say: he behaves *as if* he believed he had something to fear from the person he treats in this hostile manner. We might even, perhaps, guess what particular fear his behaviour would correspond to, if he 'really' entertained it. His behaviour thus resembles that of a man who expresses a 'well-founded' hostility, only neither he nor we can discover any of the customary reasons. In his 'behaviour syndrome' the usual causation is missing and, in the absence of conscious reasons, it is regarded and described as 'irrational', and that is what distinguishes it from the usual behaviour of a person who hates. But a better case can be made out for this theory; it can be turned into a 'reconstruction'. If we delve into the man's early life, we sooner or later unearth situations (frequently in his infancy) of which we can very well say that, at the time, they must have released great fear and, in reaction to it, hatred. We thus bring to light motives of the usual kind for his present behaviour, only these motives lie far back. And we are surprised to find the behaviour to which they gave rise preserved in such an unchanged form as an emotional enclave in an adult personality—a personality, moreover, which could so completely 'forget' these situations, although they were well calculated to explain its behaviour. (The word 'although' will, of course, sound naïve to the psycho-analyst. The correct word would be 'because'.) But our reconstruction of the motives can call witnesses more intimately involved than outside observers. If we can get our subject to stop vainly racking his brains about his motives for hatred and induce him to undertake a special form of reflection, that of 'free association', he will be able after a time to reconstruct for *himself* the original situation which evoked hatred and reproduce the emotion now in all its usual many-sidedness, which includes the knowledge of its motives. Instead of the 'unconsciously motivated' feeling there now appears a consciously motivated emotion of the kind familiar to pre-analytical and everyday psychology.

Let us now try to sketch a model of *instinctive* behaviour and its disturbance.

(It should be understood that all our examples are meant only to serve as logical models: it is not *what* they describe, but *how* they describe that matters. They are meant to illustrate a termino-

logy; their perspicuity is more important than their completeness, and this is the justification for our choice of examples.)

Take the food-seeking instinct. Some time after the new-born infant is separated, by the act of birth, from the maternal source of nourishment, he begins to be hungry. He cries and wants to be fed. Or, more exactly, *we* say that he 'wants' to be fed. He himself merely exhibits an excited behaviour, which is appeased when, through sucking, he has absorbed enough nourishment. He brings with him into the world the disposition to carry out sucking movements when something touches his lips, provided that it does not startle him, e.g. through having too low a temperature. And after absorbing a certain quantity of food he stops sucking and falls asleep, with the expression on his face that has given rise to the poetic simile, 'smiling as happily as a well-fed baby'. His previous muscular tension gives place to the thoroughly relaxed posture of sleep. It is something like this that we have observed when we say: he was hungry before, and now he is satisfied. We observe a piece of 'instinctive' behaviour which leads the baby from the state of hunger to that of being satisfied. What we have to describe here is, in the first instance, only an instinct directed towards a *state* (or, better, a change of state) and not one directed towards an *object*. A process of conditioning has to take place before the original aim of the instinct, the 'appeasement' of hunger, draws into association with it an object—the breast or the bottle. We thus have two unconditioned modes of behaviour: hunger, with which the baby reacts to the physiological state of needing food, and sucking, with which he responds to the touching of his lips. If he sucks the right object—the breast or the bottle—the success of the sucking puts an end to the physiological state which called forth hunger, and the 'excitement' of hunger is appeased and gives place to the behaviour of being 'satisfied'. Even in this model we see that the process is more than a little complex.

(In describing the baby's instinctive behaviour we had no occasion to say that he had an 'urge' to seek satisfaction or that he 'wanted' the mother's breast. We adults command the resources of language to describe when and to what we are 'urged'. Our instinctive behaviour is enriched by a whole series of 'experience propositions' which we are disposed to think or utter in the course of it. But we understand that these articulate expressions of wishing and willing are only parts of the behaviour that characterizes adult wishing and willing.)

I remember reading in Friedrich Engels's famous book, *The Condition of the Working Classes in England*, a description of the treatment bestowed by overworked women on their babies, which they had no time to feed regularly. They gave them pieces of wool, soaked in cheap rum, to suck. One

can imagine what happened : the feeling of hunger disappeared and they fell asleep. They soon grew accustomed to this easy way of satisfying their instinct and did not want to follow the more strenuous business of sucking when their mothers came home from work and offered them the breast. The rum-soaked dummy had ousted the mother's breast as the object of the instinct, and the babies were now conditioned to a source of satisfaction which the mothers had originally thought of as a substitute. As in this way they overcame the stimulus of hunger but did not adequately meet the need for food, they cried less but lapsed into a lamentable state of malnutrition and succumbed to the slightest infection. They had been thoroughly 'mis-conditioned' (like the 'masochistic' dog, described earlier). Most of the disturbances of the instincts which are described in medical psychology are, of course, much more complicated than this. They usually branch off from very highly conditioned modes of behaviour ; and the difficulties of adjustment to which they give rise are much less direct and can hardly be taken in at a glance, since the disturbing results of mis-conditioning often occur far from their point of origin. For this reason we could not choose our model from among them.

We have now, I think, dealt sufficiently with the task we assigned to this section of our study, namely, to introduce the concepts of psychological function and dysfunction. We have given examples of concepts from the psychology of perception, feeling and conation and we have seen how their meaning has changed according to the different use made of them in propositions belonging to the psychology of experience and in those of the psycho-analytical theory of unconscious psychological behaviour. It is by means of these and similar concepts that the functions and their disturbances that determine the state of psychological health and illness are described.

THE DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPTS 'PSYCHOLOGICALLY ILL' AND 'PSYCHOLOGICALLY HEALTHY'

Before we set about particularizing our general concept of illness for the purpose of defining psychological illness, we must introduce one more concept which is of importance in the sphere of psychological behaviour. This is the concept of the *anomaly*. (We are quite aware that the relation of meaning between the words 'abnormal', 'abnormality', 'anomalous', 'anomaly', 'anomalie' and 'anormal' in everyday and scientific language is extremely vague. What we are trying to do here is to discuss some of the 'nuclear' meanings which underlie the usage of these words.) With Lenz, we define an organism's condition as anomalous if it deviates from the average condition of its species without either

increasing or decreasing the probability of maintaining life. The organism differs from its fellows in some respect, but it is neither better nor worse adjusted than they. If the average is healthy and well adjusted, so is the anomalous individual. To have six fingers, on each hand is, for example, an 'inherited' bodily anomaly.

(At this point one might wish to define the relations between the concepts 'anomalous' and 'normal'. But the word 'normal' bristles with different meanings. If we take it to mean 'having the average standard of adjustment', the question at once arises whether we should call a man 'normal' even if the average of his fellows were ill and he shared their illness. The average among human beings is, as a matter of fact, usually healthy, and a representative of the average type—a 'normal' human being, if that is how we are using the word—would therefore be healthy too. But, as we saw earlier, this is an empirical fact, not a logical consequence of the concept of the average. In practice, we generally have both ideas in mind when we speak of a 'normal person'—namely, that he is like the average *and* in addition that he is healthy. But if we are going to use the word scientifically (that is, if we do not decide to dispense with it altogether), it would be a good thing to restrict ourselves to *one* of the two usages—either as synonymous with 'average' or as synonymous with 'healthy'.

Some men of science feel justified in saying that 'all geniuses are unhealthy'. They would deny that in so doing they have simply uttered a tautology, as might be argued on the ground that 'to be a genius' would by definition signify an exceptional state and that every exceptional state would by definition mean being ill. It is not my purpose to decide whether in fact geniuses are always physically or psychologically ill. Possibly they are only anomalous. Whether they differ from their normal fellows genotypically or only phenotypically, I cannot say. But in any case it remains to investigate their exceptional state, in order to discover whether, in being geniuses, they have difficulties or disturbances in adjusting themselves to their environment (in other words, are ill) ; or whether they fare neither better nor worse than the average (in which case we might call them anomalous) ; or whether, perhaps, thanks to being geniuses, they adjust themselves better than the average. Of course, heightened functional efficiency on one side might be accompanied by dysfunctioning on another, and so, in the total adjustment, the balance might be preserved. I do not know how a family of apes—endowed with powers of judgement—might have regarded the first appearance among them of a youngster who was able to walk upright ; and whether the increased disposition to inflammation of the apex of the lungs and to varicose veins would not have seemed to them to

cancel out the advantages in adjustment conferred by walking upright.

We might be inclined to define 'psychological illness' in this way: a person is 'psychologically ill' if his adjustment to his environment is disturbed; if, in consequence, the probability of his maintaining life is lowered, compared with that of his fellows who are well adjusted; and if this is the result of a pathological disturbance of his psychological behaviour. By a 'pathological' disturbance of psychological behaviour we mean that it deviates from the same person's behaviour when he was still adjusted and healthy—at which time he was in no other respect different from now. We lay the responsibility for his disturbed adjustment on the pathological disturbance of his psychological behaviour. The function is described as 'disturbed'; the person as 'ill'. If the person was already ill before, we can identify the nature of the functional disturbance which accounts for his illness by comparing him with persons who are well adjusted and who otherwise resemble him in all essential functions but those to whose disturbance we attribute his illness. In the same way we say that a man has heart disease if the action of his heart deviates from that of a well adjusted person and if this is the cause of his illness.⁷ What sort of functions we call 'psychological' has been discussed in the previous section. But is it a fact that we *always* speak of a psychological illness if a diminished standard of adjustment is due to a disturbance of psychological functions? Is it a matter of indifference how the disturbance of the psychological behaviour arose?

Suppose, for instance, a man has been given a certain medicine, after which he exhibits a disturbance of perception, sufficient to upset his power of orientating himself in his surroundings, but otherwise no physical consequences can be detected. Should we call him 'psychologically ill'? To expect a final answer to this question would be to misunderstand the position. The scientific language for describing such situations is not laid down once and for all, any more than everyday language is. Or how about such a question as whether sexual impotence should be called a 'psychological' or an 'organic' illness? It seems as though we sometimes call an illness 'organic' which expresses itself in a disturbance of psychological functions, and sometimes call one 'psychological' which expresses itself organically. It would seem then that our definition requires additions or alterations.

(I do not want to embark here on the problems

which arise if one tries to distinguish the concepts 'organic' and 'psychological' from one another as a pair of opposites. A parallel situation arises when the concepts 'physical' and 'biological' are treated as a pair of opposites, as though the biological description of a process were incompatible with a physical description. When we attempted to distinguish the psychological functions of an organism from its other functions, we had no intention of setting them up as *opposites*. We were not trying to prejudge any other question, but simply to pick out one group of functions from the totality of vital functions.)

It seems comparatively easy to explain why one regards certain forms of impotence as psychological illnesses. The patients who come to the doctor with this disorder generally show a whole series of disturbed psychological functions, so that the disturbance of these psychological functions and the disturbance of this organic function compose a 'syndrome'. I must admit, all the same, that this does not remove my doubt whether the criteria of our definition can be called 'necessary' and 'sufficient' by the standards of general usage. And the question still remains unanswered whether we should say that a disturbance of perception brought about by drugs caused a state of 'psychological' illness. For, in this case, the disturbance of the power of perception is the only disturbance of function diminishing the individual's capacity for adjustment; there are no additional non-psychological disturbances to justify the choice of the expression 'organic illness'.

It seems, in fact, as though, when we answer the question whether an illness is to be called 'psychological', we pay attention not only to which functions are disturbed, but also to how these disturbances arose and—in the opinion of some—to how they can be removed (if they are removable).

If our inability to adjust ourselves is caused by a disturbance of perception due to drugs, we shall perhaps be uncertain whether to call the condition one of 'psychological illness'; we may perhaps definitely refuse to do so. But if, as in the case of a person suffering from hysterical blindness, we are aware of the psychological *origin* of the state of illness, we shall not hesitate to call the person 'psychologically ill'. It seems to me that this way of determining the concept by reference to the origin of the functional disturbance also plays a part where the symptom of the illness is an 'organic' disturbance (accompanied, it may be, by psychological symptoms as well), as in the case of 'psychological impotence'. It appears that *what* anyone who uses the word in this way calls a

⁷ We often, in a casual way, call a condition 'ill' which does not itself disturb adjustment, but which leads to a condition of illness. For instance, we sometimes speak of a man as 'fatally ill', if bacteria are circulating in his blood which, we know, will kill him within a few weeks, although in the meantime he goes about happily and well adjusted and is only carrying in him the germ of a later

state of illness. Sometimes we even hear the presence of these bacteria described as the 'real illness', and the alteration in the state of adjustment which results from their activity as the 'symptoms of the illness'. I think that considerations of this kind lead to a different view of the concept of illness—to what is often called an 'explanatory' as opposed to a 'merely descriptive' concept.

'psychological illness' depends on his views about how organic and psychological functional disturbances arise. For example, psycho-analysts—rightly, in my opinion—assign to the theory of neuroses, as cases of conversion-hysteria, many illnesses which would be dealt with by their opponents under the heading of 'internal medicine'.

(The position seems to be similar if we propose to call an illness 'psychological' when it can be influenced by 'psychotherapy'. I think that this definition, which is often put forward, owes its suggestion to a tacit empirical assumption, namely, that all illnesses which arise through psychological influences can be influenced by psychotherapy. Now, everybody would call schizophrenia a 'psychological illness', although we cannot influence it appreciably by psychological means (and, furthermore, little can be said about its causes). It has even seemed recently as if some remission of the schizophrenic condition could be brought about by organic intervention, the insulin shock treatment. We should certainly not stop speaking of psychological illnesses, even if we could cure them all by, say, special drugs. On the other hand, no one would call every kind of wart a psychological illness, merely because you can sometimes get rid of them by suggestion.)

Here again we do not wish to take up a final position—not because we cannot make up our minds to choose a particular definition, but because such a decision would not carry us any further for the purposes of this study. One may modify the concept of psychological illness that we first put forward, by taking into account the origin of the state of illness, or one may prefer not to make this modification—the point for us is that whichever is done shall be done *explicitly* and the reasons given for choosing one concept or the other (or some third or fourth concept).

We have linked up our discussion of the concept of psychological illness with the definition of the word 'ill' given in our general biological section, which makes the individual's degree of adjustment and chance of survival the criterion of his state of health or illness. What is the position, then, with regard to the other possibilities we mentioned in the way of definition—which proposed to measure the individual's state of health by how he felt or by the chances of survival of the species?

So far we have said nothing about the use of the words 'psychologically healthy'. But, it is obvious that, within the framework of our first definition, we mean by psychologically healthy the state of an organism which exhibits no psychological disturbance relevant to illness—whose psychological functions, therefore, promote a state of adjustment favourable to the maintenance of life.

(It is noticeable, by the way, how crude all these concepts are when they are used in such an unspecific fashion. We may comfort ourselves with the reflection that we are not called upon to decide,

in the capacity of 'eugenic judges', as it were, whether somebody is 'ill' or 'healthy'. In actual medical practice we have to make much more highly differentiated pronouncements about separate functions and their interaction. The decision whether a patient is ill or healthy forms nothing more than a very crude frame, against which the differentiated medical picture, with its finely drawn features, stands out in contrast. There was clearly no need to make this frame into a carefully articulated work of logical art. It is not surprising that the concepts of illness and health, even when more exactly formulated, are not specially significant or very detailed or full of manifold differentiae. They are only intended to provide a broad distinction.)

But to return to our question. Is the *psychological* health or illness of a person also sometimes measured by its bearing on the chances of survival of the species? We found in childbirth and sterility examples of states which are commonly called 'healthy' or 'ill' because they promote or threaten the perpetuation of the species. Is there anything analogous when we come to psychological states? I think there is.

A homosexual person, for example, is often called 'psychologically ill', although he may to a great extent be adjusted to the circumstances of his life—that is to say, his sexual peculiarity need not have disturbed his adjustment to his environment. At the same time, many people 'feel' that this condition is one of illness; their linguistic sense would lead them to say so, although they know nothing of the frequent coincidence of manifest homosexuality and neurotic disturbance, which would justify the use of the word 'ill' in the additional sense of individual maladjustment. I believe that when people call sterile and homosexual persons 'ill'—the one 'organically', the other 'psychologically'—they do so for similar reasons. What they have in mind is the disturbance, observable in both cases, of the function of perpetuating the species. (Impotence, if one disregards the neurotic disturbances which accompany it, should also be added to this group of illnesses.) Nor is it difficult to discover a psychological pendant to our example of childbirth, which endangers the life of the individual but is not called an 'illness'. It is to be found in the state of being in love. Heine, in his *Atta Troll*, writes:

'Liebeswahnsinn! Pleonasmus!

Liebe ist ja schon ein Wahnsinn!'

['Love-madness! A pleonasm! Love itself is a madness!']

This dictum is not to be dismissed as mere poetic exaggeration. The delusional misconception and even denial of reality, the utter remoteness from actuality, which characterize the state of being in love, are clinically demonstrable facts. No poetic metaphor is needed to emphasize their gravity.

People in love sometimes seriously endanger their self-preservation by their actions. Who would deny that they often lower their individual standard of adjustment? Some confusion of concepts arises, it is true, through the fact that their state is 'normal', in the sense that it is the average and entirely usual thing in their situation. But that does not make it any 'healthier'. All the same, the fact that we only call people in love 'love-sick' with a particular meaning tone shows that we recognize the state of being in love as tending to perpetuate the species and that, as in the case of childbirth, we mean by a 'healthy' state one which does this. There are also closer connections between the two cases, since the state of being in love stands in a certain relation of probability to that of childbirth.

Many other cases could be cited where the usage of language leans rather to our second definition, the definition which judges the individual by reference to the human society that helps to maintain him. There is the case of the martyr or revolutionary who is ready to sacrifice his life, it may be, to bring about a moral or social order that shall guarantee civilization. One would scarcely be inclined to call him 'psychologically ill' because he is ready to do so. Martyrs and revolutionaries may sometimes display neurotic or psychotic traits. But in that case one would call them 'psychologically ill' because of their neurosis or psychosis, not because they are ready to sacrifice themselves. I am only trying, of course, to follow the ordinary usage of language. If one refuses in principle to call a man under any circumstances 'psychologically healthy' who voluntarily causes his own death, or at least will not be deterred from doing something by the possibility of its causing his death, then one has automatically decided to measure the state of psychological illness or health by reference solely to the individual's probability of survival. In that case, I think one departs from the ordinary usage of language; and that is the point to which I wish to draw attention.

Altogether we find ourselves in difficulties if we begin to judge men's 'social' psychological reactions according to their relevance to health or illness. It is sometimes very hard to say whether a particular form of social behaviour is helpful or harmful to the individual or to the species. It obviously depends in part on whether one is going to call it 'healthy' or 'unhealthy'. What criteria are to decide, for instance, whether a certain psychological state on the part of the masses constitutes 'mass psychosis' or a 'healthy progressive movement'? In these departments of social psychology most of the concepts of biology and individual psychology begin to overflow the banks of their definitions.

In any case, one always needs the terminology of psycho-analysis when one describes pathological states that express themselves in a defective adjust-

ment to the social *milieu*. The reason lies in the nature of the disturbing functions; for many of the modes of behaviour which are 'unconscious' in the analytical sense are modes of behaviour unsuited to given situations. They are often reactions which were appropriate on some quite different occasion, but which now reappear, in a peculiar psychological way, at the wrong place and upset the situation to the disadvantage of the individual. It can easily be imagined, for instance, how a man would prejudice his social existence if, from unconscious motives, he were to fall into ungovernable fits of hatred, as in the case cited in a previous section. A considerable part of the theory of neuroses deals with disturbances of social adjustment; while in psychoses the range of disturbances goes far beyond the social sphere and we find a dysfunctioning of even the most elementary psychological reactions.

The third proposed definition mentioned in our general section—that a man's health or illness should be judged by how he feels—is always with us in the theory of psychological illness. The commonest complaint with which people come to the psychotherapist is that they 'feel so bad', whereas they usually go to an oculist or heart specialist with the complaint that in such and such a situation their eyes or their heart let them down. There is no need to repeat how close the connections are between feeling well or ill, on the one hand, and adequacy or disturbance of adjustment, on the other. Almost every disturbance of psychological function, almost every deterioration of adjustment, brings with it a feeling of not being well. Sometimes the psychological disturbance consists precisely and exclusively in a disturbance of the sense of well-being that is otherwise the reaction to a certain situation; and it is this disturbance of the sense of well-being that brings with it a cessation of all adjustment. An attack of melancholia is an example. We might also say: to feel well or unwell are modes of psychological behaviour, which can run with or without disturbance just like any other psychological reactions and, like them, can form the content of psychological illness or health, as usually defined on the basis of adjustment. Accordingly, we sometimes describe the sense of well-being and its opposite as simply indicators of the state of illness, but sometimes recognize them to be the disturbed functions themselves which have produced a state of diminished adjustment. The 'disturbance of the sense of well-being' is, in fact, one of the three disturbances of psychological function which are usually enumerated in the preliminary psycho-analytic description of a state of psychological illness—a state of disturbed capacity for work, for love and for enjoyment. For the popular conception of 'well-being' coincides to some extent with the more discriminating concept of 'enjoyment', while a disturbed capacity for love diminishes the

chances of perpetuation of the species, just as an impaired capacity for work diminishes the individual's prospects of maintaining life.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION AND THE SEARCH FOR THE 'NATURE' OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS

It is time, I think, to meet an objection which the reader may have wished to raise, perhaps at quite an early stage. 'What has been said about the definition of the words "healthy" and "ill" may be all right'—the objection might run—'but we have been given, so to speak, stones instead of bread. We have been treated to a "word definition" of the concepts "healthy" and "ill", but we have learnt nothing about the nature of health and illness. You have withheld from us what the philosophers, so we are told, call the "real definition". In short, we should like to have explained to us what health and illness *really* are, and not merely how people apply these words. We are eager to penetrate to the kernel of the matter and not to remain stuck at the verbal shell.'

This objection hardly comes as a surprise. It almost always crops up, in this or some similar form, when an examination is undertaken in terms of the logic of science, whether the concept to be analysed is that of illness or that of causality. And it springs from a perfectly fair claim. The only question is whether this criticism, through not being clear about its own intentions, does not find fault with the work of the logician on account of something which should be sought in the work of the empirical scientist.

If someone asks, let us say, what is meant in pathological anatomy by a 'burn', we should explain it in some such way as this: what is meant is the changes to be observed in a body which has been exposed long enough to a high temperature. We observe in it certain modes of behaviour: the skin reddens and forms blisters and after a time the tissues begin to be carbonized. 'Very well', our inquirer would reply, 'you have told me what people *call* a burn. But now what interests me is what a burn *really is*.' And he might add, to make his point quite clear: 'What its exact causes are, what happens, and what its effects are.' We should regard this question as both intelligible and intelligent, and we should try to tell him all we know about the sensitivity to heat of the body's cells, the process of necrosis under the protracted application of heat, and perhaps the general somatic and psychological consequences of a burn. If our inquirer is satisfied with the kind of answer we have given (the *kind* of answer, not necessarily the quantity of information we have to offer), we have discovered what he meant when he impatiently asked us what a burn *really is*. We understand, too, what sort of answer he wants to hear to the question, 'What is the nature of a

burn?'—namely, a definition of the word 'burn' and everything 'essential' that we know about burns. The answer he wants would give both the meaning of the concept and also a full description of the process he has named, together with an explanation of its causes and effects. But to provide all this is not the business of logic. All that concerns logic is to define what is covered by the concept, not to tell everything we know about what has thus been defined.

(Every science seeks to use as few differentiae as possible in making a definition, and so to leave the terms hitherto employed in laying down its meaning free for the description of the objects which it covers. It is sometimes useful, of course, to separate objects and processes which have previously borne the same name, and assign them now to different concepts. The evolution of science leads to the abolition of many concepts, which then very often continue a pre-scientific existence in popular usage, while science replaces them by a whole series of differentiated concepts. An instance of this is the concept of a 'plague' in pre-scientific epidemiology.)

To return to our concepts 'ill' and 'healthy'. We have followed the procedure of the scientific formation of concepts just described and, in defining the words 'healthy' and 'ill' in general medicine and medical psychology, have not brought in all we *know* about the multifarious healthy and unhealthy states of organisms, their origin, their exact course and their prognosis. We undertook to give a logical analysis of these concepts, not to write a monograph on states of psychological illness and health. To such a monograph an examination in terms of the logic of science only furnishes the 'prolegomena'.

It would be a mischievous misunderstanding to play off the one proceeding against the other. Each has its legitimate place among the tasks of medical psychology.

In concluding this study I have only one remark to make. It seems to me that the concepts 'healthy' and 'ill', however common they may have been in everyday language and in the medical literature of earlier times, are seldom used nowadays in scientific medical treatises. There might be two reasons for this. It might be possible that they are not explicitly mentioned because they are taken for granted in descriptions of these states and are, so to speak, to be read between the lines. Or, alternatively, it might be that scientific usage has passed beyond them and is on the verge of developing much more highly differentiated concepts, which will oust the concepts of 'healthy' and 'ill' and render them obsolete.

Having raised this question, we will leave it at that. At least it shows how ill-advised we should be to attempt any sort of final 'summary'. A logical examination, based on the living language, seldom leaves one in a position where one could

usefully draw together the threads which the multiplex and suggestive practice of language has unravelled.

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DETERMINISM AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

By J. O. WISDOM, BATH

Psycho-analysis was founded upon the postulate of determinism, a postulate that has never been contradicted by clinical experience. Since, however, its validity has been repeatedly questioned not only in the past but in very recent times, the subject is one that deserves our attention.

Considering that the dispute between determinism and free will has interested the greatest intellects, it is astonishing to find how few writings upon it there are that furnish sustained and precise argument; often there is little beyond bare assertion of belief. Though confronted with some scientific evidence against them, most thinkers in their heart of hearts seem to have believed in free will and have been impotent to produce more in their favour than could be put in a sentence or two. Apart from the task of finding grounds for the belief, it is difficult even to state what the thesis of free will or libertarianism asserts. I know of but three admirable writings advocating determinism: the first is a little known tract by Anthony Collins (1), an early eighteenth-century deist; the second a paper by Mr. Hobart (2); and the third a chapter by Sir David Ross (3). On the other side Kant (4), with his celebrated thesis that the existence of moral law implies freedom to carry it out, stands alone. Idealist philosophers have framed transcendental senses in which the will is free, but, since these kinds of freedom by their very nature transcend the natural world and human actions that occur in it, no relevance may be attached to them. Whether or not Bergson should be included in this category is perhaps a moot

point: he maintained that one could find determinism in a chain of events *after* they had happened without being able even in principle to predict them. This view may contain something that is true and important, but it does not bear on the traditional issue. There is also an attempt made by Sir Arthur Eddington to defend the position in view of certain peculiarities of quantum physics. Finally, there is a trend in current logico-analytical philosophy to regard determinism as a mild form of superstition, though this must not be taken to imply that free will is maintained as the alternative. These last two approaches are really concerned with the minimum requirements of science and causal relations; they find no room for determinism but do little for free will.

A difficulty that has always beset the problem is that freedom and determinism have been closely associated with deeply cherished beliefs. But a peculiarity about the issue is that, like the Whigs and Tories, the types of advocate have changed sides. The form it took with the post-Newtonian growth of science was a religious one: the 'billiard-ball' universe of science required determinism; theologians required free will.¹ But now the emancipated intellect has in some degree taken sides against determinism—most logico-analytical philosophers, some physicists who hold views of a similar kind about scientific methodology, and some quantum physicists (though nothing like the overwhelming majority that one might suppose from the relative volume of writing upon the subject). There is considerable divergence of

¹ There was possibly an earlier stage in which emancipated thinkers defended free will against theologians who

believed that the omnipotence of God implied determinism. See Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, 1907, II, 310.

opinion: atheists may disagree with one another on the matter, as may theologians. The heterogeneous nature of some of the views to be found was nicely expressed by Susan Stebbing (5): 'Planck is anxious to refute indeterminacy in physics in order to save the dignity of man. Eddington is anxious to increase the amount of indeterminacy, recently introduced into physics, in order to safeguard our feeling of responsibility. Sir Herbert Samuel is afraid lest the denial of determinism should make man the sport of chance and lead to irresponsibility in action and increase of unreason in politics and life.' To-day, one can safely adopt either side under the pretext of attacking myth and speculation—though on neither side may one be safe from the charge of upholding them. Further, it is interesting to observe, the defence of determinism by Sir David Ross, Mr. Hobart and Rashdall, which allows room for strict moral responsibility, renders the belief 'respectable'. Thus, while some may have ulterior aims to support when they deal with the controversy, there is a reasonable possibility that one may be able to detach oneself from a welter of conflicting consequences because they may be regarded as cancelling one another out, and hence make more progress with the investigation of the issue.

It is first necessary to investigate the methodological attack on determinism. The two approaches already referred to in this connection suggest that the need for the concept may be denied on three grounds. These are: (i) that, as sciences become advanced and mathematical, causal relations disappear; (ii) that scrutiny of the nature of the causal relation in general leads some to think that it contains no basic element of the kind one would have expected before making the investigation, and therefore contains no element in virtue of which one would have called it 'causal'; and (iii) that Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle in quantum physics renders causation otiose.

(i) It is true that the concept of *cause*, which is implied in all laws of nature, disappears when scientific theories become developed. Thus, that a magnet attracts a compass-needle is a law in which the concept is absent in name but implied in fact—a magnet causes a compass-needle to deflect. But the theory of attraction, which asserts that the force of attraction between two bodies of equal mass is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them, does not contain it; the theory provides a functional correlation between force and distance, in the sense that, given the numerical value of either, the numerical value of the other can be calculated. If we prefer it, we may say that the theory is a shorthand description of an infinite group of pairs of numbers (force and distance). This may be illustrated from the familiar equation for a body falling freely from rest: $s = \frac{1}{2}gt^2$. Let t be

measured in seconds and s in centimetres, so that $g = 980$. Then if $t = 0$, it follows that $s = 0$; if $t = 1$, $s = 490$; if $t = 2$, $s = 1960$; and so on. Thus the equation shortly describes all such pairs of numbers, s, t . (6).

The inference sometimes drawn is that causation is not fundamental in science and is superseded in scientific theory by correlation. This is exceedingly doubtful, however, because it may be maintained that, though a mathematical equation expressing a theory may describe an infinite class of pairs of numbers in that its sole use is to provide information about one of a pair when the other is given, *such an equation holds only if the events it describes are causally produced*: in other words, it provides knowledge about *aspects* of events and not about their *occurrence*. This contention would be denied in many quarters; but whether it is true or false is just the question at issue, and, without entering into its possible justification, the opponent is on no surer ground, so that, if he denies determinism on the grounds that the concept of causation does not appear in scientific theory, he begs the question. Not much is to be gained by pursuing this matter further.

(ii) The attack on the concept by philosophers of empiricist schools is more convincing. It was begun by Berkeley (7), though originality for his view is usually attributed to Hume; by whom, however, it was put in an extremely cogent form (8); and it has been adopted and adapted by Mill (9), Russell (10), Wittgenstein (11), Ramsey (12), Carnap (13), Braithwaite (14), Ayer (15), and other well-known writers from the modern schools of logical analysis.

The relevant part of Berkeley's view was that what are called 'causes' and what are called 'effects' are correlated, and that they occur in pairs with regularity; he was particularly concerned to deny any *occult power* to the cause in virtue of which it *necessarily* produced its effect. The views of the others mentioned are very similar, and such differences as exist between them do not bear on the present theme. Those of a like way of thinking may or may not enter into a verbal dispute concerning whether causal relations consist solely of regularity of certain occurrences or whether no such relations exist—that is to say, whether or not it is suitable to call appropriate correlations, which do exist, 'causal'.

What is attractive to the scientific outlook is the note of empiricism: all that are observed are events and correlations, but no relation of *necessity*. Thus when determinism is seriously questioned from this point of view, and not merely because of the needs of morality, or on the grounds of some unsubstantiated intuition, or because in quantum phenomena electrons behave in an uncertain manner, what is being opposed is an unverifiable power or necessity, which smacks of the irrational. The conception thus opposed may be an anthropo-

morphic one of projected pulling and pushing. It may also, as Kelsen interestingly suggests, be a disguised form of moral retribution—the dread Necessity of which the classics speak (16).

This may be so; but the case for the determinist is that this (let us say) ‘phenomenalist’ interpretation of causal relations as reliable correlations provides no explanation, and leaves no room for one, to account for the regularity that undoubtedly exists, without which purposive behaviour would be inconceivable. Thus for him the phenomenalist view is irrational—and both parties use the same reproach against each other.

What, then, is required to reconcile the two positions, on the assumption that both have much to recommend them? Let us suppose we could find by *scientific* means some general property of the natural world or of its primary constituents, such as electrons, protons, and the like, such that the empiricist philosopher could no longer correctly assert: ‘It is not self-contradictory to suppose that water should result from the fusion in suitable conditions of hydrogen and oxygen.’ The empiricist is inclined to make a good deal of ‘logical possibility’, using examples such as, ‘It is logically possible that I should *not* have been writing this page at this moment’; but if sufficient premises are supplied to the effect that I have an uninhibited desire to do so and that no incompatible physical constraint prevents me, then the assertion *would* be self-contradictory. Now if macroscopic appearances could be found to be properties of the ultramicroscopic constituents of nature, and if the correlations that hold in the sphere of the microscopic depended solely upon the spatial configuration of its constituents, then we should have something of the sort required by determinism, in that we should have a basis for necessity and should understand that events could not happen otherwise than they do, while fulfilling the empiricist’s demand that this basis should not be occult or incapable of scientific investigation. In the absence of such knowledge, this proposal must inevitably be vague; but it may be sufficiently clear to show that determinism might be maintained in a reasonable sense without including some mysterious power. Should such a proposal be at all acceptable, it is worth remarking that phenomenologists ought to be interpreted as denying the existence of causation and not merely as maintaining that it consists solely in regularity; that is to say, it would be improper for them to call reliable correlations ‘causation’.

Pending the required scientific discovery, it should not be forgotten that whatever postulate psycho-analysis needs—be it determinism or an unexplained orderliness—it is exactly the same postulate that is essential to every other science.

(iii) Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, according to which the precise behaviour of an electron cannot even in principle be predicted, forms the

basis of the chief attack on determinism. Here are the high lights of what Eddington (17) has to say about it:—

‘The feature of the present situation is that, whether permanently or temporarily, determinism has disappeared altogether from the basis of modern physics. That is a statement of fact, not a prophecy; and so far as I am aware, there is no disagreement about the fact. The physicist may or may not believe in determinism, but in his own domain he has at present no evidence for it and, what is more, he has at present no use for it.

‘We may fairly claim to have demonstrated the possibility of a non-deterministic universe by having formulated one—an extraordinarily difficult achievement.

‘I must make it clear that the scientific doctrine of indeterminism is not that there exist occasional exceptions to deterministic law, but that every phenomenon is to a greater or lesser extent indeterminate.

‘The determinism formerly professed by the physicist was of a specialized kind, which I will call *predictability*.

‘Let us now compare two phenomena, one of which is supposed to be undetermined and the other (for practical purposes though not absolutely) determined. As an example of a presumably undetermined phenomenon I will take the breaking up of a radium atom; at the present moment t_0 it is undetermined whether the atom will break up at time t_1 or at some other time t_2 Contrast this with an (almost) determined phenomenon, viz., the planet Pluto will reach a certain position in the sky at time t_1 , not t_2 . When we observe the radium atom to break up at time t_1 we can if we like “infer” a retrospective property X_1 at time t_0 ; but in default of any other way of describing X_1 than by connecting it with the break-up at time t_1 , we are merely stating the observed fact in different words. From the observation of Pluto we can likewise infer a property X_1 at time t_0 ; but in this case X_1 is a genuine inference, for it is not defined by reference to that which it is inferred from. Thus the property X_1 may be that Pluto was in a particular position in the sky at time t_0 , or that it then exerted certain perturbing forces on Neptune. These properties are definable by reference to manifestations occurring earlier than t_1

‘I have contrasted the indeterminacy of the break-up of the radium atom with the determinacy of the position of Pluto; but I must make it clear that this is a difference of degree, not of kind. There is an indeterminacy in the position of Pluto, only it is too small to be of practical importance. . . . If we had chosen instead a lump of radium the size of Pluto, we could predict the amount broken up at any future date with about as much accuracy and certainty as we can predict the position of the planet . . .

'We believe that Heisenberg's principle is one of the great fundamental principles of the physical universe (or of our mode of apprehending it) comparable with the principle of Relativity. . . . The indeterminism of modern physics is not merely a failure of determinism such as we might postulate as an excuse for our failure to discover determining factors. If we are right, it is a positive discovery about nature. It is a precise quantitative generalization just as much entitled to be called a law of nature as any of the generalizations which constitute causal law . . .

'The entrenchment of determinism in physics was due to the fact that throughout the whole range of macroscopic phenomena the unpredictability is negligibly small, so that for all practical purposes a strictly causal scheme is the most obvious and simplest way of treating them. It is only when we come to link on the microscopic phenomena of the world that we realize that the present causal scheme is inexact and cannot be fundamental.'

Here there are several important ideas : (i) physicists do not need determinism ; (ii) they have formulated the reverse ; (iii) they are concerned with predictability ; (iv) indeterminism pervades all nature, even large-scale phenomena ; and (v) it is as ultimate as any other great scientific principle. Now I venture to think that Eddington has laid his finger on the important factor—predictability—and made faulty use of it. He is concerned to show that modern physics aims not at predicting an exact result, which would be quite exact if physicists were more careful or had better instruments, but at predicting results within certain limits, small it is true, but irreducible, and that this irreducibility is not due to imperfection of instruments. With this one must agree. One might of course contend that it is due to an 'instrument-centric predicament', i.e. that the very presence or use of an instrument rendered exactitude impossible. But, leaving on one side such a delicate matter, I would interpret Eddington as describing correctly the scientific methodology of modern physics, i.e. that physicists predict to a high degree of probability upon a statistical basis, and that this procedure is simply one that does not use the concept of determinism. Now by parity of reasoning, however, this concept would be otiose to an actuary, who might, if he chose, frame an 'uncertainty principle' on the grounds that his predictions were within certain limits elastic ; which would express that determinism was useless in a certain sphere, not that it was false. This habit of mind arises towards physics only when it becomes preferable in this field, as it is in insurance, to aim at achieving large numbers of good but not perfect predictions instead of a few excellent ones. But let it be admitted freely that determinism is not now serviceable in *physics* ; that seems no reason for supposing that it is not true of nature.

Eddington would maintain, on the other hand, that determinism was not only of no practical utility but that it could not be used even in principle ; and, if this were correct, Occam's razor would demand its rejection. In that event, I should have recourse to the contention, for which there are empirical grounds, that the presence and use of instruments interfered with what was to be measured and thus prevented precisely predictable events presupposed by determinism from being observed, and should therefore interpret the uncertainty principle as describing not an ultimate feature of nature but a complex relationship between nature, observers, and the use of instruments. And, whether this is correct or not, there would be no need to agree that because determinism was superfluous in physics it was also unnecessary in psychology. Meanwhile, unless and until psychology becomes a mathematical science, and that of an advanced kind dealing with ultramicroscopic factors, it may retain the concept of determinism, as did physics prior to sub-atomic investigation.

If it be granted that the concept of determinism is not superfluous, the next task is to consider its claims to be true as opposed to libertarianism.

The case for determinism is twofold : science presupposes it, and the occurrence of an uncaused event is inconceivable—the *a priori* argument.

To regard determinism as self-evident has sometimes been understood to make of it an *a priori* synthetic proposition ; and this would naturally be sufficient to render it suspect and, in the eyes of many, to reject it, for if it is synthetic, i.e. more than a tautology, it would require proof. Now I hold it to be inconceivable that determinism should not be true, but it is necessary to indicate that this contention is not *a priori*—in other words to explain in what sense it is 'inconceivable'. I mean that scientific discoveries render it such, so that 'inconceivability' stands merely for a psychological shorthand attitude to vast numbers of scientific results. Thus I would not separate the two types of basis for determinism, as is usually done, but replace the interpretation of the *a priori* argument from self-evidence by a psychological interpretation based upon empirical findings.

That is the positive side of the case. I have to admit candidly that, try as I will, I cannot imagine the world not subject to determinism ; I can think only of something dream-like. On the other hand, Eddington is able to do so. Let us now turn to the negative aspect, based on the weakness of libertarianism.

The case for libertarianism is also twofold : human beings have an intuition of freedom of choice, and it is presupposed by the existence of moral duties.

The determinist's attitude is that either of his arguments or both suffice for his contention and

that all he need do is to reconcile with his standpoint the claims of libertarians and explain why they come to hold their view, noting that it is due to subjective needs and not to objective considerations about nature.

It would take up too much space even to give a synopsis of the writings of the three determinists mentioned at the outset of this paper, which the reader will find it a pleasure to read in their brief entirety.

The main conclusion to be drawn from all three is that part of the argument for libertarianism, i.e. its being a prerequisite of moral law, is false, and, on the contrary, that moral action would be impossible without determinism. On this count, their theses, both severally and collectively, seem to be unanswerable. Mr. Hobart considers further that there is an intuition of freedom, but that this, too, is compatible with determinism and even presupposes it. It is from this point that I would renew investigation, both in order to ascertain what kind of freedom is thus sanctioned and because the plain man, who believes he has an intuition of freedom, is apt to feel that these arguments savour of dialectical subtlety and do not solve the problem—that in fact the rabbit that Sir David Ross and Mr. Hobart have pulled out of their mortar-boards is a logical one, not fit for boiling.

Broadly speaking determinists seek to reconcile free will to their position by defining it as 'self-determination'. Now, while it is to be accepted that a man's decision is determined by his self as a whole, the question is to decide whether this provides the kind of freedom that the ordinary man claims to have. What is needed is an enquiry into the psychological nature of freedom and the intuition of its reality.

A beginning may be made with the process of *choice* or *forming a decision*. This is at the bottom of the whole issue; we are not concerned with an academic statement that a human being could have walked along one side of the street instead of the other had he so chosen, because we wish to deal with a real choice which involves reasons and causal factors for and against it. Consider the case of a man confronted with two alternative actions, towards which he has conflicting desires. He may know his own mind, i.e. realize that he can satisfy one but not both of two desires no matter which action he elects to do; this presumes that he has formed an opinion of what the consequences of the actions would be. He may know further that he prefers one course to the other. If he is as clear as this in his own mind, he will embark upon the course he prefers and suppress the other desire. Here the objective factors or consequences of the action determine his choice only indirectly, in so far as they define the character that the actions will have for him. This is ideal, however. In many cases he will deliberate on the objective

factors, not because he can form no opinion of them, but because he does not know his own mind about his preference; or again, he may be unable to form an opinion of them because he does not know his own mind. This would seem to be the true psychology of many cases of indecision, and not the converse, that he cannot tell his preference because he has too little to go upon to estimate the objective factors—this is often, though not necessarily always, a rationalization. Deliberation about consequences is then apt to be the conscious form of an unresolved conflict of desires, and the process of arriving at a decision the sign that the weaker desire has adjusted itself to the stronger and found a way of obtaining some substitute-satisfaction. To all this, however, a significant qualification must be made: there are rarely but two alternatives, if the real ends to be gained by the actions are not lost sight of, so that if the man is alive to what he wants he may well find that other alternatives are possible.

Thus coming to a decision may be a conscious process of finding out what one desires most and suppressing wishes that are incompatible with it, or an unconscious process in which the weaker desire gives way to the stronger by finding an alternative way of satisfying itself.

A man in whom the first process was usual would be a stronger character, or a man of 'stronger will', than one in whom the second was habitual. A man of the first kind is the one entitled, if anyone is, to say he could have done otherwise had he wished. But this would mean, not that he could have wished otherwise, but that he knew what he desired most and had the power of doing without something he required less—a typical instance of subservience of the pleasure principle to the reality principle. He is simply constituted mentally in such a way that to get maximum pleasure he forgoes a partial pleasure, which if satisfied would have reduced the total satisfaction. Thus it is perfectly clear that the choice is determined.

Now arises the need to examine the kinds of desire that may conflict with each other. This may be expressed in different forms. We may say that conflict may occur between desires emanating from the id, ego, and super-ego, to use Freud's anatomy of the mind; or between pleasure and fear; or between personal pleasure and duty. That between id and ego would correspond to the distinction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle; that between pleasure and fear and that between personal pleasure and duty might be forms of conflict either between id and super-ego or between ego and super-ego. Now it is difficult to escape the thought that what libertarians have at the backs of their minds is conflict between personal pleasure and duty, i.e. that they wish to have free will in order to control desire for pleasure, and further that the personal pleasures they wish to avoid are certain demands of what

they might call their animal nature, i.e. the id. Can one imagine the issue attracting the deep attention given to it down the ages if freedom were identified with the reality principle? If not, the super-ego, centre of deep-seated moral fears, must play a dominant rôle.

If this is correct, the reason why it has an important bearing on the problem is this: the libertarian's case may in part be fairly represented, not as denying determinism, but as contending in addition that human beings have the power of acting from (or being determined by) 'higher' motives than 'mere' pleasure. This is a fact; a fact, moreover, in which the forces of the super-ego prove stronger than those of the id. Thus a little attention to the nature of the conflict enables us satisfactorily and completely to reconcile with determinism part of the libertarian's case, since the 'harder' moral course is shown to be compatible with what we know of the unconscious mind. This naturally would not warrant the libertarian's inferring that a man could act against his desire for pleasure in an absolute sense, i.e. that the pleasure principle was false, since according to the theory of the super-ego, this sphere of the mind evolves as transformed pleasure-drives, in a broad sense that includes avoidance of pain. There is, too, a further inference he must avoid, for there is an ambiguity in 'having the power of acting' from worthy motives: all that the discussion given above assumes is that human beings *do in fact* act in such a way; but it does not follow that when they *have not* thus acted they *could have* done so.

The other part of the libertarian's case, that we have an intuition of freedom, must also be approached in the light of the kind of conflict under discussion; for it is unrealistic to argue it, as philosophers sometimes do, upon the basis, for instance, that a person could raise his arm if he wished, without entering into the grounds for performing such an act or asking why he should do so without rhyme or reason. The libertarian, after he has chosen the course of private pleasure and come to think that his duty was to have done something else, believes he has an intuition that he *could have* acted otherwise; and, while deliberating before he has chosen, that he has the power of following the path of duty, even if he does not afterwards do so. On the other hand, a friend with sufficient knowledge of his character would in such a situation have a shrewd opinion that he would not succeed in carrying out what he conceives to be his duty; which makes it difficult to accept the libertarian's belief. That it is, moreover, a delusion is rendered scientifically certain by psycho-analytical experience.

While any moral conflict may give rise to indecision and deliberation, many people will be able in their own lives to find some powerful impulse that to their great distress overcomes

them; the individual is helpless to alter the outcome by deliberation. Analysts are familiar with the struggles some people endure in trying to deal with such difficulties, and who will say on an occasion when an unsanctioned desire has gained the mastery that it could have been held at bay? Analytical experience in this sphere gives overwhelming support to determinism. The logically-minded reader may agree with this but deny that the conclusion is necessarily applicable to all conflicts. It is not intended, however, that the conclusion should be given general application as the result of an induction from one example; all that is meant is that it is easy to see in any basic conflict. More superficial difficulties in the emotional life provide no evidence against this view, since they cannot form the basis of discussion until analysed into unconscious fundamentals.

It may be added that the libertarian seems willing to reduce the world to the status of a dream—yet even the bizarre details of a dream are determined.

Some difficulties that libertarians may find in determinism may now be considered.

No doubt some will infer that determinism of the deepest mental drives makes it not worth while trying to overcome a desire that the super-ego cannot hold down. This would be to forget, however, that the struggle, too, is determined and is simply the outward form of the mechanism by which one desire gives way to another, thus permitting action. Possibly, also, they may conceive of this inference in the form of advice from one person to another; the determinist saying, 'Give in—the result will be the same', and the libertarian exhorting, 'Strive to conquer the desire'. Advice and exhortation, however, complicate the psychology of the situation and may modify the unconscious forces engaged in conflict.

Another difficulty comes from Mr. Hobart, who, with modern psychology in mind, objects to 'the school that would sweep away all notions of desert, all indignation, whether against public or private offenders, on the ground that free will and responsibility are illusions, and would substitute the moral hospital for the prison.' (p. 26.)

It would be a mistake to suppose that psycho-analytical determinism implied a denial of responsibility—quite the reverse—and, as to the idea of replacing the prison by the moral hospital, who could refuse assent to such a social reform, if he knew that mental therapy might cure criminal tendencies? Mr. Hobart has made a mistake on the first point and adopted a strange attitude to the second; but this may be because of confusing the two, for he may think that the mental hospital project requires us to relinquish moral censure.

This is not so; or rather it is true as a matter of degree. A community, wildly indignant at a crime, will not consider treatment for a sick mind; but an enlightened social reformer may, on the other hand, feel some degree of moral anger. The

difference in degree of response would seem to be fundamentally due to a difference in kind: the anger remaining would be a response to aggression; the anger to be removed would be a defence against an unconscious sympathy with the criminal. Since psycho-analysts are concerned with what their therapeutic technique can change and since what is alterable in mentally undesirable states is of far greater social harm than what cannot be influenced, it is not surprising that they should sometimes talk of what is alterable as being all there is, for it is all there is so far as improvement is concerned. Thus they may give the impression that the moral hospital attitude would exclude anger of every kind. Let us consider the analogue of physical sickness. Civilized man does not make a habit of being indignant at it. Primitive man did so; and indeed it may be met with in civilized communities. A man may be annoyed with someone for giving him influenza, even though at the time when infection took place the carrier may not have known of his condition. Annoyance of this kind is irrelevant to realities and civilized man has largely risen above it in his conscious attitude. Would it not be reasonable, then, to wish to rise above it, where mental illness, such as crime, is concerned?

The present treatment of the free will problem may, it is hoped, reconcile the libertarian to determinism so far as his first contention—that morality implies free will—is concerned; but there is little reason to expect him to agree that the intuition of freedom is a delusion, for this proposal is likely to assail his defences against desires of which he disapproves. Let us now turn, therefore, to the psychology of libertarianism.

For purposes of clarity it is well to distinguish two kinds of freedom to which psycho-analytical therapy leads: freedom from emotional tension (which has nothing to do with the free will controversy) and freedom to admit ownership of previously unsanctioned desires, which means in effect replacing domination on the part of the super-ego by obedience to the reality principle. In this way a human being is freer to control desires that are incompatible with the demands of reality, not, however, in the sense of libertarianism, but in the sense that when thus freed he will more often than formerly come to decisions in which reality-considerations dominate impulses from the id.

Libertarian freedom is of a wholly different kind. Underlying it may be found the *omnipotence of thought*. This strange conception occurs throughout life in many forms. The primitive believes he can injure an enemy by thought alone. The cultured philosopher essays to discover in this way the truth about all reality, and even to create God from an idea. This last is noteworthy. It consists in the celebrated ontological argument for the existence of God, usually attributed to Anselm, and it runs:—God is a concept of perfection which

necessarily embraces all attributes; if he lacked existence he would lack an attribute and thus be imperfect; therefore he exists. It is widely interpreted, I think rightly, as amounting to an inference from an idea to existence; if this is correct, it is clearly a manifestation of the omnipotence of thought. This omnipotence would seem to have dominated those that have accepted this astonishingly crude argument, and some of the greatest thinkers have done so. Another example may be found in a comic opera by Gilbert and Sullivan. The Mikado has ordered an execution, and the executioner, who has not carried out the injunction, has to describe the scene to the Emperor; when his duplicity comes to light, he explains it on the grounds that his Majesty's will is law, if he gives a command it is as good as carried out, and if it is done why not say so—rather a subtle compliment to the omnipotence of the Mikado's thought, which he is inclined to accept.

This delusory conception, which belongs to the primitive layers of the mind, is clearly a wishful compensation for man's lack of power to carry out his desires; and it is surely plain that the libertarian, who wishes to be able to control certain classes of desire, is subject to the delusion, for he would have to exercise the same kind of omnipotent magic in order to interfere with the determinism of mental processes as the primitive believes he employs in magical rituals.

Mr. Hobart, too, argues from idea to its counterpart in reality. 'Under the laws of origin of our conceptions, how were we able to conceive an elementary type of volition that has no counterpart in real life?' (*Ibid.*)

The psychogenesis of the idea can be understood by giving some attention to the interesting peculiarity that the libertarian identifies himself—his 'I'—with his 'higher' motives and uses phrases implying that his 'unworthy' motives are not really part of himself. That is to say, he frames an ego-ideal, a portrait of what he would like himself to be, and, by turning a blind eye to what does not fit into the picture, believes that this forms his true character. The ego-ideal has its main roots in the super-ego; it may in fact be defined as the system of sentiments that come into play when the ego in its dealings with reality is most subject to the influence of the super-ego in the refined and conscious form in which it meets reality. The ego-ideal is an evolutionary product of the prohibitions of the super-ego; it is the adult form of the super-ego. Since the nature of the latter is to refuse sanction to the unadulterated lusts of the id, there is nothing surprising in the libertarian's taking sides with it against the id and using phraseology that refuses by implication to include guilt-fraught desires within the mind. Thus the delusion that determinism admits of exceptions springs from the very nature of human mentality, from primordial sense of guilt and the evolution of the super-ego,

and it is therefore a delusion from which no one, not even the most hardened determinist, can be wholly immune. In view of this, to inaugurate the hypothesis in the mental sphere and to pursue it unswervingly, which Freud succeeded in doing, was indeed a wonderful achievement.

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SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON PSYCHIC REALITY¹

By JOHN M. DORSEY, DETROIT

Perspective. One of Freud's greatest contributions to the welfare of mankind was his discovery of the hypothesis 'free association' and the way in which he tested his hypothesis. Much of Freud's genius found expression as the immediate result of his applying to the mind (by means of the tool 'free association') the law of determinism and his subsequent full acceptance of the evidence of his senses. His capacity for following whole-souledly where the facts of his immediate observation led him made possible his recognition that an idea was real, as real as was any other part of himself. Possibly therein lies his greatest object lesson for all of us.

In time of conflict we are sorely tempted to regress to positions of relative imbalance of authority and responsibility. War is the consuming reality of our day. With its constant impact upon us it may be particularly helpful for each of us to take stock in himself to learn if he is waging the most effective war, insuring the most effective peace. The present world war is recognized as total war. Each one of us is a warrior. Each one of us is also his own enemy. This self-respect makes the most efficient soldier.

We never do anything in this world unless and until we have to. With this understanding uppermost, let us review some ideas to reimpress ourselves about, and lend further dominance to, disciplined thinking. All of the observations that follow bear on our need to be constantly redressing

ourselves by regularly testing our own acceptance of the *idea*.

This study considers the meaning of meaning, that is, the raw material of mental structure, the nature of psychic reality. In general, by considering one matter at a time, it eliminates the conventional psychic distinction set up between ourselves as the subject and the rest of the world as our objects. It keeps reminding us of the fact that 'other' people and things can exist, for us, only in so far as we can provide object presentations, 'doubles', for them by using parts of our own minds to reproduce them.

Such a task has been made possible by the fact that in recent years we have developed a set of words, or terms, for describing the reality within us as distinct from the reality outside us, the world of our minds as apart from the necessities external to them. We now have some hard-earned scientific terms for designating the consideration of meanings that the mind employs for its dealings. Expressions related to the life and death instincts and their derivatives, definitions such as meaning, psychic reality, external necessity, transference, psychic systems, ego, libido, pleasure and reality principles, object presentation, isolation, undoing, rationalization, all bear witness to our growing nomenclature.

Topography. Psycho-analysis deals with massive meanings. We choose the most massive of all for

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examination in the construct 'psychic reality'. The topography of psychic reality comprehends all meaning, that is, all mental structure. The location of the mental structure is on the highest level of development of the organism. The psychic series has the only reality for the psyche involved. All one can ever be is subjective. 'Objective' thinking exercises the mind's capacity for operating object presentations. All observation is self-observation, all consciousness is self-consciousness. Every effective elementary psychology begins with and never strays from this basic psychological truth.

Accepting the meaning of our mind as a functioning organ, it follows that it will do to us what it must do; that it pays to observe what it does; that effective attempts to control its functioning will be restricted to the observing, collecting, understanding, and manipulating of its organic agencies which we recognize as its actions.

It is a necessary condition of human nature to be, and hence express, all that characterizes human nature. Since be it we must and express it we must, it is to our advantage to do so with insight, with our own best interests working. All we can ever do is to speak our own minds. To deny the existence of 'whatever is' is not really a quick remedy. However, to the extent that our minds are undisciplined we are inclined to disown (feel 'apart from') expressed attitudes of 'other' human beings towards their human conditions. Or, we are wont to speak in terms of 'extrinsic' factors operating upon us and, thus, succeed in losing sight of our own participation. When we are unable to accept (recognize as our own, become) the behaviour of 'others', our rejections tend to mask our own vulnerabilities from us. Our active avoidance of, or aversion for, any aspect of living is avoidance of, and aversion for, unwelcome meanings in ourselves.

From our own analyses, while being deprived of our proxies, each one of us has had to discover that he had needed the construct 'others' for the expression of unaccepted parts of himself. Without such 'others' we would have to be (and do) for ourselves what the 'others' had been (and had been doing) for us. We have come to realize that this unrecognized need of people helps to account for their *laissez faire* attitudes towards 'crime' and other intellectually unacceptable behaviour.

Let us re-examine our own mental organ with its weaknesses and strengths. For us, no one is ever more superstitious or more religious or more matter-of-fact or sick or well than we are. We defend our errors, our stupidities, because we must protect them as we would any other part of ourselves. Preserving our illness is a manifestation of self-defence. We attain freedom from such and other human conditions by acquiring insight regarding them. Insight is not undoing. Through isolation or negation we may let the 'religious' believe in God for us and the 'superstitious' do

our believing in magic for us. We do not escape our past; rather, we look to the history of anything for the understanding of it.

Dynamic. The dynamics of psychic reality, all of the dynamics of the mind, include the excitation of all meaning, all cathexes and anti-cathexes of the mental representations of the instincts. The mind must maintain its equilibrium under the impact of psychic events. The function of the mind is to operate meanings, that is, to test, evaluate, and react to them; the essential difference between a well and a sick mind lies in the degree to which the sick mind demands distortion of its meanings.

Picturing the mental representations of the instincts operating in the psychic systems somewhat as in a democracy, every idea and feeling has equal right to representation in our perceptual-conscious system. There are no aliens. All psychological things are potentially equal as far as their title to the quality of consciousness is concerned. And it is by providing such equal rights for each one that freedom for all is made possible. Deprive a single citizen of the mind of his suffrage and every citizen feels his own freedom really threatened. Any citizen may at any time assume such importance for the commonwealth that good government insists upon equal opportunity for all. Even that citizen of the mind we might name 'the wish to kill' can be the most valuable of all citizens now that we are at war. Even that citizen of the mind we might name 'the wish to die' is the most valuable of all citizens 'in the fullness of time'. Our best interests most adequately determine priority for any part of ourselves. Any other basis for conscious perception of ourselves maintains scatter-brain activity.

Ideas of omnipotence (the necessary counterpart of the utter helplessness of our infancy) are carried over into adult life because of our continued insecurity as adults. There is a place for the meaning 'omnipotence' in the mature mind. Causes, as it were, omnipotently produce effects. The necessity for treating mental processes with projection and introjection values, generated very early in life, finds its purest expression where the responsibility for much of one's mental activities is entirely denied, for example, in criminality, mental disease, dreams. 'Other' has its proper meaning in the well mind, as a figurative concept of practical worth in designating external necessities.

Let us again face the fact that psycho-analysis, even, cannot 'analyse away' ideas and feelings of animism, magic, and divinity. Just to consider the concept 'omnipotence' is to participate in it. Merely to entertain the idea 'God' is, to that extent at least, assuming the rôle of God. Simply to give connotation to the word 'ghost' is to live ghost. Reaction-formations can be most un-

obtrusive. It pays us to be effectively aware of the advantages inherent in that kind of self-acceptance we know as surrender. Resistance conceals itself in the rejection of symptoms. Because affective reactions are perceptions of memories of past situations, through displacement and condensation they interfere with our perceiving the present. In judging the divine and the witch doctor, the 'present' may be our own unrecognized exercise of our own omnipotence and of our own superstitiousness. Our minds are susceptible to all these considerations of the inscrutable. The question is: How vulnerable are they on these scores? How much are their meanings disguised?

Growing up to accept psychic reality is the final process in everyone's weaning. What about shortcuts to this freedom? Experience is the only conveyor of meaning. All experience is self-experience. As analysts we have this understanding dominant: discovering the repressed meanings of the unconscious ego always involves a change in the organization of the conscious ego and never involves an executive action of the conscious ego. Conscious ego growth, that is, the development of reality sense, is a process of first losing one's self and then finding one's self in one's observations. Without this development the conscious ego, having relatively little capacity for libido contact with the unconscious ego, feels inadequate to accept psychic reality and defends itself with anxiety against such synthesis.

The Economic. The economy of psychic reality involves the measure and disposition of all meaning, the account of the total psychic energy. Education to psychic reality is a furtherance of ego synthesis that develops the most economic freedom of psychic action and provides the best articulation with external necessity, the external world. An individual's optimal mental health is defined as his capacity to express all of himself to his own best interests. Motivation for the unreserved acceptance of psychic reality is optimal mental health.

As a person integrates his mind, he discovers that everything that he cannot experience is an empty abstraction. He learns that, for him, all possession is self-possession, all control is self-control. In return for this disenchantment the whole real world is offered him. When we observe the conduct of anyone else, the conditions of sampling the situation obtain. Thinking and feeling are economic and safe forms of action that may provide us with opportunities for us to do on a small scale anything and everything that is humanly possible.

We live in a psychological world; whatever in the world concerns our minds is psychological. There is a difference, however, as to whether we use our minds for investigating our minds (pure psychology) or whether we use them for work on

other materials (applied psychology). Workers whose research involves using their minds on mixtures of 'pure' and 'applied' psychology, for example, educators, sociologists, and psychosomaticists, can avoid confusing categories of meaning only with the greatest of understanding.

Ethics and Psychic Reality. We work with the theory that it is impossible for a person to consider fully, or point directly towards, his pleasure before he can consider himself fully. To the extent that all of one's self enters into the determination of what is pleasant, the pleasure principle may be seen as aligning itself with the reality principle.

Whenever a person acts to his own ultimate disadvantage he is punishing himself and any pleasure accruing from his part-self indulgence is apparent rather than real. However, as his awareness of his inclusiveness increases, he is forced to take more of himself under consideration in the concept of his pleasure. Only what is to the whole person's advantage can offer pleasure to an integrated person. In the integrated mind the pleasure and reality principles merge economically towards the common goal: the attainment of instinct gratification in acting to one's own best interests in total representation of one's self.

We feel guilty about that behaviour over which we have no control. Guilt is an attempt at control which is primitive and which commonly mis-carries. Justice is not an experience reserved for 'a next world'. Justice is a mortal value and a mortal experience. Every day is judgement day. We, here and now, receive our rewards and forfeits for 'good' and 'bad' respectively done. 'Good' is to our advantage. 'Bad' is to our disadvantage. Nothing is more true of our endopsychic economy than that we pay as we go. We never 'owe' anything. Each one of our transgressions is costly and is fully paid for. We get what we pay for—only what we pay for. We get nothing for nothing. To accuse ourselves about any of our behaviour is to imply that we did not need to do what we did do, that we could just as well have done other than what we did do.

We derive our only effective motivation for tempering our violent emotions when we fully understand their boomerang nature. Only the anaesthetic hand is allowed to 'rest' on the hot stove. We tend to renounce our lying when we add consciousness to the fact that we are lying to ourselves. The same economic handling of our cheating, fearing, hating, loving and all of the rest of our endopsychic sequences follows our finding ourselves in this real sense.

Acceptance of psychic reality acquires significance in the light of understanding of motivation and the budgeting of human energy. This extent of reality sense is essential for effective external necessity relationships, because only to the extent that our psychic reality is respected by us can we

respect the individuality of anybody and anything of our external object world.

Sociology and Psychic Reality. The mind is made up of pairs of opposite meanings. Opposite meanings define each other. Now the opposite of the idea 'individual' is the idea 'group'. A group is composed of individuals. To be an individual means to be able to accept psychic reality. A society's reason to be is to further the welfare of its individuals. We are now at war to preserve our democratic form of government because, more than any other kind of government, it observes the truth of psychic reality, the dignity of the individual.

Every person constitutes society for himself just to the extent that society has meaning for him; 'and by meaning we understand significance, intention, tendency and a position in a sequence of mental concatenations.'² What do our cells care about 'others'? Altruism is a psychological device (sublimation) for sharing experience with one's fellow man. It results from an individual's undeceiving himself on the extent, inclusiveness and capacity for development of his egoism. His act of charity is an act of mature self-love in which such attitudes as the fear of self-gain, the wish for self-effacement and the denial that he represents 'others' for himself are not dominant. In mature people childhood selfishness (egoism) has altered to become grown-up selfishness (altruism). Only when we are capable of accepting the fact that anything that we are experiencing is an exercise of our own selves, can our observation be an accurate one and our orientation non-pharisaical.

We think of ourselves as participating in a social organization but we have it only to the extent that we are it. We are it to the extent that we are meaning it. When a person develops enough awareness of his psychic reality to become an individual he will sense within himself the advantages of good government and sound social organization. A person is a 'social' person only to the extent that the various parts within himself are social towards each other.

Our perceptions, dependent though some of them may be upon external stimuli for their arousal, are we, just as our ideas and other parts of our bodies are we. Indeed certain of our perceptions are treated regularly by projection ('distance' receptors).

The experiencing of one's self by perceiving another individual, for example, by seeing him or hearing him, is the germ of the 'social instinct'. A human being groups more naturally with his kind than with other kinds of individuals or objects because sensing human beings through his perceptual-conscious system arouses greater meaning in him. Perceiving anyone, or anything—impermanant as the experience is in the perceptual-

conscious system—is momentarily meaning that 'anyone' or 'anything'. For this process the presence of the external object is indispensable, the developmental layer of the ego the most recent, and conscious ego synthesis is not prerequisite. Identification, in the preconscious system, may be a sequence of this earlier continuation of the external stimulus. However, nothing is more unknown and uncertain than what the perceptual-conscious system may be called upon to handle, meeting first, as it does, external necessity, and its new meanings must be relatively unaltered by old ones.

The quality of impermanence attributed to the internal sequence (image, object presentation occurring in the perceptual-conscious system) of the external excitant lends itself to repression. Therefore it may well be that this most recent reality system, particularly, needs further mastery through acceptance.

Psycho-somatic Medicine and Psychic Reality. Psychological illness is characterized by the patient's need to disguise meanings and his resulting impaired ability to act as a whole person in his relationships towards his objects. Lacking self-meaning (integration) he cannot, as a whole person, relate himself realistically to objects; he cannot 'take hold', 'hang on' and 'let go' wholeheartedly in accordance with his best interests.

The course of a psycho-analysis involves a two-stage decompression of the patient's repressed self-meanings: first, the bringing of all of the analysand's material into his analyst-analysand relationship ('pointing of the transference') and then, as that degree of the return of the repressed is supportable, exposing it as the intra-personal situation that it is ('resolving the transference'). Psycho-analytic treatment offers the analysand opportunity to experience his meanings, his own psychic reality, more accurately—that is, more undisguised.

Every analytic hour reveals the analysand's seeing much of himself in the only way he can bear to see himself, that is, disguised as 'other' persons and as 'other' things and events. Through this dilution of his human nature the patient's lack of integration publishes itself. Discovering that he is as much his dislikes as he is his likes and that he is all that he can in any way experience—in fact, that he belongs together—is coincident with his integrating himself.

The most significant single criterion for differentiating analysts from other workers on the psychological level, and analysts among themselves, is their grasp of themselves. His own mind is the analyst's only tool. Acceptance of all of one's meanings, as we have observed, is synonymous with integration. We recognize greatness in a man in his ability to embrace his whole being, to

² Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, 48.

know that he is his own everything. Responsibility for being an individual is possible only to the person who has achieved this true comprehension of his psychic reality.

The meaning of meaning as discovered by Freud focalizes scientific research on the true sources of accuracy and error for all human effort. The discovery that psychiatric symptoms are meanings that had to be disguised in order that their import be concealed from the patient provided the basis of psychopathology and of the psycho-analytic method of treatment. Instinct aims beyond those the conscious ego has tested and found safe as to object investment and frustration charge are meanings that are universally distorted, disguised, by anxiety. Accustomed to sensing the ulterior, let us ask ourselves: How much does our term 'psycho-somatic' favour a concession to the fact of psycho-analysis and how much does it favour a watering of all that psycho-analysis stands for? Is it a term conceived and cultured in the service of service?

Freud's definition of meaning as 'significance, intention, tendency and a position in a sequence of mental concatenations' exposes de-reistic thinking applied to the psychological level of the body. Either one is treating psychological illness and hence working with meanings on the psychological level of the body (transference neurosis) or one is not. Meaning is peculiar to the mental process and is the exclusive property of the psychological level of the body. A mind is able to experience the meaning of anything in nature only to the extent that it can reproduce that 'anything' with its own psychological constructs.

Meaning is the evidence of psychic being, the *sine qua non* of all that is mental, the substance of psychic reality. To be is to be expressed; meaning is the fundamental raw material of self-expression as it occurs through mental action. Meaning is the form cause takes in mental matter. Meanings are the materials out of which mental operations are built up. Disguised meanings are the structures of psychopathology. Can it be that the idea 'psycho-somatic' represents a disguised meaning? On the other hand, does this idea lead straight to the fact that meanings are structural values? To be able to know something about what we say and do is one matter; to be able to know all about it is another. Whether the psycho-somaticist knows that he is dealing with the psychological level of the body where mental illness is concerned, whether he is turning to other levels of the body than the psychological, only the individual psycho-somaticist can know.

In conclusion, it is well said that to be able to frame a question correctly is already to know half. Let us ask ourselves if our capacity for acceptance of meaning is truly valued? For example, how much is our understanding of psychic reality such that it can be effective consistently, as a governor that makes prevention of excess possible? And how much is it such that it can be effective only at intervals, somewhat after the fashion of an emergency brake? How much is it serving us only as a device for never having to 'go without anything' and how much is it truly in the service of service? How much is it a free, undisguised, meaning?

THE RÔLE OF MENSTRUATION IN HUMAN PHYLOGENESIS AND ONTOGENESIS¹

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PART I

The psychic reactions of present-day groups and individuals have been shaped by past events. Psycho-analysis attempts the reconstruction of these events by considering sexual evolution, social behaviour and psycho-neurotic tendencies in relation to functional disturbances, and does so mainly through the study of the individual's ontogenetic development and adaptability to the social milieu and the consideration of the forces and mental mechanisms involved.

Freud repeatedly drew attention to the inadequacy of our knowledge of certain aspects of psychic evolution, particularly of the evolution of culture as a special process comparable to the normal growth of an individual to maturity. (See, for instance, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 1929.) If we wished to know the value of recognizing this

inadequacy, he urged us to attack another problem and put the question: What are the influences to which the evolution of culture owes its origin, how did it arise, and what determined its course?

This study deals more particularly with the first two of these three factors and has special reference to the genesis of ambivalence, incest dread, sadism and masochism. It endeavours to throw some light on the causes of the transformation of instinct which has resulted in the evolution of human culture.

Freud, in *Totem and Taboo* (1912-13), traced the origins of culture so far as psycho-analysis understood them at that time, taking care to point out very distinctly the considerable limits to our knowledge. Thus he wrote (Pelican Edition, 148): 'In this evolution I am at a loss to indicate the place of the great maternal deities.' This was

¹ Greatly expanded from a paper read before the Fourteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Marien-

bad, 1936. Evidence in support of the theory here given in outline will be published later in book form.

tantamount to saying that psycho-analysis had yet to unravel the rôle played by the mother's sexuality in ontogenetic evolution. Again (*ibid*, 155): 'We have so frequently had occasion to show the ambivalence of the emotions in its real sense, that is to say, the coincidence of love and hate towards the same object, at the root of important cultural formations. We know nothing about the origin of this ambivalence.' Although we may regard this statement partly as an example of Freud's inherent modesty, yet it is a fact that the relation of the origin of this ambivalence to female sexuality had not then been fully elucidated, although its connection with the repression of incest and the father complex was known. And again (*ibid*, 127): 'One is compelled to subscribe to Frazer's resigned statement, namely, that we do not know the origin of incest dread and do not know even how to guess at it. None of the solutions of the riddle so far advanced seems satisfactory to us.' This statement shows clearly that a considerable portion of the problem remained to be solved.

Freud referred again to the inadequacy of our knowledge of female sexuality and man's reaction thereto in his chapter on 'The Psychology of Women' in his *New Introductory Lectures* (1933).

The following approach, which differs slightly in orientation and perhaps more in exact definition from my early researches (1927 and 1928), is a further attempt to show broadly the genetic source of these problems and to provide a biological basis for the discussion of clinical material.

Since one of the avowed objects of psycho-analysis is the cure of the neuroses by bringing about a re-mastery of the instincts where repression has failed, it has to apply itself to obtaining as complete a knowledge as possible of the vicissitudes of the instincts in the course of the upward trends of both ontogenetic and phylogenetic evolution.

There are, we know, two considerable obstacles to our analytical endeavours: one, the still incompletely resolved origins of the neuroses with particular relation to incest dread, ambivalence and the conflicting tendencies of affects; the other, the universal defence mechanisms which somehow or another hinder our understanding of these phenomena which appear to be connected with unknown, or insufficiently understood, events in our prehistoric evolution. Our knowledge of the origins of the taboos, like those of the neuroses, is still incomplete; and it would appear that there still remains a part of our buried id to be brought into consciousness if the *tendencies* towards individual neuroses on the one hand, and racial outbursts of a neurotic and paranoid character on the other, are to be brought under greater control—if reason is finally to triumph over blind reaction.

In our scientific observations and conjectures we are prone to error. Those universal defence

mechanisms, the heirs of the taboos, render it comparatively easy for us to overlook material the meaning of which would otherwise be obvious; hence perhaps the saying that 'the simplest truths are often the last to be believed'. It is easier to rationalize rather than to analyse and explain correctly, to elaborate rather than to reduce to the simplest terms—to mention but two of the numerous pitfalls with which the scientific exploration of the truth has to contend.

As Freud (1937) so aptly put it: 'In its relations with the id the ego is paralysed by its restrictions or blinded by its errors, and the result in the sphere of psychic processes may be compared to the progress of a poor walker in a country which he does not know.' We are all of us such poor walkers—nevertheless let us turn our faltering steps again in the direction of that deep id material, once the chief object of psycho-analytical research. The deeper we are able to penetrate into the profound secrets of the id, the more clearly eventually shall we understand the causes of amnesia and mental dissociation.

At the commencement of my researches I was under the influence of deep material which had erupted from my unconscious after prolonged self-analysis. In the absence of any psycho-analytical knowledge to guide me—for at that time little or no attention had been given by psycho-analysis to the rôle played by menstruation in *ontogenetic* evolution—I turned to physiology and anthropology in search of information connected with my personal discoveries and of parallel material which I had observed in Hinduism. I was then led into an error which I now wish to correct: from the study of the then existing physiological literature I accepted too easily the current finding of the majority of physiologists, that the analogy between the heat of animals and the menstruation of monkeys and human females was very much more complete than now proves actually to be the case.

I hope to be able, in the course of this paper, to clarify to some extent this very obscure subject.

Science has ever been baffled both (1) as to the reasons for the gradual evolution of the heat of the lower animals into the menstruation of the primates, and (2) as to the causes of the psychological reactions associated with the latter in both man and woman.

Our approach will commence by being more biological and physiological than psychological; nevertheless it will lead us eventually to the heart of our problem. Although some understanding of the physiology of this process will not give us the solution either of the psychic inhibitions or of the social and pathological disturbances connected with it, yet such knowledge is indispensable for the adequate appreciation of the problems involved, in which physiological and psychological processes

bear a close affinity and react the one upon the other.

The primary biological causes of the changes in the physiological process still remain obscure, though physiology has made very considerable progress of late years regarding knowledge of the glandular secretions which influence the process itself.

Let us first consider the findings of the earlier research workers on this subject. According to Havelock Ellis (1899), menstruation in the past has been widely supposed to be due to a rhythmic contraction of the uterus, the result of a disappointed preparation for impregnation, a kind of miniature childbirth, the abortion of a decidua. It was held to be in accordance with the facts that the entire pro-œstrous process of heat in animals is of the nature of a preparation for the lodgement of the ovum. (*Ibid.* 1936 ed.; 94 f.)

It was long ago pointed out that the repeated œstrus of unimpregnated animals in conditions of captivity was to some extent comparable to menstruation in primates, including human beings. This suggests to us the idea that possibly, back in the dim past, it may have been some form of frustration which, interfering with impregnation, brought about a physiological change in the females, resulting in continuous menstuous cycles replacing periodicity such as has occurred in the primates; but, if so, science at present knows little or nothing of the circumstances which occasioned this change. It would appear highly probable, however, that among our pre-human forebears menstruation would have been infrequent—since pregnancy followed by prolonged lactation would have continually intervened.

We know little, too, of the reasons for the monthly rhythm of menstruation in human beings, though it is commonly held, following Darwin, to be associated with the lunar revolutions. It is to be observed that its lunar monthly occurrence is only well marked in the human species, though menstruation occurs over varying intervals in monkeys. Amongst some human races, owing particularly to the severity of climatic conditions, it either occurs at longer intervals, or is in abeyance in winter, as with the Eskimos, Laplanders, Greenlanders.

The condition referred to as menstruation is a part of a continuous process, the actual bleeding being merely the climax of a cycle which is in constant flux and reflux. Amongst the lower animals the breeding times are mostly a matter of seasonal influence dependent upon the climatic conditions prevalent in the particular country.

Imperfect as is our comprehension of the human phenomena, our knowledge of the corresponding phenomena among the apes is even more fragmentary, owing to the difficulties of observation under suitable conditions (i.e. in the wild state), and its obscurity has led to endless controversy.

The œstrous cycle of the lower mammals is better understood owing to the fact that observation and experiment have been easier. The heat or œstrus of the lower animals is divided into two phases: the pro-œstrus, which we have already noted as a preparatory phase for the lodgement of the ovum, and the œstrus, the culminating event of the follicular phase, when ovulation occurs and the female permits copulation. This condition is periodic with most of the lower mammals, occurring once or twice during the year, usually in spring or autumn. There is a great deal of progression in the upward march of this phenomenon as we approach our own allied zoological series. Progression is not only towards greater frequency with higher evolution, but there is also a change in the character of the discharge. The more highly evolved the animal, the more copious the catamenial flow; until we meet the monkeys, where this aspect of the discharge is well marked. In the human the bleeding has still further increased, and seasonal periodicity has been completely replaced by the monthly cycle, although the seasons still exercise some influence in the psychic sphere on the libidinal and aggressive instincts which affect mating.

The above remarks, largely gleaned from the compilation of Havelock Ellis (1899), summarize the chief conclusions arrived at up till about twenty-five years ago, and the analogy between heat and menstruation which had then been concluded. There was, nevertheless, as he pointed out (*ibid.*; 98), a tendency on the part of certain investigators, e.g. Lawson Tait, Beard, etc., to deny this analogy, which they did on the ground that women have a disinclination to be approached by men at the time of menstruation—a statement which appears to be correct for the majority of women in this phase of our culture. Havelock Ellis countered these arguments, saying that many women have strong inclinations at the time but are inhibited from disclosing them as a result of the fear of arousing *social disapproval* and individual man's disgust. He drew attention, however, to what he calls the remarkable fact (to which I also gave considerable attention in my earlier publications, but which I did not then understand any more than he) that, while in most animals the period of heat is the only period of sexual intercourse, amongst all human races, from the very lowest, the time of menstruation, thought to be analogous with heat, is the one time when sexual intercourse is for the most part strictly prohibited, usually under severe penalties—even of death itself. This, he said, was a social and *not* a physiological fact; so he disputed the grounds upon which those authors endeavour to reject the analogy between heat and menstruation. There was, as we shall presently see, something correct though inadequately understood on both sides of the discussion. I hope to be able to show

in what follows that avoidance by the man during the female's period is variously conditioned: partly by the fact that it is not (as previously supposed) the natural time for conjugation but mostly by psychological factors belonging to the universal fear of blood and the association of that fear with the repression of incest. Very considerable progress has fortunately since been made in our knowledge, both by physiologists in the physiology of the sexual processes and by psycho-analysts in the psychology of the inhibitory factors, though the rôle of menstruation as an inhibitory factor has received but little attention, apart from the researches of Groddeck (1923), Mary Chadwick (1932) and myself (1927 and 1928). (Previously the only work of any considerable value had been contributed by anthropology in relation to the taboos.)

During the last few decades experimental physiologists have advanced our knowledge of the physiological aspects of these phenomena considerably. A fairly complete summary of their findings was given by Zuckerman (1932).

An excellent synthesis of the physiological researches of late years has been given by Robson (1934) who, from the point of view of an orthodox representation of modern knowledge of the physiology of the menstrual cycle, has supplied a long-felt need and brings to light various factors the knowledge of which did not exist when I wrote my embryonic paper on the menstruation complex. He remarks (*ibid.*; 4 f.): 'Although much progress has been made in the understanding of the causation of the morphological changes associated with the sexual and reproductive cycles, the factors responsible for activating the mating and maternal reflexes are to a great extent still obscure.' He makes no reference, however, to those other psychic factors brought to light by anthropology and psycho-analysis, which are responsible for *inhibiting* sexuality and which play such a deep part as causative factors of illness in those very disturbances in the sexual sphere towards an understanding of which his work is so helpful.

When we turn to the psychological literature of the same period we find that, similarly, considerable advance has been made in our knowledge of the psychology of these inhibitory factors, principally by psycho-analytical research, but that here psycho-analysis has also been working without knowledge of the recent advances in physiology. It is to be hoped that this paper will to some extent bring the views of anthropologists, psycho-analysts and physiologists more into harmony.

To obtain a clear understanding of the situation we have to consider the heat, i.e. pro-œstrus and œstrus of animals, in relation to the whole human menstrual cycle, instead of only in relation to the monthly flow. It will then be seen that the analogy between heat and menstruation requires further analysis and that menstrual bleeding is not

analogous to the *complete* heat of the animals, but only to a portion of it, as Robson so clearly demonstrates.

According to him (*ibid.*; 95) 'the changes in the uterus brought about by the activity of the corpus luteum constitute a preparation for nidation of a fertilized ovum. If nidation occurs and pregnancy supervenes, the alterations due to the corpus luteum are continued. In the absence of gestation the uterine changes are, however, interrupted and degeneration of the endometrium occurs, constituting menstruation.' This is the conception of menstruation that has been held for some few years by physiologists—it assumes that 'the process is degenerative in type and occurs in a proliferated endometrium. The initiation of menstruation is passive in character, being dependent upon the comparatively sudden cessation of the secretory activity of the corpus luteum.' It will thus be seen that menstruation is *not* the natural time for impregnation as is the heat of the lower animals, but results from the absence of impregnation and is a breaking-down of the physiological process analogous to heat as a result of non-impregnation. When impregnation takes place, menstruation ceases.

One factor having a particular bearing on our discussion and one by which my personal interest and views have been stimulated is the biological function of the pro-œstrus of animals to which so far science has devoted but little attention. Visual, olfactory, and gustatory stimuli excite the male sexual impulse, and through this excitation the male appears to be libidinally bound to the female until fecundation takes place at the œstrus, unless ousted by a rival. This attraction, however, is apparently, in the opinion of some physiologists, independent of the mating instinct, which precedes it in many species of herd animals.

Heape (1900) long ago stated his belief that the period of the menstrual flow in women corresponded to the congestive stage or pro-œstrus of female animals, i.e. the period when the female animal attracts the male but does not permit penetration. But in animals the œstrus or period of sexual desire of the female immediately follows the pro-œstrus and is a direct consequence of it; whereas, as stated above, modern physiology shows that menstruation is a break-down of the process owing to non-impregnation.

It would seem that there is in some animals a direct relation between ovulation and receptivity, whilst in others coitus induces ovulation (e.g. in the cat, ferret, rabbit). The consensus of opinion regarding ovulation both in the human female and in the monkey is that it normally occurs midway between the periods, but with many exceptions in the case of the human. Well-recognized authorities still hold divergent opinions, and a full understanding of human ovulatory phenomena must await additional and more exact data. In the

intermediate time between the successive menstruations rapid muscular contractions are said to occur in the human oviduct (Snyder), and comparison with other mammals suggests that such increased activity is correlated with the downward passage of the ovum (Westman). During the first period of the heat in most of the higher animals, e.g. dogs, the male follows the female about, smelling and licking the female organ; he is highly aggressive and fights other male intruders.² The female permits the *fore-pleasures*, but *energetically resists* attempts at penetration on the part of the male until ovulation has taken place, i.e. the appropriate time for fecundation has arrived. Both sexes are highly excitable at this time.

The oestrous cycle is important, because it is responsible for the most striking internal changes affecting the disposition of the female animal, as well as for presenting to the male some of the most powerful libidinal stimuli, at the same time calling into activity the aggressive component of the sexual instinct and driving it to the mastery of its object and to sexual union.

Some physiologists have compared the oestrous cycles of the lower animals with the menstrual cycle of the apes and monkeys and those of the human female; they have not, however, so far as I am aware, sufficiently considered the very important changes in behaviour that have resulted from the repression of incest in human beings. It is just this change in the reaction of the male to the female sexuality which is the outstanding difference between the breeding of humans and of monkeys.³

The most important discoveries in the physiological field of late years relate to the question of the hormones, with the activity of which sexual desire (which psycho-analysis speaks of as libido) is closely associated. The differences between the *behaviour* of the lower animals and that of the apes and monkeys is said to be dependent on the varying degree of activity of the rut-hormone.

The pro-oestrous behaviour (not to be confused with the time of the copulation), which is still present amongst the monkeys and apes,⁴ has almost disappeared in adult humans. It remains mostly only as a deep precipitate in the id, whilst in the ego it is associated with the reaction-

formations of shame, disgust and guilt, the previous attraction and pleasure belonging to the pro-oestrus having become largely unpleasurable, revolting and disgusting to the senses through repressions associated with the prohibition of incest, reinforced by the anal repressions which were one of the later consequences of the human culture.

I would suggest, as a hypothesis only, that among pre-human males the menstrual bleeding of the females was one of the factors which aroused aggressiveness towards rivals and tenderness and possessiveness towards their females.

The partial frustration of the instinctual impulses forms an important functional basis of the neuroses, a full understanding of which has been hidden from us owing to the universal defence mechanisms inherent in the taboos. This remark is in keeping with what Freud (1933; 99) says: 'Conative impulses which have never got beyond the id, and even impressions which have been pushed down into the id by repression, are *virtually immortal*. . . . They can only be recognized as belonging to the past, deprived of their significance, and robbed of their charge of energy, after they have been made conscious by the work of analysis, and no small part of the therapeutic effect of analytic treatment rests upon this fact. *It is constantly being borne in upon me that we have made far too little use for our theory of the indubitable fact that the repressed remains unaltered by the passage of time. This seems to offer us the possibility of an approach to some really profound truths.*' (My italics, C.D.D.) This is Freud in an optimistic mood, and is very encouraging. The method of investigation which he has so well and truly forged may eventually help us to unearth still deeper factors of the id, towards which goal this paper is a contribution.

It is possible that we shall never know the causes of the evolutionary change in the female's physiology from the heat condition of the lower animals to the menstrual period of the monkeys—a change which lies in the field of biological research. For the present we may perhaps rest content if we can show what brought about the further and presumably *much less remote* change between the breeding conditions of the immediately

² These *pleasure* aspects of the pro-oestrus are in the nature of sense perceptions, which in psycho-analysis we at present are more prone to associate with the oral and anal phases, where they are more easily observable, than with the phallic and genital phases.

³ This question of *behaviour and reaction* is perhaps more particularly the field of anthropologists and psycho-analysts than of physiologists. The first of these had already collected the most valuable material concerning the incest and menstruation taboos before the advent of psycho-analysis, but it remained for psycho-analysis to elucidate the importance of parallel material in ontogenesis and the rôle it played in the psycho-neuroses, and thus to throw further light on the valuable findings of anthropology, whose workers, however, with a few exceptions, had not the advantages of a knowledge of unconscious

functioning. It now rests with us to study and elucidate the ontogenetic reactions of both sexes in this relation and the influence of these reactions upon present-day human development, and, with field anthropologists with a knowledge of psycho-analysis, to trace this evolution in their field work.

⁴ The sexual attractiveness of a female monkey, according to Zuckerman (1932; 55), 'is not constant, but varies rhythmically. . . . It is strongest . . . about the middle of a menstrual cycle, but, although it decreases greatly at other times, it is never entirely absent.' Thus it is strongest about the time ovulation occurs, and, if this finding is correct, it corresponds with the wave of desire on the human female's part which, it is held by many observers, occurs about the same time.

pre-human and human beings—a change in which psychology is concerned.

Freud, in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1929; 66 and 77), after reading my embryonic researches, referred to my work in two footnotes. These notes, however, do not convey my personal view nor am I in agreement with them; they were his own reflections on reading my two papers, afterwards published in *Imago* (1927 and 1928). He referred to the fact which I had emphasized that though the periodicity of the sexual process has perished yet the effect on mental sexual excitation has been almost reversed. He connected this change primarily with the diminishing importance of the olfactory stimuli, which, following his early papers, he hypothesized as being due to man's erection from the earth. According to this theory the function of the olfactory stimuli, which previously had produced sexual excitement in the mind of the male, was taken over by visual stimuli, which could operate permanently instead of intermittently like the olfactory ones. He further put forward the hypothesis that the taboo of menstruation had its origin in this organic repression resulting from man's erection from the earth, which acted as a barrier against a phase of development that had been passed beyond.

It may be argued, however, that the menstruation taboo (not menstruation itself) must have been of considerably later origin than man's assumption of an upright gait. There are, I believe, sufficient reasons for us to conclude that the taboo belongs to the animistic phase of evolution which followed the repression of incest with the incorporation of the castration fear into the human psyche. Freud, in my opinion, was much nearer the truth in his earlier work, *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13; 102), in which, contrary to this later supposition, he stated definitely (no doubt following Frazer and other anthropologists who had reached the same conclusion) that 'the countless taboo rules to which the women of savages are subject during their menstrual periods are motivated by the superstitious dread of blood'—a remark with which I am in complete agreement. At anyrate, these two widely different origins of the taboo, chronologically so far apart, can hardly be reconciled. If, however, having accepted the later one, we were to remain content with it, we should not be true to the scientific method of research, which demands of us that we should go farther and attempt the solution of the psychic origins of this superstitious dread of blood.

I agree with Landauer (1936) that the contradictory tendencies of affects in the human being are typical for the human being alone. In discussing the failure to adjust the conflicting tendencies, Landauer mentions the typical behaviour of animals in heat and notes that it is only when the positive tendencies in the human

have been partly bound by the negative ones, which undergo displacement and projection, that human 'faithfulness' comes into existence. To which I should like to add the hypothesis that it is in this manner that the *binding functions* of the pro-œstrus of animals and the menstruation of pre-human beings were replaced by *psychic bonds* at a higher cultural level.

According to Freud (1929; 78 n.), 'the whole of sexuality . . . is threatened with falling a victim to the organic repression consequent upon man's adoption of the erect posture and the lowering in value of the sense of smell; so that since that time the sexual function has been associated with a resistance not susceptible of further explanation, which puts obstacles in the way of full satisfaction and forces it away from its sexual aim towards sublimations and displacements of libido.' I cannot agree with this purely hypothetical observation of Freud's, for reasons which will, I hope, become clear in the course of this paper. It is my opinion that these resistances *are* capable of explanation when the repression belonging to female sexuality and man's reactions to it have been overcome, and the origins of the taboos discovered.

There is little in biology to support the theory of specific organic repression *at this particular level*. It has been observed that some change in the physiology of the females of primates took place, but as to when this change came about and what the causes of it were we remain so far ignorant.

In my view the phylogenetic frustration of the binding function of menstruation, the non-impregnation of the female at the time of her first period and the incorporation of the fear of castration into the human psyche (so that menstruation came to have a consciously *repelling* instead of *attractive* effect on the mental excitation of the human male) is a more potent concept than the purely hypothetical one of organic repression associated with man's assumption of an upright gait—an evolution which surely can only have taken place, comparatively speaking, over a very much greater space of time and which clearly far preceded the repression of incest.

Allowing that a lowering in the sense of smell caused a weakening of the olfactory value of the object, yet it is difficult to see how this would necessarily result in psychic resistances, such as we are able to observe in analysis, without some psychological threat to the instinct of self-preservation. If, however, one regards the matter from the point of view of the *sight* of the menstruous woman confirming the fear of being eaten and of being castrated, we only bring it into relation with that 'horror' of the female organ first described by Freud (1905). We do no harm to psycho-analytical theory if we add the effects produced upon the *fore-pleasures* by the repression of the elementary gustatory and olfactory pleasure elements and

avoid assuming too easily that the repression of anal erotism is the only factor demonstrable clinically.

Perhaps I am only being *plus royaliste que le roi* in my estimation of what is implied by the castration fear. The fear of death by being eaten and the fear of castration which re-inforced it were surely (taking into consideration the terrible puberty rites by which these fears were later impressed upon the soul) psychical factors sufficient to place obstacles in the way of full satisfaction and capable of forcing the libido towards sublimation and displacement—without the need to hypothesize an organic repression for which there is no evidence at this phase of evolution, since we know that the assumption of an upright gait far preceded the repression of incest.

Freud (1929; 78 n.), with his usual scientific integrity, says that these findings 'are but unconfirmed possibilities, not yet scientifically substantiated'⁵. From this remark we may surmise that he was not entirely satisfied with this assumption of an organic resistance insusceptible of further explanation. I, too, recognize some earlier change, but suspect it to have been connected with the physiological change from heat to menstruation, which change, however, I separate from the much later and purely *psychological* reactions towards menstruation which appear to have their origin in the repression of incest, from which time, for the reasons already explained, I believe that the retardation of human development commenced. This tends to be confirmed by the fact that *no* such retardation takes place in the monkeys and apes. I would suggest that it is just here that we have to suspect that some of the psychological resistances which have so far eluded explanation will eventually be found to have their origin.

It appears to me that man's assumption of an upright gait, great as its consequences have undoubtedly been, has in this particular connection been given an importance which only bears an indirect relationship to the much later phase of evolution in which the normal development of the sexual instinct was frustrated by the repression of incest which caused that breach in development which differentiates the human from the rest of the animal world.

Perhaps Freud's hypothesis regarding man's erection from the earth is capable of a psychological explanation and belongs to deeply repressed memories of the individual's prehistoric past. In ontogenesis the upright gait of adults has a psychological magnitude of importance to the crawling infant which we can hardly over-

emphasize, and this is borne out by the immensity of the satisfaction of the child when it first begins to walk and its extreme pride in the achievement.⁶

As to the part which odour plays in this evolution, it is perhaps not out of place here to observe that throughout the world odoriferous drugs have been used for many centuries by both savages and cultured people in the treatment of hysteria. There is good reason to suppose that their therapeutic value is largely due to the smell satisfaction which they offer to the sufferer's unconscious, where the forbidden olfactory pleasure quiets the frustrated impulse (Daly and White, 1930). This points to the probability that the repression of smell in ontogenesis plays a more important rôle in the neuroses than it would do if it had been rendered relatively unimportant by the diminution of the olfactory sense. It is not, of course, my intention to deny the easily demonstrable fact that the importance of the sense of smell has steadily diminished in the upward course of evolution, which is shown by the physiology of the brain.

Freud took an early interest in the olfactory manifestations of neurotics; as far back as 1909 he remarked, that 'a tendency to pleasure in smell, which has become extinct since childhood may play a part in the genesis of neurosis'; but later (1929; 67 n.) he was inclined to attribute this disappearance to the repression of anal erotism alone. In a discussion of fetishism (1905; 23 n.) he emphasized the importance of a coprophilic pleasure in smell which has been lost through repression. 'Feet and hair are strong-smelling objects which are exalted into fetishes after the sensation of smell has become unpleasant and been abandoned. Accordingly, in the perversion corresponding to foot-fetishism, the dirty and evil-smelling foot is the only sexual object.'

We would here observe that the so-called ill-smelling foot does not smell ill to these perverts. Perverts in this sense are merely people who consider smells *pleasurable* which the normal man and woman on a higher cultural level find *unpleasant*. They behave in an archaic manner, having regressed to an earlier level by virtue of their castration and other fears, and remain fixated to this level, whilst their interest has been displaced on to a less terrifying part of the body which still supplies the olfactory sense with some satisfaction. It is, I think, important for us to note that fetishism is usually accompanied by a strong object-fixation—here the frustrated smell-pleasure is found to be related to the fixation to the object and the terrifying sexual organ from which

⁵ In another passage in the same work Freud (1929; 66 n.) refers to man's erection from the earth as exposing the genitals and thus evoking feelings of shame. I am of opinion that feelings of shame connected with the genitals belong to *much* later times than man's assumption of an upright gait. Moreover, by the assumption of an upright gait, the *female's* genitals were *less* exposed than

when she went 'on all fours'.

⁶ Further, there is evidence in dreams, folklore and myths of the importance of the parents by virtue of their upright gait and the ease with which they move from one place to another—a factor which possibly has a still deeper biological memory trace of a time when the young clung to their mothers as they jumped from tree to tree.

it has regressed. The smell-pervert misdirects the aim of the instinct to an object where the smell fore-pleasure cannot lead directly to the fulfilment of its biological purpose, while at the same time he avoids being reminded of the dreaded consequences of being eaten and castrated, of which the female genital (particularly the bleeding genital) is the most potent reminder. Hence he gains an incomplete end-pleasure only, through nocturnal emissions, masturbation, etc., as is the case with other perverts.

Brill (1932) gives a number of clinical cases showing how, through the mother fixation, smell played the principal rôle and had influenced the patients both as to their mode of life and selection of professions. According to him, they presented the last links with an early mother cathexis, in which the sense of smell played the *predominant* part. They unconsciously endeavoured either to mask or to replace the unpleasant odours associated with their mother cathexes by perfumes, flowers and pleasant scents and sights, but nevertheless they still unconsciously adhered to the odoriferous mother.

In some of these examples from Brill's case histories, which demonstrate strong mother fixations, we may trace the failure of the repression of the *sexual* olfactory stimuli, the result of the unsatisfactory weathering of the Oedipus phase. Such pathological examples may be due either to excessive olfactory sensitiveness in the subject or excessive stimulation from the object, or both, combined with traumatic frustration of the instinct, which in these instances fixated the individual at the level where sexual olfaction, one of the factors of sense perception which excites the libido in the phallic phase, was performing its most primitive binding function.

Perfumes are among the artificial products of culture, a consequence of the inhibition of the previous attractive sexual odours. Nevertheless, as is well known, such perfumes for the most part have a sexual basis. The prohibitions which occasioned the repression of pleasure in purely sexual odours (except at the height of passion) gave rise to the reaction-formations of disgust and shame, the former of which is predominantly associated with the threats to self-preservation and with the castration complex and the latter with guilt attributes. Yet in culture the instincts have discovered ways of circumventing the inhibiting factors in the use of socially permissible perfumes, by which odour still plays something of its original rôle of attracting and binding the male.

In passing, we may remark that smell would appear to play a more important part in incorporation, identification, introjection and projection than has hitherto been attributed to it. Fenichel (1935) has remarked, in speaking of the rôle which the eye and ear play in identification and introjection: 'We must observe that, all the

same, they seem less suitable for such representation than another sense organ, the nose, for in olfactory perception the introjection of minute particles of the objects is actually real.'

In the sphere of vision, women (since their declarations of independence shown in the bobbing of their hair, which coincided with the suffrage movement) grow ever more bold in their use of cosmetics. Scarlet lips are surely a return of the repressed, and invite men to overcome what is forbidden and taboo and approach where they are not afraid. They may act on man's repressed sadism or embolden him by calling forth once more the aggressive component of the sexual instinct. Women thus enhance their sexual attraction so as to overcome male fear: they unconsciously declare that they no longer desire to be regarded as privileged drudges or as angels on pedestals, but wish to be desired as sexual women and not as second-hand editions of the ideal immaculate mother. It is not so very long ago in European culture that the use of certain exotic perfumes and the painting of lips and face were resorted to by prostitutes alone, as an allurement to the male sex. We may not forget that in the unconscious the prostitute equals the repressed sexual mother. (If I were a trained anthropologist or an historian with a flair for aesthetics, I should find it interesting to carry out researches regarding the secondary effects of the frustration of the sexual instinct. Consider to what ends men's horror and disgust at women's sexuality have driven women in order to enhance their attractions: the endless subterfuges, extraordinary distortions of the face, body, hands and feet—tattooing, painting, through all the vagaries of fashion, crinolines, bustles, etc. What are all of these but secondary ideals of female loveliness which have their origin in man's flight from her sexuality which the repression of incest has occasioned?)

For those who regard introjection and projection as being particularly concerned with the repressions which illustrate the fate and cultural evolution of the sexual instinctual urges, it should not be a difficult step to appreciate the importance of understanding the repression or the reversal of the *fore-pleasure* excitation, or the causes of pathological fixation to the objects from which the stimuli to that excitation emanate. It is possible that the repression of the desire to lick and to smell the sexual organ of the female forms one of the roots of pathological disgust, and played a part in the human predisposition to hypersensitive reactions now demonstrable in the ambivalence of the oral phase of ontogenetic evolution and the inhibition of the oral component of the sexual instinct in many adult people and races. The deepest reaction of all, that of *loathing*, belongs particularly to the repression of the desire

to lick the discharge, as animals do, and it is here that one of the resistances which have so far proved insusceptible of explanation is to be traced. Freud (1905; 24) suspected the connection between loathing and licking, but did not know where to look for its origin.

Freud (1905; 54 f.) has observed that the early mechanism of sexuality can be observed in the infant at the breast, when it experiences with repletion a sort of emotional orgasm akin in nature to adult end-pleasure. Whilst something similar, to which attention has been drawn by Marie Bonaparte (1936), has been observed in anal and urethral erotism as a result of satisfactory elimination. The beginnings of both fore-pleasures and end-pleasures are to be observed in these pre-phallic phases which are given final expression with the orgasm in the sexual act of maturity, of whose 'completeness' the infantile sexuality can, of course, have no actual experience.

If we wish to understand *human* psychological reactions to both fore-pleasure and end-pleasure we must follow their growth from infancy to maturity, and in doing so we find that they receive various interruptions which to a great extent reverse the pleasurable aspects or make it necessary for the stimuli to be disguised in a manner acceptable to the conscious ego. In the animal world this evolution follows a direct path, without these interruptions, until it reaches complete expression in adult sexuality.

In the process of the repression of incest, some elements in the fore-pleasures which had previously led to the gratification of instinct became repellent. Thereafter a hereditary tendency was gradually incorporated in the human mind which led, *via* culture and the sanitation which goes with it, to the further repression of anal erotism—a repression which now, in ontogenesis, precedes and prepares the ground for the overcoming of the Oedipus phase, by educating the child in the necessity to forgo some of its purely instinctual and narcissistic pleasures.

What actually happens is, we suppose, that the direct road from fore-pleasure stimulation to end-pleasure relief becomes inhibited and that this is followed by reaction-formations of guilt, shame, and disgust, so that subsequently either the tension necessary to occasion complete end-pleasure is not aroused, or more tension is aroused than can find an outlet through the medium of a sexual object no longer wholly desirable.

The possibility of experiencing complete end-pleasure is, of course, consequent upon the completion of physiological organ development, but we must not overlook the fact that human evolution has, *via* the repression of incest, introduced psychological factors which inevitably limit in varying degrees the fullness of both fore-pleasure and end-pleasure. It is necessary to realize the relation of the impulse inhibitions to the repression

of the original fore-pleasures of looking, smelling, tasting and touching, which, in animals, lead directly to the fulfilment of the instinctual aim, while in humans that aim is often reached only by devious paths and the overcoming of resistances. (It is interesting to note here that there are people who, by cutting out the fore-pleasures which would arouse their guilt, are thus able in some degree to enjoy the sexual relation and achieve orgasm and end-pleasure—unlike the extreme perverts, who find satisfaction in displaced fore-pleasure only, which does not lead to the fulfilment of the biological aim.)

To revert to the general theme. We still require more knowledge as to how the aggressive and destructive impulses were harnessed in the service of the preservation of the species and the evolution of human culture, and why it is that the methods of control continually break down and the destructive tendencies again threaten both the individual and the species with devastation.

We have previously stressed the fact that one result of the menstruation trauma is that the simple positive genital attractions are reversed and that they have become in cold blood and in their crude form unpleasant, being replaced by secondary idealized forms of attraction. At the height of passion in most normal people, when the repulsions due to inhibition have been overcome, these crude stimuli again become positive, i.e. pleasurable, and resume their natural function. In neurotics and perverts, however, they may remain either permanently (in the fetishistic forms through displacement) positive or permanently negative.

We know that in adults the conscious knowledge that a woman is sexually unobtainable because she is menstruating calls forth varying reactions. (1) It may act as an unconscious stimulus to male sexual desire, which is possibly connected with the fact that women sometimes produce menstruation at an abnormal time, when this coincides with the return of a lover who has been for some time absent. Here it would appear to exercise the same attraction as the pro-oestrus in animals. (2) It may either stir the repressed sadism, or activate the primary aggressive component of the sexual impulse, which is probably one reason why such a large percentage of criminal rape takes place when the woman is menstruating. (3) It may inhibit all desire, which is perhaps why so many cases of impotence are associated with blood, as we find in the analysis of the unconscious sources of the fears which occasion it. (4) In cases of severe trauma regression to the oral and anal levels may occur, reinforcing these phases by associating them with menstruation or parturition, and the accompanying castration fears. The backward flow of the heightened libido to these earlier prototypes may result in extremely obstinate anal-sadistic charac.

ters or be the cause of an obsessional neurosis. (5) Another very important effect of the menstruation trauma, which is clinically demonstrable, is that it causes the son to displace the previous fear and hatred of his father on to his mother, from whom he then turns with loathing and disgust, temporarily regarding her as a dangerous, malignant and diseased object—aspects which, however, because of his dependency, soon become deeply repressed and hidden behind the spiritual and ideal aspects with which she is later endowed (following the same path as the evolution of the female goddesses in phylogenesis). It may be observed that the menstruation trauma is often rendered all the more severe where extreme tenderness on the mother's part has preceded it. The reactions may be various: inversion may follow. One remembers here Ferenczi's finding that in passive homosexuality the phantasies are almost invariably connected with blood. (6) One result of the boy's extreme horror and loathing is that he denies the existence of woman's menstruating organ and endows her with a penis. (This may perhaps be only a re-endowment, following Freud's finding of the boy's narcissistic idea that all other beings have a penis similar to his own. Personally, however, I tend to the opinion that this attitude of the little boy has been phylogenetically acquired out of the castration complex, if it really does exist independently, i.e. if it has not been preceded by the earlier repressions in ontogenesis relating to the mother's sexuality with which we are dealing in this discussion.) Still later the boy makes the re-discovery that women are anatomically different from himself, which he often does through observation of a sister or girl playmate.

It is far from my intention here to defend male narcissism, but only to point out that such narcissism, based partly upon the proud possession of a penis, is still further enhanced by the non-possession of an organ associated with loathing and disgust. In other words, man's narcissism is increased at the later levels by the repression of his passive homosexuality (i.e. his negative

(Edipus complex), which is clearly demonstrable in his sensitivity in this respect⁷—pathological fears of sexual disease and productive accomplishments in certain sublimated activities.

In the menstruation trauma the visual evidence of the mother's bleeding occasions the deepest horror and loathing. The bleeding confirms the fear of castration and of being eaten, whilst the smell (here negative and repulsive), partly because of its association with putrefaction, also conveys the deeper idea of death to the unconscious. This negative odour is not to be confused with the positive, attractive, pre-menstruation and mid-cycle odours, but belongs to the repulsive attributes of the complex and plays an important part in the formation of the incest barrier.

Some day, perhaps, biochemistry will contribute further to our knowledge of the olfactory tropisms in functional disturbances. It is probable that the sexual excitations which bind the child libidinally to its object have their origin partly in subtle chemical changes effected by reactions to olfactory genital stimuli which work through the intermediary of the nervous system. In the phallic phase both positive and negative smells play a rôle. The positive odours arouse the incestuous desires and the negative aid in their repression. The negative smell, with which we are here concerned, emanates during menstruation and is partly due to the decomposition of the discharge, though the presence of oophorines in it is said by some physiologists to account for the peculiarity of its smell.⁸

These two rôles of smell in relation to the attractive and repulsive attributes of female sexuality and to the castration complex⁹ are sometimes illustrated very clearly and dramatically in literature. An excellent instance of this is to be found in Edward Thompson's novel *An Indian Day* (1927). It concerns a young European missionary called Findlay, who became insane on the loss of his wife and child. The following is an abbreviated extract from the original. I shall leave my readers

⁷ History gives us examples of the anger which such a comparison to feminine attributes may call forth in man. 'We may all bring to mind', writes Hargrave Jennings (1890), 'the fierce message of William the Conqueror in 1087 (the year of his death) to the King of France, who ventured an unseemly but pointed jest on his confinement to bed [with gout] and on his corpulence, asking when the christening would take place. "Tell the King of France from me", cried the incensed William, "that, at the time proper for such appearance, I shall not only be up, but that at my churching I shall present so many and such terrible lights as shall set the whole Kingdom of France in flame."' And the English king kept his word, ravaging and burning all before him, until by accident he met his death at Mantes through his horse treading on some hot ashes.

⁸ According to L. Meyer, under the influence of ovulation, a continual production of substances, oophorines, necessary for the growth of the fetus, takes place. These substances circulate in the blood and, when they are present in large amounts, cause a stimulation of the entire nervous system. This explains the nervous irritation and

other phenomena of the period. During menstruation these substances are excreted. G. Klein thinks that the oophorines cause a chemical change of the uterine mucosa and of the blood circulating in the latter and are themselves chemically changed. They leave the body simultaneously with the menstrual blood. Hence menstruation is a real catharsis, in the sense of Hippocrates, a freeing of the body from the toxic effects of the oophorines. Their presence during the period accounts for the different smell of menstrual blood from ordinary blood. The peculiar smell from the mouth of some menstruating women may also be attributed to the presence of the oophorines in the body. According to Monin and other authorities, the woman's respiration at the time of menstruation has the odour of onions. (Extracted from B. S. Talmey, 1915.)

⁹ Brill (1932) refers to two cases of obsessional neurosis in which the outstanding symptom was halitosis and in which he directly traced this symptom to early pleasure in smell emanating from the mother. In one patient his sexual potency depended entirely on the sense of smell: if a woman had any odour recalling his mother, the patient became entirely impotent.

to interpret it in the light of their own psycho-analytical experience and the views advanced in this paper.

'He strode along, looking neither to right or left. He leapt across nullahs, he scrambled up the ravines, he was heedless of snake, or wild beast, or gathering darkness.

'Suddenly a sweet, ethereal fragrance came to him, and mingled with it a fouler taint. He knew where he was now. Those tall, intertwined trees were the grove of Padalsini, the jungle she-demon. They were a rarity, no others of their sort grew for twenty miles round, and they had been dedicated to the wood-queen. But that fouler taint was of blood, of the goats they slew in her honour.

'Then Findlay's mind broke. The terror and wrath that had been besetting him took shape. This was the land that had fooled him, the false deity for which he had flung away his jewel.

'Its sweetness, all that glory of blossoming sal . . . that had intoxicated him, was stained with blood, it stank, it was vile. And the land was living, it was a demon, it was here, its home was in that thicket. . . . She was seeking him now, she was persecuting him. . . . Findlay was mad and Padalsini was seeking him—stalking him, his soul and body would be hers, and his gallant spirit, that had never cried for help before, cried for it now. . . . As the night took visible menacing form, and towered above him with burning unpitied eyes. Findlay called out—he stumbled and felt the hands of the jungle across his flight. The demon queen had caught up with him, she was lying in his way and had gripped his foot. He cried again terribly and despairingly. Then he fell and all was blankness.'

The menstruation trauma is, I contend, one of the most important of the factors which account for the amnesia concerning male reactions to female sexuality, for the other reasons connected with the denial of his femininity were a direct consequence of it.

Freud (1905 ; 49 f.), speaking in reference to infantile amnesia, wrote : 'The very impressions which we have forgotten have nevertheless left the deepest traces in our mental life and have acted as determinants for the whole of our later development. There can therefore be no question of any real disappearance of childhood impressions, but of an amnesia such as we observe in neurotics in regard to later experiences and the essence of which lies simply in their being withheld from consciousness (i.e. repressed). But what are the forces that bring about this repression of the impressions of childhood? Anyone who could solve that riddle would also have found the solution of hysterical amnesia.'

That amnesia has been maintained up to the present time through certain universal phenomena (the menstruation, pregnancy and parturition

taboos), which are connected with the repression of incest and man's subsequent energetic rejection of the feminine tendencies arising from his repressed inverted Oedipus complex. The final explanation both of hysterical amnesia and of the compulsion and doubt neurosis lie in the unresolved depths of the Oedipus complex.

PART II

The rôle of female sexuality in human psychic evolution here hypothesized accords with one outstanding fact which psycho-analysis has stressed, namely that in the ontogenetic evolution of the human species there exists an interruption in sexual development to which there is nothing corresponding in the remainder of the animal world. The causes of this difference, however, have so far remained unexplained.

According to Freud (1926 ; 140 f.), 'we have found that the sexual life of man, unlike that of most of the animals nearly related to him, does not make a steady advance from birth to maturity, but that, after an early expansion up till the fifth year, it undergoes a very decided interruption ; and that it then starts on its course once more at puberty, beginning from the point at which it broke off in early childhood. This has led us to suppose that something momentous must have occurred in the vicissitudes of the human species which has left behind this interruption in the sexual development of the individual as a kind of historical precipitate. This factor owes its pathogenic significance to the fact that the majority of instinctual impulses belonging to infantile sexuality are treated by the ego as dangers and warded off as such, so that the later sexual impulses of puberty, which in the natural course of things would be ego-syntonic, run the risk of succumbing to the attraction of their infantile prototypes and following them into repression.'

Twelve years later, Freud (1938), in his posthumously published 'Outline of Psycho-Analysis', again refers to this breach in human development, but this time he does bring it into relation with female menstruation and male excitement, while still insisting that it is of biological more than of psychological significance. 'It must also be borne in mind', he writes, 'that in the course of cultural development no other function has been so energetically and extensively repudiated as precisely the sexual one. Theory must rest satisfied with a few hints that betray a deeper connection—the fact that the first period of childhood, during which the ego begins to be differentiated from the id, is also the period of early sexual flowering which is brought to an end by the period of latency, that it can hardly be a matter of chance that this momentous early period subsequently falls a victim to infantile amnesia, and finally that biological modifications in sexual life (such as its double-phased onset to which we

have just referred, the disappearance of the periodic character of sexual excitement and the transformation in the relation between female menstruation and male excitement)—that these innovations in sexuality must have been of high importance in the evolution of animals into men. It is left for the science of the future to bring together these isolated data into a new understanding. *It is not psychology but biology that is responsible for this gap.* [My italics, C. D. D.] We shall not be wrong, perhaps, if we say that the weak point in the organization of the ego lies in its behaviour towards the sexual function, as though the biological opposition between self-preservation and the preservation of the species had there found psychological expression.'

I hope to be able to show that the reverse of the italicized remark holds good, and that it is psychology more than biology which is responsible for the gap in the psycho-analytical theory of evolution. Considerations of space, however, unfortunately make it impossible to reproduce in the present paper the large mass of evidence from ontogenetic and phylogenetic sources which gives support to my contentions.

Psycho-analysis has shown that the first efflorescence of sexuality in the human child is invariably an incestuous one so far as its phantasy life is concerned, and that upon the manner in which this phase is overcome the whole future mental and emotional make-up of the individual is largely dependent. Is it not then reasonable to suspect that the origin of the breach in sexual development is connected with the repression of incest at the dawn of human culture, a repression which required the traumatic frustration of the sexual instincts?

One fact stands out clearly, viz., that if no such breach in development is discernible in the animals most nearly related to man, then we must search for its origin in the early phases of human evolution; for it seems unlikely that an event of such unparalleled importance can have left no trace behind it.

We will then, as a preliminary step, ask ourselves whether any factor exists in the sexuality of the higher animals which differs from human sexuality and, if so, to what causes the changes are due; whether there is any relation between these changes and the interruption that occurs in human development; and further what relation, if any, they bear to the rise of human culture.

The answer to the first question is in the affirmative. We have already demonstrated this in the changes which have taken place in the behaviour of the male at the time of the female's menstruation and towards female sexuality as a whole. We have also drawn attention to the marked increase in the catamenial discharge of the human female. Whether this is one result of the repression of

incest, or whether it is due only to further evolution along the same path which has caused the gradual change in the discharge of the higher animals, we do not know. The fact remains, however, that the catamenial flow *is* more copious in human females, where it is associated with the deepest psychological reactions in both man and woman. Our further conjectures on this evolution are necessarily largely hypothetical.

The circumstances which led to the suppression of conjugation with the young female at the time of her first period were, we suppose, an after-consequence of the break-down of the horde phase of existence, and would appear to have arisen from the necessity to isolate the chief cause of disunity within the tribe, namely, the ripe young female. Up till that time, it may be conjectured, the leaders of the hordes had maintained discipline by killing and eating any of the younger males who encroached upon their preserves, particularly upon their sexual prerogative of impregnating the ripe young females at puberty, which we assume was probably reached about the fourth or fifth year, since there is nothing to show that any interruption in sexual development had so far taken place.

The pre-human horde phase of existence is assumed to have broken down when the younger members of the hordes, having learnt their collective power, banded together and overthrew their leaders, presumably under the urge of oral or libidinal excitement. This has been called by Freud the 'primal crime', and, from the psycho-analytical evidence of the Oedipus complex and the traces brought to light by anthropological research, it seems highly probable that this crime took place under the urge of sexual rivalry.

We assume that with the break-down of the leaders' authority a phase of regression took place, and that an increase of rivalry and lust followed these revolutions within the hordes, resulting in a heightening of the aggressive component of the sexual instinct.

The period of anarchy which followed and the consequent continual dissolution of the hordes thus became a definite biological threat to the survival of the species, to counteract which the prohibition of incest gradually came about, the individuals' aggressive and incestuous tendencies being curbed in the interests of early tribal preservation. Owing however to their instinctual responses to chemotropic sexual stimuli, it is highly probable that our early ancestors were at first unable to control themselves in the presence of such stimuli: such control could only have come about slowly. But man had learnt a valuable lesson from the primal crimes, viz., that the individual could be controlled by collective action.

The earliest forms of exogamy would appear to have had their origins in this phase of repression of the sexual instinct. The heightened aggression

which had followed the 'primal crimes' was brought under repression through various prohibitions, one of the most important of which was the prohibition of conjugation at the time of the female's first period, this being the most disturbing factor.¹⁰ This prohibition was gradually extended to include avoidance of all females at their periods, and finally at all their functional crises, in which avoidances the bleeding associated with these conditions played an important rôle.

The sexual prerogatives of the primal males which had been normal to the horde phase passed away and the leaders of the tribes which replaced the hordes ruled with their powers considerably restricted. At the same time, in order to make the prohibition of incest effective, the young males were (following a phase when incestuous offences were punishable by death) threatened with castration and later (if the puberty rites of contemporary savages may here be taken as a guide) actually had some form of miniature castration performed upon them, so as to confirm their fears—such as circumcision, knocking out a tooth, etc. Similarly, the females were isolated and starved and treated with endless cruelty. The prohibition of incest could hardly have become operative except by some such methods of collectively enforced frustration of instinct.

Observation of the menstruation complex as seen in ontogenesis, when correlated with the taboo of menstruation among savage contemporaries and anthropological observations of puberty rites, indicates to us what it was that caused man to turn from woman at this time and to regard her with hatred and loathing and disgust. In ontogenesis we know from our clinical material that the menstrual bleeding of the mother often heightens the castration anxiety in the male, and may even traumatically confirm his belief in the probability of being eaten and castrated, so that *at the time* he represses all conscious knowledge of the mother's bleeding (the trauma being followed by complete amnesia), re-learning it at a later date when he discovers that all adult women have a monthly period with which much mystery is associated.

It would seem highly probable and a warrantable assumption that, if in phylogenesis the male's change in psychic reactions towards the sexuality of the human female occurred at the same time, and as a consequence of the same evolutionary processes, as those by which male aggressiveness was being curbed, then the non-impregnation of the female at her first period and the exceptionally cruel methods by which the repression of her desires was achieved came to have a significance in the female incest complex very similar to that of castration in the male incest complex, while the

blow to the maternal cravings was *specifically female*. These conclusions are manifested nowadays in ontogenesis in the Oedipus complex, where the frustration of the little girl's desire for a child by the father is shown to have far-reaching consequences for her future development.

We hypothesize therefore that early in phylogenesis the 'profuse' bleeding of the human female (which profuseness was possibly one result of non-impregnation at puberty) became associated with man's fears of being eaten and castrated. The castration threat was employed to reinforce the earlier fear of being eaten and to inhibit man's normal sexual aggressiveness and the desire previously awakened by the female's period. It was thus, we suppose, that the inhibition of the incestuous phase *at puberty*, which in those days was at a very much younger age, was brought about in prehistoric times, an inhibition which, *viâ* a long period of evolution, now appears to find its ontogenetic parallel in the interruption of the development of the sexual impulse effected by the passing of the Oedipus phase. The repression of incest appears to have been contemporary with the end-phase of an evolutionary change in the physiology of the female, in that, in association with psychological fears, it brought about a definite change in man's attitude to woman's sexuality. It is to be remarked that among monkeys and apes there is no aversion to menstrual bleeding and that in many species it is a time when the male shows much tenderness to the female, cuddling and petting her like a human being with his sweetheart.

We have still to explain how it is that these repressions, which at one time, no doubt, took place at puberty, (cf. the puberty rites of the primitives), are now effected in ontogenesis in the phallic phase. It is suggested that it was the frustration of the natural reactions of the sexual instinct brought about by the repression of incest which was responsible for the biological retardation of human sexual development as well as for the retardation of human growth in contrast to the remainder of the animal world. In monkeys and apes puberty is reached at an early age and there is no interruption of development which in any way corresponds to human retardation.

It is of considerable interest to note here that occasionally isolated instances occur where the breach in sexual development does *not* take place and where the female reaches puberty at what would normally in human beings be the height of the Oedipus phase—between 4 and 5 years of age. This condition is known as *pubertas præcox*. Such a case, which was very fully reported, took place in a South American hospital just before the present war. Photographs of this young mother

¹⁰ This may have been one of the *last* of the phases of incest repression, as by it father and daughter incest was prevented. Freud (1912-13; 17n) has said that he thought that the repression of father and daughter incest

was probably the last of these repressions. The first prohibitions of the totem system appear to have been directed against the incestuous desires of the son.

with her child appeared in the illustrated papers. Although various causes for such early puberty have been advanced and may in some cases be correct, yet where (as in the case just mentioned) the child is in all respects normal and healthy, we must suspect that the event is a throw-back to pre-human development.

At no point do our views, and the importance ascribed to the menstruation complex within the Oedipus complex, contradict the sound premises upon which the theory of psycho-analysis is founded. They do full justice to the libido theory, frustration, anxiety, inhibition, and the relation of these to the repressions of the aggressive and libidinal components of the sexual instinct. Further, they provide both a biological and psychological basis for the increase of ambivalence, sadism and masochism among humans, and the relation of these affects to frustrated and retarded development. Thus it may be hoped that they will bring psycho-analysis more into harmony with the indisputable findings of anthropology concerning the importance of the menstruation, pregnancy and parturition taboos, and the rôle of the mother and of female sexuality in human evolution. Nowhere else can we trace an actual breach in the evolution of the breeding process of such importance as that inherent in the menstruation complex and the menstruation taboos in their relation to the fears of being eaten and to the castration complex. Primary attractions or fore-pleasures of the sexual instinct were, through the confirmation of these fears, reversed and became repulsive, so that from that time on full sexual satisfaction, such as occurs in the animal world, was no longer possible to human beings, and they were forced into all manner of sublimations and displacements of libido.

There exists in evolution, so far as we have been able to discover, no instance of such biological or psychological significance for either the basic phylogenetic origin of the neuroses or for the development of the secondary characteristics of human culture as this breach in the development of the sexual instinct in the human being; particularly when given its correct orientation in the one-sided evolution postulated in *Totem and Taboo* so as to include the rôle played by female sexuality and the mother goddesses, which, as Freud himself expressly states, was there left unexplained.

This breach in the natural evolution of the sexual instinct provides the demarcation line between pre-human and human evolution, causing, as we suggest, a split in the ego, the primitive portion of which became repressed. Founding our hypothesis on what has been clinically observed, we may suppose that the path of development was on the following lines.

The damming up of both libido and aggressivity resulted in producing a situation where the ego had constantly to deal with the problem of excessive

internal demands, driving the individuals either to instinctual satisfaction and consequently to death at the hands of the tribe or to break-down through pathological fear. There followed deep reactions towards all functional manifestations of female sexuality, and the consequent taboo upon such objects at all their functional crises, avoidance being due to the ego's desire to prevent the production of an anxiety situation which would overwhelm it in the form of aphanisis—the only word (Jones, 1929) which aptly describes the condition.

We may surmise that the earliest tendencies towards this dissociation of the ego had probably commenced in the horde phase, where the young male adults felt guilt towards the primal father as a consequence of their aggressiveness and their frustrated libido, which reactions were possibly based on oral antecedents.

Following the primal crime and the later collective control of the individual's aggressive and libidinal impulses and the formation of a collective taboo conscience, the introjection of the primal father must gradually have taken place, and the early layers of the human super-ego (as we are now able to observe in analysis), in both its devil and saviour aspects, were formed; all later introjections connected with the repression of incest, including that of the frustrating mother, seem to have followed the same path. The repression of the later homosexual phase (which resulted from the inhibition of the incestuous heterosexuality and is closely related to the pregnancy and parturition complexes and the allied taboos) added yet further dissociating factors, together with which the whole complicated system of defence mechanisms was built up. The repression of overt homosexuality followed much the same path as the earlier repression of incest—and for similar reasons, i.e. the threat of disunity within the tribe.

Those instinctual impulses which form the basis of the primary pleasure ego and which in the animal world are almost uncontrollable in the presence of the olfactory and visual sexual tropisms of the female (and in the insect world are hypnotic), were now rejected by the ego, as a consequence of the reality threat of death and castration. They remained suspended in the unconscious ego between the conscious ego and the id, where they were afterwards upheld by the incest barrier inherent in the taboos. (The taboos represent an inculcated system of ego defensive mechanisms.)

This split in the ego is in keeping with Ferenczi's (1909) idea that introjection occurs in the phase of separation of the external world and the ego, and Freud's (1911) theory that the primary ego is a pleasure ego. In phylogenesis the first great blow to this pleasure ego (apart from the biological results of the ice age) must have been the frustration of instinctual libidinal desire. The fact that pleasure is (and, of course, was also in phylogenesis) first experienced at the breast, and that

now in our cultural existence greater frustration or incomplete satisfaction occurs at the oral level with some dissociation of the ego, does not invalidate the theory that the phylogenetic dissociation of the ego resulted in the first place from the frustration of the sexual instinct at puberty. It only shows that in ontogenesis the earlier frustrations in the anal and oral spheres (which are largely a result of the cultural evolution) have similar effects, and cause the individual mental development to follow the same paths as those which originally (before retardation set in) occurred at puberty. The breach in the development of the sexual instinct which interfered with the repetition compulsion of pure instinct split the ego and erected the incest barrier, and, though it deprived man of the ability fully to enjoy simple instinctual pleasure, yet it taught him prudence and the exercise of 'will' as opposed to purely instinctual response.

If this hypothesis is correct, it means that in studying the growth of the ego in ontogenesis we have to recognize two distinct phases of development. (1) There is the phase which occurs *up to* the passing of the Oedipus complex and which then sinks largely into repression and becomes the unconscious ego. This early ego development is not, however, comparable to what we suppose the development of an *animal's* ego to be, because from the beginning it is under the influence of hereditary tendencies which have been acquired during *human* evolution, with the gradual retardation of human development, and of oral and anal restrictions which do not exist in the animal world but are a consequence of *human* culture. (2) There is the phase which *follows* the passing of the Oedipus complex. The adult conscious ego, as we come mostly into contact with it, belongs to the post-Oedipus phase (the latency period and puberty); it is associated with idealism and built up largely of defensive mechanisms, the outcome of later cultural (i.e. hygienic) and intellectual education.

We need not here touch on the deeper primordial ego that must form the basis of the ego as it develops in the human child, except to say that perhaps such an ego represents the surface of the id, for the id itself and all instincts appear to be nothing but innumerable layers of internal and

external experiences built up from the beginning of organic life. Our work lies in trying to understand the differences between the two phases of ego development which can be observed in analysis.

In phylogenesis the origins of the taboos, which eventually came to function on behalf of the super-ego, became lost in racial amnesia; the taboos continued to function automatically, their psychic precipitates now supporting ontogenetic repression. Certain instinctual impulses appear to be almost missing among normal human beings, and are barely acknowledged except in a highly disguised form. The origins of the processes by which these repressions were brought about, and by which instinct succumbed to collective pressure from within the species, have sunk into amnesia and are difficult of resuscitation, because these precipitates of the universal taboos seem in some people to consist only of tendencies or, if it is preferred, phylogenetically acquired defence mechanisms, which resist exploration.

Lord Raglan (1933), an anthropologist of renown (unacquainted, so far as I am aware, with my views and somewhat unsympathetic towards the theories of Freud), has also given the menstruation taboo the central rôle in this evolution. In my opinion he rightly considers that, in order to understand the incest taboo, we must explain the menstruation taboo. This he does, however, by attributing to it 'magic', which we do not think solves the problem.¹¹

From the economic point of view, it is perhaps not out of place to mention here that, of all the taboos, the menstruation taboo is the most virulent. It should not, therefore, surprise us to find that psychological reactions to the phenomena of menstruation, pregnancy and birth in ontogenesis are of more importance than we have hitherto supposed. It is my contention that the menstruation aspect in particular is at the root of the extreme horror of the female genital which Freud attributed to the castration fear, though he was not satisfied that this fully explained it. He did not associate this horror with menstruation, but with the confirmation of castration fears arising when the little boy discovered that a sister or some other little girl-playmate had no sexual organ. (At that time Freud supposed that menstruation was an adult phenomenon wholly or almost unknown to the child.¹²)

¹¹ Magic here belongs to reactions to the outer world with its reality punishments and to the inner world with its instinctual urges. Both of these give rise through repression to phenomena which the individual, being unable to explain them in any other way, attributes to magic. The subject externalizes and projects his unconscious repressed desires and fears on to outer objects and explains them as magic called forth by those objects. Magic is supposed to bring harm and destruction to various kinds of enemies, except where it has the sanction of religion and is considered a miracle (equivalent to 'white' magic). Menstrual blood is used for various purposes in both black and white magic, as shown by numerous instances throughout anthropological literature. For

instance, it is used all over the world by superstitious women as a love charm, in which projection they are giving it the biological function of binding the male to them in the service of impregnation. For man, menstruous woman is taboo because this deeply unconscious id-attraction is associated with the unconscious ego's fear of being eaten and castrated, fear through which his incestuous desires were frustrated. Moreover, the previous hatred and fear of the father have been displaced on to woman, thus increasing her black magic. The terribly beautiful and loathsomely ugly aspects of the aggressive goddesses and witches have their genesis here.

¹² Private communication, after he had read one of my early papers.

The effect of all bleeding in relation to traumas is and so far always has, in my view, been underestimated, for the very reason that traumas cause such *sudden* repression, associated with the deepest amnesia, while lesser phenomena of a similar nature are continually coming to light and thus give a false impression of being more universal and important. This frequency of occurrence and ease of observation and illustration facilitate the acceptance of the over-valuation of material which is, comparatively speaking, less important. The castration fear, for instance, is more easily observed than its deepest traumatic causes. The perception of the adult sexual organs of both sexes by children deeply impresses them: not only because of their size and odour and the presence of hair, but also because of the phenomenon of erection, with the expansion of the glans penis, in the male or of menstruation in the female. These are the two elements in sexuality which disturb and excite the child most and which are surrounded by mystery.

Where in ontogenesis instincts are no longer *directly* frustrated, their inhibition now comes about *indirectly*, because the ways for the repressions of the phallic phase have already been prepared by nursery education in the earlier oral and anal phases. That is to say that, with the phylogenetic repression of incest, certain tendencies seem gradually to have been formed in the human mind, now usually referred to as acquired tendencies. These have almost the power of the instincts themselves, though they may be directed against these, functioning in the service of the super-ego and of repression. The apparently almost spontaneous development of certain of these 'acquired' tendencies in the infantile ego may belong to this purely human predisposition, though they may also partly result from the child's absorption of the taboo reactions inherent in its parents and environment.

This would seem to be the psychological basis of 'appersonization', a term employed by Schilder and Sperling meaning the adoption of the emotions, experiences and actions of another person (as opposed to instinctive mimicry) which takes place to some extent as a component of identification and introjection.

Theodor Reik has put it correctly, I think, when he says that originally psychological understanding was direct apprehension of the nature and direction of other people's instinctual tendencies. The introjection and projection processes are largely of later development.¹³ Thus, in the frustration of the primary impulses which the repression of incest necessitated, the simple immediate forms of *instinctive* understanding were inhibited, and the secondary tendencies were gradually formed in the human mind. The budding instinctual sexual impulses are often only partially

developed in human children when they already come under the influence of their parents' disapproving attitudes. Babies are often subjected to repression almost from birth. Impulses may thus appear at the phallic level merely as atrophied attributes of instinct. It is often only in the psychoses and some extreme criminal types that traces of pure instinct (almost as seen in the animal world) can be observed. (For instance, a psychotic patient of mine wanted to put her menstrual blood in my bed in order that she might seduce me and bind me to her; in this she was giving her menstrual bleeding the function which the pro-oestrous discharge performs in the lower animal world, i.e. that of *binding* the male to the female until fecundation is procured at the oestrus. The following night she dreamt that she had a child by me. Smell also played an exceptional rôle in the analysis of this patient; she attempted my seduction by the use of odour also. This material is not to be confused with the pathological binding which comes from castration fear.)

The analysis of the unconscious ego appears to me to be one of the most difficult tasks that we have to perform. We need more fully to understand the nature of the attractive id elements of the primitive instinctual impulses, against which the secondary conscious ego has set up its defences. The super-ego automatically restrains the anti-social, rebellious tendencies of that part of the ego (the primary pleasure ego) which tends to respond to the id impulses. When these, through stimuli communicated by the sense perceptions, attempt to break forth from repression, the super-ego permits the expression of the libidinal and aggressive tendencies only along socially permissible paths. This transition, it has been generally assumed, took place through introjection, identification, and projection, by which the id-strivings towards the object were abandoned. This evolution has been considerably clarified by Edward Glover in 'The Neurotic Character' (1926) and in various papers dealing with ego differentiation.

In the universal superstitious dread of blood, we may detect the ego's fear of repressed aggressive impulses, and it is at this point that the father complex is mingled directly with the mother complex. The tendency is for the sight of blood to call forth at one and the same time the repressed aggressive component of the sexual impulse, once directed against the father in the primal crime, and the taboo reaction associated with the repression, as well as the accompanying libidinal impulses. Hence blood also tends to arouse the deepest sense of guilt accompanied by the inevitable super-ego sadism.

One of the few observations which Freud (1908) made on the subject of menstruation was that the chance acquaintance with menstrual blood appeared to play an important rôle in the genesis of sadism

¹³ See the excellent historical survey on introjection by Fuchs (1937).

(where children observed it on the bedding or their mother's clothing), *viâ* identification with the father in the primal scene, in which the mother's bleeding is supposed to have been caused by the father.

In sadism the normal aggressive component of the sexual instinct (a part function of which, in addition to fighting rivals, is to subjugate the female in pursuance of its biological aim) is separated from the original aim and pursued for the fulfilment of its perverted pleasure aspect of hatred, while the tender components of the instinct are converted into cruelty. When the menstruation trauma, preceded by castration threats, has resulted in the displacement of the hatred of the father on to the mother, the son freely identifies himself with the father in his phantasies of cruel assaults upon the mother; and when these also undergo repression, they form a deep unconscious source of guilt towards the mother and all her surrogates. At the passive homosexual level he identifies himself with the mother and craves the father's assault.

Let us turn again to the other side of the picture, viz., that which is concerned with the frustration of the specifically *feminine* elements of sexuality, particularly the repression of the daughter's instinctual desire for a child from the father. The methods by which this repression was and is brought about have not been and cannot be so dramatically illustrated as the analysis of the castration fear of the male, though in the findings of anthropology the evidence is sufficiently impressive. We may suppose that in phylogenesis up till the repression of incest there had been little or no frustration of the female's sexuality, such as had occurred in the young male with his subjection to the primal male in the horde phase. But when this repression did come about, with the repression of incest, it must have required of the female a more sudden and greater disappointment than in the case of the male, whose ego had been prepared for it by the previous horde phase in which his desires had already been to some extent curbed.

There are some who say that they are able to accept my theory of the menstruation complex so far as it relates to the boy, and who agree that the bleeding of the mother may play an important rôle in its traumatic confirmation of the fear of castration and of being eaten, and in the genesis of sadism, phobias and the compulsion neuroses, but who cannot agree that it contains an equally deep basis for neurosis in the case of the little girl, and in the genesis of pathological masochism, penis envy and hysteria. These people do not take sufficiently into account the fact that in the girl the repression of the wish for a child from the father (upon which Freud, as we know, always laid so much stress)—a wish that was *once* fulfilled at puberty—is just as specific as are the

desires inhibited by castration in the boy. Nor do they take sufficiently into consideration the *Œdipus* sources of the rivalry between mother and daughter in connection with the mother's menstruation in childhood and the daughter's menstruation at puberty.

The general mental condition of the majority of women both just before and during menstruation, quite apart from those in which there is evidence of pathological conditions, is by common consent acknowledged to be disturbed, and such disturbance has come to be regarded by many people as a part of the *normal* mental life of women; it is taken for granted that every allowance should be made for them at this time, when they are also commonly considered not to be normal—a contradiction of attitudes which is difficult of reconciliation yet is easily dismissed by simply saying that it constitutes one of the mysteries of woman. The explanation of man's attitude to woman at this time has to be sought for in male psychology and particularly in man's repression of passive homosexuality.

As Karen Horney (1931) has pointed out, and as we may observe both analytically and otherwise, women frequently suffer from depression at this time which is accompanied by a marked feeling of oppression and frustration, sometimes with signs of irritability and anxiety. Their dreams are often highly coloured and typical impregnation dreams, or the expression of the deepest passionate unconscious wishes accompanied by extremely sadistic acts of revenge on man for their non-fulfilment. We would, however, reject the idea that this specifically feminine element of the menstruation complex is of importance in women *only* at puberty and then mostly *only* in connection with the feminine castration complex. The girl in the positive phase of her *Œdipus* complex is a little woman just as the boy is a little man, and the fact that she does not menstruate and produce ova is only parallel to the fact that the boy does not produce sperm. What we here speak of as the 'menstruation complex' refers primarily to the *Œdipus* phase of ontogenetic evolution, without a full understanding of which we can scarcely expect correctly to evaluate the later anxieties of adults, male and female, nor to overcome the pathological passivity of the male neurotic nor the pathological activity of the female neurotic.

There are various forms of anxiety in adult women associated with both the pre-menstrual phase and the actual flow, and these, as is well known, are found on analysis to relate particularly to the non-receipt of a child from the father in the female positive *Œdipus* phase and to the castration complex in the female negative *Œdipus* phase. With reference to hysteria, as we have already seen, Freud (1905; 50) wrote: 'What are the forces that bring about the repression of the impressions of childhood? Anyone who could solve that riddle

would also have found the solution of hysterical amnesia.' Whilst later (1926; 117 f.) he wrote: 'Since there is no doubt that hysteria has a strong affinity with the nature of women, just as obsessional neurosis has with that of men, it appears probable that, as a determinant of anxiety, loss of love plays much the same part in hysteria as the threat of castration does in phobias and fear of the super-ego in obsessional neurosis.'

May we not suspect that in hysteria this determinant of anxiety (the loss of love), which in the Oedipus phase belongs to the non-receipt of a child from the father, is the ontogenetic equivalent for non-impregnation at puberty which in the very dim past was frustrated in phylogenesis with the repression of incest? That impregnation would previously, in the horde phase, before retardation of human sexuality intervened, have always been brought about by the primal male and would remain in the female psyche as a precipitate upon which rests the disappointment in her love relations with the father that occasions the passing of the girl's positive Oedipus complex, and it would thus be the complement of the male castration fear.

Karen Horney (1931), in the same paper, based upon my early work on the menstruation complex, has drawn attention to the fact that the rise in libido just before menstruation¹⁴ has the biological aim of a preparation for impregnation, and finds that the patients have an unconscious perception of what the important organic changes signify, and that this influences their mental lives. This involves a sense of guilt—a feeling of something bad and sinful from which relief is gained by the onset of the flow. What her patients have repressed turns out to be the wish for a child from the father—a desire beset with fear and feelings of guilt on account of old associations with destructive impulses. Such repression leads in extreme cases to a complete renunciation of the desire to bear children.

From the cases observed, Horney draws the conclusion that, at the time the body prepares itself for impregnation, the repressed desire for a child from the father mobilizes against itself all the defence mechanisms available, and that this is what leads to those disturbances in the mental equilibrium which we are accustomed to meet in the pre-menstrual phase. Dreams occur here with remarkable frequency, which betray the nature of the conflict. She supposes that the pre-menstrual disorders are directly initiated by the physiological process of preparing for pregnancy, and that this is a time of oppression only in the case of those women in whom the thought of motherhood is associated with sharp inner conflicts belonging to the Oedipus phase, and that the wish for a child is the primary characteristic anchored deeply in

biological tendencies, which is *secondarily* strengthened by the penis envy. The desire for impregnation shows all the attributes which Freud has mentioned as necessary for an 'instinct': the craving for motherhood is the psychical representative of a continuously flowing inner somatic source of stimulation.

The daughter's Oedipus wish to be the father's object is certainly not less important than the male wish to have the mother as his object. The terrible severity of the puberty rites of girls amongst contemporary savages (although they are possibly also in part capable of different explanations connected with human sadism) do appear to contain vestiges of the more remote repression of father and daughter incest. We should not overlook the fact that among many tribes there is a strict taboo against the father seeing his daughter at puberty. The severity of the puberty rites ensures that the incestuous tendencies of the Oedipus phase do not again break through with the heightened libido.

CONCLUSION

The digression into the female menstruation complex in the foregoing paragraphs has led us astray from our main object, which was to show the influence which man's reactions to female sexuality have had upon human psychic evolution. Nevertheless it was necessary to take into consideration both the male and female aspects of the complex in order correctly to evaluate its influence as a causative factor of ambivalence, masochism and sadism, which are intimately bound up psychologically with the breach in sexual development that occurred with the repression of incest and the increase of homosexuality which followed it.

We have, as a hypothesis, endeavoured broadly to show the influences to which the evolution of culture owes its origins. The most important of these was the biological threat to the preservation of our species contained in the period of anarchy which followed the previous break-down of the horde phase. To counteract this, our early ancestors *collectively* put restraints upon the sexual activities of individual members of these primitive communities. The traumatic effects of these frustrations eventually brought about a breach in sexual development and in the repetition compulsion of pure instinct, a breach which was the cause of that retardation of human development that differentiates the human being from the remainder of the animal world.

We have further postulated that man's reactions to the bleeding of the female (because of the psycho-biological connections of blood with oral and sexual satisfaction—love and birth—on the

¹⁴ This, I would add, coincides with the change in the woman's breath, which at that time often has a sweet odour not unlike that of chloroform. This is not to be

confused with the odour, often rather like that of onions, which accompanies the menstrual period itself.

one side and the fears of death and castration on the other) were so traumatic that they became lost in racial amnesia. This amnesia has been upheld by the taboos and the phylogenetically acquired tendency to react traumatically to blood in ontogenesis. The causes of the reactions are lost, but only in the sense of phylogenetic and ontogenetic repression; so that we may reasonably hope that the resuscitation of these traumatic instances will throw considerable light not only on the obscurity of the genetic sources of our psychic evolution, but also on the neuroses which are the heirs of the unsuccessful repression or sublimation of these traumas. Thus we find a substantiation of Freud's belief that some important details of our psychic evolution still remained to be recovered from the unconscious, when we could overcome our resistances to them.

Attention has also been directed to the economic factor—viz., that the menstruation taboo is the most virulent of all the taboos. (The only other taboo which approaches it in virulence is the parturition taboo, which is also connected with blood.) It has been suggested that this factor provides a clue to the solution of incest dread, a phenomenon in regard to which Freud insisted that it remained so far unexplained and that we did not even know how to guess at its explanation.

We have dealt in greater detail in this paper with the menstruation complex than with the other two important factors in female sexuality, pregnancy and parturition. We have done so partly from limitations of space and partly because the investigation of its psychic rôle in ontogenetic evolution has been more neglected. But we have been mainly influenced by the fact that we had reason to believe that the biological reactions to the bleeding of the female, both in menstruation and parturition, were primary factors in effecting the repression of both heterosexual and homosexual incestuous desire, and that of these the psychological importance of menstruation was the least appreciated. Although full weight must be given to the part played in this evolution by the parturition complex,¹⁵ yet the reactions to it cannot be completely understood without an appreciation of the menstruation complex. The latter is in action earlier than the pregnancy and parturition complexes, since the child usually comes under the influence of its mother's changing cycle before it comes up against the conditions of pregnancy and the final crisis of parturition.

In view of the material that has been adduced, it seems justifiable to correlate the ontogenetic menstruation complex with the menstruation taboo. It is to be hoped that the conclusions reached will throw some light upon the obscurity which has

hitherto veiled the origins of incest dread, savage men's superstitious fear of blood and the repressed ontogenetic horror of the female vagina—three factors which had not previously been brought into close relation with one another in their bearing upon the repression of incest.

The inhibition of the sexual instinct was followed by a long series of psychological reactions, of which the most important in the realm of pathology comprise the negative reactions of both sexes in the incestuous phase, together with the causes of those reactions and of their repression.

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¹⁵ In this paper I speak of the 'parturition complex' instead of the 'birth complex', to differentiate it from Rank's theory of the birth trauma. The latter is concerned with the child's reactions to its own birth, whereas

we are concerned with the child's reactions to the birth of another child and with the repression of its own desire to have a child.

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A STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL ABSTINENCE FROM THE DREAMS OF AN ASCETIC

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Freud (1912) wrote as follows: 'It may be maintained that the ascetic tendency of Christianity had the effect of raising the psychical value of love in a way that heathen antiquity could never achieve; it developed greatest significance in the lives of the ascetic monks, which were almost entirely occupied with the struggles against libidinous temptation.'

The following paper is a short study showing how this transition is achieved in Hinduism. The methods employed in this case at puberty appear to follow a path similar to the repression of the Œdipus phase, though the mother's sexuality is here shown to play a bigger rôle in that evolution than is ordinarily attributed to it.

The material is taken from the private diary of a Hindu of the Brahmin caste, with whom I was personally acquainted.

Kuladananda Brahmachary was a disciple of Bijoy Krishna Goswami, a renowned saint of Bengal, popularly known as Gossain. He was born during the Bengali year 1274, and belonged to a very respectable Brahmin family. He was the youngest son and was reading in school when his father died during the Bengali year 1293. He then took initiation from Gossain in order to embrace a religious life and afterwards became an ascetic. He kept a faithful diary during the period of his discipleship, five parts of which were published, after which unfortunately he died.

Brahmachary, under the instruction of his teacher, the saint Gossain, recorded several of his dreams in the diary. Gossain appears to have been endowed with considerable psychological insight. The following opinion of Gossain regarding the value of dreams for testing the stage of asceticism obtained occurs in the diary (III, 198):

'The character of a person is tested by his dreams. When you find in dreams that you can remain calm amongst temptations, you are proceeding towards the right state. If you find even slight mental disturbance you will understand that your inward weakness is not gone. The irrelevant elements of many dreams have significance. It is

good luck to dream a good dream. Through a dream a mental state can be attained within a short time, for which lengthy mystic practices would otherwise be necessary.'

There are instances in the diary, which is under publication, of some attempt being made by Gossain to discover the latent meaning of dreams from their manifest content. His interpretations however were intuitions rather than analytic. These occurrences took place in Bengal, before the subject of dream interpretation had been investigated by Freud; for Gossain was born in the Bengali year 1248, while the present Bengali year is 1342.

When Brahmachary was alive and came to Calcutta, I met him and tried to explain to him the psychology of the unconscious, and also about dream analysis. I asked him what he thought about the psycho-analytical explanation of his dreams. He replied that though he did not fully understand my theory about the unconscious, still so far as he could do so he believed it to be correct. He was able to attain sexual abstinence, because his Sadhana or religious practices acted upon his unconscious mind. Several of his dreams helped the effect of the Sadhana upon his unconscious mind.

The first step for attaining the life of an ascetic is to practice Brahmacharya or sexual abstinence. By this the sexual passion is to be so completely subdued that there must remain no thought of sexual matters, *even in the dream state*, in order that there shall be no pollution, which would show that the carnal nature had not been extinguished.

The dreams recorded by Brahmachary indicate the conflict in his unconscious when he was struggling against the natural urges of his libido during his early religious training. These dreams are of some value from the psycho-analytical point of view, as from them we obtain an insight into the activities of Brahmachary's unconscious during the time when he was earnestly endeavouring to attain his ascetic ideals.

For the purpose of this study I have selected four dreams from Brahmachary's diary, giving

them in a form slightly abridged from that in which they were originally recorded, following them in each case with a few broad psycho-analytical interpretations of the symbolism, which is all that is possible in the absence of complete associative material.

DREAM No. I

This dream, which occurred on the 1st Jaista 1295 (Bengali year), was recorded in the form of a narration to his master Gossain, as follows :

'You came to me accompanied by an ascetic named Barodia and a householder named Tarakanta. You called upon me to follow you. Barodia went first, then you, then Tarakanta, while I followed last of all. We walked towards a dense and terrible forest which looked beautiful. As we approached it, I found that it was not merely a forest, but a large hill. At last, after ascending and descending many uneven places, we reached a level spot on the highest peak of the hill.

'There you took me to a place where you showed me three seats (Asanas, i.e. seats used as place for worship). The three seats were made of slabs of red mountain earth (the word used is *Gairic* earth) and marked 1, 2, 3.

'You pointed out to me one of the seats, marked 3, and said : "This is your seat. You have to practise Sadhana¹ here for some time." This I did. You yourself sat upon the seat marked 2, while the seat marked 1 was left unoccupied.

'Then you got up and said : "Follow me!" Then all four of us began to walk in the order mentioned before. With great difficulty we were approaching a large kingdom. The kingdom was surrounded by a thick fencing of thorns. There was only one door, leading from the forest we were in to that radiant kingdom in front of us, which was very narrow. When we approached the door we found a dreadful long and jet-black snake, making a hissing noise. It went towards Barodia and spread its hood and stood up. Then it lowered the hood and ran towards you (i.e. Gossain). But you did not pay any heed to it and repeatedly encouraged me saying : "There is no fear, there is no fear." The snake contracted its hood and made for Tarakanta. Senseless with fear, Tarakanta hit the snake with the stick which he had in his hand. Then you shouted : "Don't strike it ! stop : you cannot get rid of it by striking. If you don't strike it, it will never bite you." But Tarakanta in fear and perturbation hit the snake with the stick again and again, and the snake began to coil itself strongly around his body. At this moment I looked up and saw the naked, tall and white complexioned figure of Barodia, entering the radiant kingdom by the narrow pathway.

'You stood in the middle of the door and said to me : "Jump towards me, the snake will not be able to hurt you."

'At this suggestion I jumped over the snake and fell nearby you. The shock of falling awoke me from my sleep.'

INTERPRETATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS ON DREAM No. I

The forest-covered hill with a passage ending with a narrow door symbolizes the *mons veneris* and the female genital organ ; whilst the entrance into the narrow passage symbolizes both coitus and birth. Hindu religious books say that a man is twice born, i.e. is born again after initiation into religious practice by a true spiritual preceptor. In the dream this spiritual re-birth is taking place, in the presence of the saint, Gossain, the ideal non-sexual father surrogate, as opposed to the evil, i.e. sexual, father, symbolized by the black snake.

In the dream there are birth symbols of different degrees for different persons, according to the degree of their spiritual advancement by religious practice.

Barodia the ascetic, also an ideal of Brahmachary, is shown in the dream as travelling ahead of all and as being born pure and naked as a child.

Brahmachary is being shown the way of new birth by his religious preceptor Gossain. He is being shown also that the way to spiritual contentment lies, not by aggression towards his father substitute who, like his real father, forbids the satisfaction of his desires, but by absolute submission which can only be attained by the complete extinction of his passion for women (just as he had previously abandoned his desire for his mother). He must not attack the snake, nor may he possess women : he must extinguish all aggression and sexual desire and be born again in a spiritual sense.

Tarakanta is not even being shown the way—which is interpreted as meaning that Brahmachary is better than Tarakanta. A portion of the libido is obtaining narcissistic satisfaction, which in its turn, as later dreams show, must also be overcome.

The snake represents sexual passion or the evil repressed sexual father who resides in the mother's vagina—like the 'Kala Nag', or black snake, which infests the rivers of Hindustan in Hindu folklore and mythology.

The teaching of Gossain is similar to the religious instruction often given in various lands, viz. that, if you do not pay any attention to sexual desire it will not trouble you. In the dream, Gossain is saying the same thing regarding the snake. Evil is combated by purity. *Actually*, however, the repression is brought about by the practice of Sadhana, the explanation of which is given later.

The snake is powerless against Barodia the ascetic, who has already mastered his sexual passion. Tarakanta, who has not yet obtained initiation into Sadhana or religious practice and is paying attention to the snake (representing sexual

¹ The method of religious worship taught by Gossain, which is not to be disclosed to the uninitiated.

passion and the feared father who inhabits the holy kingdom), is helpless against it. But Brahmachary has the advantage over Tarakanta, inasmuch as he has obtained initiation into Sadhana or religious practice from Gossain and is following the guidance of Gossain. Here also a portion of the libido is obtaining both narcissistic satisfaction and a psycho-homosexual outlet *via* identification with his spiritual ideal.

In the dream, Brahmachary is instructed to carry on Sadhana or religious practice, sitting on a seat made of red mountain earth, popularly known as Gairic earth. Brahmachary in his diary says Gossain told him that, according to Hindu religious books, Gairic earth represents the menstrual blood of the divine mother. It is interesting to compare the symbolization in the Hindu religion with the red earth symbol quoted by Daly (1928) from the dream of a Christian in his early researches into the menstruation complex, where he first advanced his theory of the importance of reactions in early childhood to the mother's menstruation and showed from the dream that the mother's menstruation had caused a trauma behind which lay buried prehistoric memories.

The object of the religious practice Sadhana is so to train the unconscious mind that it will regard the symbol of the female organ as that of the divine mother—the terrible castrating, menstruating mother who, through the displacement of the fear of the father on to her, is introjected and takes her place beside the father as a deity. This will do away with the sexual attraction which thoughts of the female organ would ordinarily evoke.

The slab of Gairic earth, the Asana, or the seat, which is symbolical of the Divine Mother's menstruating organ and upon which Brahmachary sits to carry out Sadhana, is marked 3. The number 3 is a symbol of male genitalia, the combination of the two being symbolical of sexual union.² In the practice of Sadhana the libido is partly being used up by the repressing forces, and it would seem also to be obtaining the satisfaction of a disguised coitus in the sitting on the seat of red Gairic earth.

This disguised satisfaction may be taken as a form of religious sublimation of sexual libido, which was possible because of the religious ideas of Brahmachary. The process originated from the introjection of the idealistic conception of his saintly master Gossain into the super-ego (the spiritual father super-imposed upon his original father imago), much as happens in the earlier latency period.

The dense and terrible forest which represents the female sexual organ also looked beautiful, whilst the mother's womb was symbolically described as a radiant kingdom. The occurrence of æsthetic ideas such as these will be shown later on to be a form of sublimation of sexual libido

which follows upon frustration. The previously attractive sexual organ of the mother becomes ugly and repulsive owing to its confirmation of the punishments once feared in the Œdipus phase—i.e. castration and the fear of being eaten. The knowledge of this undergoes repression and is replaced by the idealistic sacred conception of the mother. Thus in this dream we find that the sexual libido is being frustrated by worship in the Asana, the symbol representing the menstruating Divine Mother.

Barodia represents the ideal to which Brahmachary wishes to attain, whilst Tarakanta is the miserable failure that Brahmachary knows himself still to be. This is shown by the fact that in the dream it is he himself who is really the last of all of them, i.e. the least worthy.

The dream and Gossain's teachings in regard to it clearly show that Brahmachary can only hope to attain the Kingdom of God (i.e. a spiritual peace corresponding to the actual peace that he once knew within his mother's womb) if he can succeed in giving up both his aggression towards and identification with his repressed earthly and sexual father—the black snake which dwells within the Kingdom of God, the mother's vagina. Further, he must replace the sexual father in his super-ego by the later ideal, Gossain the saint, who has carried his submission, idealism and asceticism to such a point that, in order to eradicate all sense of guilt, he has repressed all sexual desire and sublimated his homosexual libido into love for and reverence of God. Brahmachary's repressed oral libido is displaced on to the father's penis in the form of the biting snake.

Gossain, in drawing attention to the fact that the red earth in the dream is symbolical of the menstrual blood of the Divine Mother, has provided interesting material which lends considerable support to Daly's view that the menstruation complex in its confirmation of castration fear and the fear of death is one of the main causes of the repression of incestuous tendencies. Gossain's instructions were: 'Sadhana is to instruct the unconscious mind to regard the symbol of the female sexual organ as the menstruating organ of the Divine Mother, in order that it may inhibit the natural attractions which the female sexual organs would otherwise evoke.' Gossain, with correct intuition, reproduces in this teaching the terrible fear of the menstruating mother in order to bring about the repression of all passion in the interests of religious sublimation and asceticism, thus repeating the deepest repressive factor of the Œdipus phase. (The 'rose' and 'garland' symbolism in Christianity similarly shows that the Divine Mother is the menstruating mother, and that her 'sacred' aspect has its genesis in the menstruation complex.) This explains why the

² So here is symbolic coitus. The birth symbol previously mentioned is also, as already stated, symbolical

of coitus, as also is the ascending and descending of the uneven places mentioned earlier in the dream.

great Divine Mother in most mythologies is both beautiful and terrifying—as the mother's sexual organ is shown to be in the symbolism in this dream.³

DREAM NO. II

The date of the dream is 17th Nāg 1295 :

'I had assembled with a thousand of my spiritual brothers (i.e. disciples of Gossain) at a masonry ghat for bathing in the Ganges. I saw that my master (i.e. Gossain) was approaching with hurried steps and was jumping and catching hold of some of us. Suddenly leaving the others, he came and said to me : "Be naked at once and let me rub my hand lightly over the whole of your body and you will attain a much desired stage which it is difficult to reach."

'No sooner had the master uttered these words, than I felt a shivering all over my body and an excitement in my penis. Suddenly I was restless with a sexual desire which was difficult to control. I fell at the feet of my master and said : "Kindly give me a respite of two minutes, so that I can become quiet." He repeatedly asked me to become naked and when he found that I could not according to his directions he said : "Nothing can be done this time. I will come again after 3 days."

INTERPRETATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS ON DREAM NO. II

In this Œdipus dream the libido is still being transformed through Sadhana, or religious practice. This transformation is taking place in the homosexual phase which follows the first heterosexual repression by Sadhana.

Auto-erotic habits are being idealized and transformed into religious practice by a man who is under the vow of sexual abstinence.

It shows the transition from the positive to the negative or inverted Œdipus complex, which accords with Daly's view that where the menstruation trauma occurs during the positive phase of the Œdipus complex it causes the little boy to turn homosexual ; he displaces his fear of the father on to the mother in the trauma which confirms his fears ; the libido is first attached to the father as object, later to brothers, cousins and playmates. This dream shows the homosexual father fixation in the negative inverted phase, whilst Dream No. III, which follows, shows clearly the transference of homosexual libido to the cousin.

The repressed homosexual masturbatory desire is freely exposed in this dream in the 'shivering all over his body and the excitement in his penis' when his master (= father surrogate) offered 'to rub his hand lightly over the whole of his body', which, though indicative both of his repressed

homosexual passion and guilty fear of his father's disapproval, may also be a projection of his desire to touch and be touched by his father. This desire had been formerly felt in regard to the mother, before the menstruation trauma caused him to turn from her in fear, and displace his object wishes and desires on to his father. (For it is the mother's hand that arouses in the boy those pleasant sensations in his genitals in the first place, when she freely handles them in washing and bathing him, etc.)

The bathing in the Ganges (= mother) has somewhat the same symbolical content as the approach to the door in the forest in the first dream—but this time the fear of the father is shown in direct relation to the sudden appearance of the father surrogate, Gossain. Brahmachary feels guilty towards Gossain because of his repressed wishes for coitus with the mother and because of his consciously felt sexual desires (symbolically shown as bathing in the Ganges⁴) whilst his castration fear, as well as his guilty homosexual craving, is shown in the refusal to expose himself.

DREAM NO. III

The date of the dream is Baisakh 1297 :

'My cousin Monmohun was my elder by 9 days. He died at the age of thirteen. Last night I dreamt that he appeared before me in the garb of an ascetic. I was elated at the sight and said : "I am glad that you have become an ascetic. I am going to be one too and we shall then live together."

'My ascetic cousin replied : "The stage of asceticism does not consist in a change of the outward garb. It is essentially an alteration of the mental state. Unless you can gain control over your passions, you cannot attain success. It is not so easy as you think."

'I said : "I don't feel any disturbance of the mind even in the company of women. My mind is thus fit for asceticism."

'My cousin replied : "Is that so ? come, be naked."

'At this I became naked. My cousin looked at me, smiled gently and said : "That will do. Put on your cloth. Do you hope to become an ascetic with this kind of fitness ? Put that desire out of mind for the present. As long as the penis remains, one cannot be a true ascetic. Under the influence of religious practice the penis will have not only to be controlled but to be made to disappear within the body. Until this takes place nothing will happen. Go on with your Sadhana. If the master is kind to you, you will gain your desire. Do not be in a hurry. Adieu."

'I said : "I wish to know what progress you have made in this outward sign of asceticism about which you are speaking."

³ Cf. Daly (1927), where the author developed the theory that the worship of the Divine Mother is conditioned by the fear of castration and death being con-

firmed by the menstruation trauma.
⁴ The Ganges is always referred to as 'mother' by Hindus, and the bathing is a ritual cleansing.

'My ascetic cousin became naked. Seeing that he had *no* penis, I exclaimed in surprise : "What is this, brother ?" ⁵ Your sexual organ is like that of a woman.'

'My ascetic cousin replied : "No, it is not as you think. By the restraint of the sexual passion (produced by practising *Sadhana*) the activities of the penis are destroyed. It then gradually shrinks and becomes small. Then it becomes inverted and draws itself within the body in such a way that its very root enters into the body. By this process its appearance becomes that of a female sexual organ, while really it is the disappearance of the male sexual organ from outside the body. This is nothing more than an outward development of an ascetic. The extraordinary and difficult mental stage of the ascetic can be obtained solely through the grace of the master."

'After this the ascetic cousin disappeared and I woke up.'

INTERPRETATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS ON DREAM NO. III

The dreamer is both identifying himself with his cousin, whose sexual organ has been transformed into that of a female, and regarding him as a love object.

The religious teachings of Gossain were based upon those of the Baishnab cult. According to this cult, every devotee should try to identify himself or herself with Sree Radha, the godly woman beloved of Sri Krishna (who was God incarnate in human form). This Sree Radha offered her body for the sexual enjoyment of Sri Krishna and not for her own pleasure. Several Christian mystics also had this passive homosexual ideal that they were really women beloved of God. The above dream is of this type. The dreamer is struggling against surrendering his libido in the homosexual phase and the guilt occasioned by his erection.

Wishing for complete sexual abstinence, he has in the dream phantasy got rid of the troublesome male sexual organ in the cousin as evidence of his wish fulfilment. But at the same time he draws comfort from the phantasy of abandonment to passive homosexual love in its sublimated form of spiritual admiration of the father. It would also appear that, at the same time, Brahmachary is in the dream regarding his cousin, who is practically a female, as a passive love object. Thus he is obtaining psychically a certain amount of active homosexual libidinal satisfaction.

We may also regard his cousin as a dream picture of himself. For he feels that so long as he has a penis which registers his carnal desires he will be unable to overcome them. If only he were like a woman, he would not be worried with erections and the path of religious submission to God would be made easy.

The dream also avoids the failure of its wish fulfilment function by denial of castration, attributing the absence of the penis to the virtue of the repression of sexual desire.

DREAM NO. IV

The date of the dream is 21st Aগ্রহায়ণ 1296 :

In this dream Brahmachary hears the voice of a woman, who says : 'Your uncontrolled feelings have stopped my upward progress. I have been drawn to you by your imagination and excitement. I have no hope of being saved as long as your perversion (*Bikar*) lasts. So please satisfy your desires and be calm and give me peace.'

Brahmachary, who touched the dim shadow of this woman who spoke to him, by which contact he felt a thrill of joy through his whole body and began to shiver repeatedly, was thus spoken to by the woman : 'For shame ! You have not been able to give up bodily passion and thought of a woman. You have ruined yourself. And just think to what a pitiful condition you have reduced me too by this. I was lost in ecstatic enjoyment of the *Samadhi* (trance). By this time I would have passed the changeful (earthly) state into the *Samadhi* trance. But I have been bound because of the unseverable relationship with you. The attractive force of your violent excitement does not enable me to lift myself. So, out of sheer helplessness, I have come. Please give me freedom. Please satisfy your desires.'

In the description of the dream Brahmachary continues : 'As I placed my hand on her waist, the sight of her heavenly beauty unnerved me with surprise. My lifeless arm dropped down. I saw a beautiful damsel, with blue effulgence playing upon her, standing naked in front of me.'

The concluding paragraph of this dream is : 'Saying so, the naked damsel rose upwards, brightening the ends of the horizon with the effulgence of her dark beauty . . . and I, crying "Alas ! alas ! where are you gone ?", rushed out of the room.'

INTERPRETATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS ON DREAM NO. IV

From the diary of Brahmachary (III, 20-21) it appears that Brahmachary related this dream to his master Gossain, and Gossain made the following remarks regarding this dream :

'The cravings of your nature demand satisfaction. It was your nature which appeared before you and spoke to you in this manner. Natural cravings may be satisfied in two ways, by legitimate enjoyment and by the kind of religious practices known as *Sadhana*. It is by practices of *Sadhana* that you must satisfy the cravings of your nature. In your case it is the only way.'

We should not overlook the importance of the sentence in the dream in which Brahmachary says :

⁵ The expression brother is used by Hindus as a term of affection, even among friends.

'As I placed my hand on her waist, the sight of her heavenly beauty unnerved me with surprise.'

The first phrase we may regard perhaps as a displacement upwards. And, since we know that this dream apparition is a return of the Œdipus mother, may we not suppose that the heavenly beauty referred to as unnerving him with surprise, which was followed afterwards by the repression of his sexual passion and its sublimation in spiritual reverence, was just that vision of the menstruating sexual organ of the mother which Gossain told his pupil was necessary in order that desire for woman might be suppressed, and which, according to Daly, has the same effect in ontogenesis among Europeans?

'My lifeless arm dropped down.' What else can this mean but 'my erect penis withered'? (Compare with the anthropological data, such as 'Man's legs wither and his bones turn soft at the sight of a menstruating woman, etc.', as quoted by Frazer, Crawley, Lord Raglan and other anthropologists, and referred to by Daly in his psycho-analytical studies.)

'I saw a beautiful damsel . . . standing naked in front of me.' May we not suppose that behind this beauty lies the ugly vision which caused the traumatic fixation? The woman blaming him for preventing her from obtaining spiritual freedom is a projection of his own hate of woman for the temptation that they are for him. The struggles of Brahmachary are not unlike those of St. Antony.

In the remarks on the different dreams an attempt has been made to show (according to the views of Gossain and also of Brahmachary) that in the religious practice of Sadhana there is a psychological substitute for the gratification of the sexual passion which may be justified from the point of view of unconscious psychology and the theory of frustration and sublimation. In this practice there would appear to be a kind of spiritual masochistic enjoyment in the resignation involved.

Brahmachary has thus noted in the diary the effect of the last dream vision: 'Since I saw the unearthly vision, my mind was restless with the thought of how and when I should get another sight of that incomparable vision. I lost all taste for the harmful and vicious fancies which until then I had pleasurably indulged in. On the contrary, they became positively distasteful.'

CONCLUSION

Dr. Rabindra Nath Tagore, the great Bengali poet and a profound psychologist, has said (in his article 'Alap-Alochora', published in *Prabazi* for Bhadra, 1333) that the attractions between persons

of opposite sex consist of two different elements, viz :

(1) The pure sexual attraction, in which we are on the same level as the brutes.

(2) The attraction due to the æsthetic charm of a female or a male, which is in a different category and exercises a kind of spiritual and elevating influence on the mind.

We may take the æsthetic charm to be a form of sublimated sexual libido, a product of human culture and religious evolution.

In the present case we find that this sublimation is being brought about in the unconscious by Sadhana, which is a religious psychological process, and, according to Gossain's interpretation of the first dream, is obtained through worship at the Asana of the Divine Mother, a seat of red earth symbolical of her menstruation. This red earth is also used in the worship of the Hindu Goddess Kali, in place of menstrual blood.

Sadhana therefore repeats at a later date, in the interests of religious education and asceticism, the same phenomenon which caused the repression of the son's Œdipus wishes in childhood, i.e. the menstruation trauma, which is caused by the castration fear and the universal fear of blood. In childhood, too, the son's need of his mother's love, coupled with her love and service, result through frustration in the sublimation of active passion into idealism, loving adoration and reverence, the latter belonging to the repressed and transposed fear.

Although Freud has not directly explained how the psychical value of love is raised by the ascetic tendency, yet many of his writings give here and there hints as to how this comes about.

It is to be hoped that this little study may arouse interest in a somewhat obscure subject, and that it may throw some light on it. Certain aspects of mental evolution are perhaps more pronounced in Hindus than in Christians, and therefore provide a better medium for studying both their normal and pathological aspects. The worship of the mother plays a bigger rôle in present day Hinduism than it does in modern Christianity, and hence perhaps the influence of female sexuality is more discernible in it.

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NOTES ON THE CONVERSION OF JOHN BUNYAN: A STUDY IN ENGLISH PURITANISM

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'As I passed through the wilderness of this world I lighted on a place where was a den, and laid me down in that place to sleep; and as I slept I dreamed a dream, I dreamed and behold, I saw a man clothed with rags and standing in a certain place, with his face from his own house, a book in his hand, and a great burden upon his back. I looked and saw him open the book and read therein; and as he read, he wept and trembled; and not being able longer to contain, he broke out with a lamentable cry, saying, What shall I do?'

These are the opening words of *Pilgrim's Progress*. The man of course is John Bunyan, and in that picture of the terrified sinner, fleeing from the City of Destruction in a desperate effort to save his soul, the Puritans of seventeenth-century England recognized their own plight and bewilderment.

The importance of Bunyan as an object of study is to be found in the fact that he is representative of the most repressive religious movement in history. That movement is known as Puritanism and it was during the seventeenth century that it grew and triumphed, leaving an indelible stamp on the English character. As R. H. Tawney (1926) has pointed out, it was Puritanism and not the Tudor secession from Rome that was the true English Reformation, and it is in that struggle against the old order that an England unmistakably modern emerges. The triumphs of the Puritan spirit in Church and State, its fight for civil and religious liberty both in the old world and the new, have been a constant theme for historians. But the real impact of the Puritan movement is to be seen in the changes which it wrought in the life of the individual, in the minutiae of his everyday conduct and in his outlook on God, the soul and immortality. Overwhelmed by the vanity of this world he scorns its pleasures as mere distractions which may deflect him from his purpose. Heaven is his destination and the road is straight and narrow with many a steep gradient, but he presses on 'with his fingers in his ears' deaf even to the claims of friendship for, he concludes, it is better to enter heaven maimed and halt than having two eyes be cast into eternal fire. The creative achievements of man he scouts as mere 'toys' and in a tremendous effort to achieve his salvation he spends his days in toil, prayer and self-discipline.

Herein lies the real contribution of the Puritan doctrine of God and man, in producing a type of character that was ideally suited to the expanding commerce and developing capitalism of that period. Herein, too, lies the irony of the Puritan movement. Beginning as a movement which condemned every form of self-indulgent expendi-

ture as a sin, it ended in producing some of the most successful company promoters of the two succeeding centuries. Beginning with the doctrine of the individual's responsibility to God it soon found itself giving a sanction to *laissez faire*. The qualities of initiative, enterprise, ceaseless energy, thrift and discipline—in fact all those qualities which go to make for 'efficiency' and the kind of progress which can be measured by statistics—found their inspiration in Puritanism. These qualities were at first advocated in order that a man might save his soul: they were soon found to be equally useful in the less difficult task of saving his money. The fanatical driving force of the Puritan, his scorn of idleness, his spirit of rugged independence and enterprise and, above all, his sense of mission made him one of the best colonizers the world has known. There is in fact no part of the English culture pattern which has not been affected by Puritanism. Dibelius (1923), writing as a German to German people after the last war, went so far as to say that 'Puritanism dominates the English soul'. 'It is,' he added, 'the parent of English cant'.

In view of the part that the Puritan movement has played in shaping our national life and conduct, an analysis of Puritanism is no mere academic pursuit. At the present moment, in the fifth year of the war, when traditional attitudes are breaking down and very great changes are taking place in our national life and thought, the ability to hold our culture at arms' length and see it in perspective is a matter of practical urgency. To serve in the ranks of the army is to realize very keenly how criticism is being directed to every aspect of our present day society. Much of this criticism is shrewd and informed, based not on a reading of sociological surveys but on hard experience of the way the religious and economic structure impinges on one's personal life. The citizen in khaki now has ample time to reflect upon the contemporary scene. One cannot help being struck by the disparity that exists between the spontaneous criticism of the barrack room and the calculated statements of parliamentarians and pulpiteers. English public life is still predominantly Puritan; but not so the lower strata of our society, of which we have a fair sample in the ranks of the armed forces, where the spirit is definitely in revolt against the Puritan conscience.

The theme of this essay may thus be formulated: in order to understand 'that heterogeneous thing the Englishman' we must first understand Puritanism, and in order to understand Puritanism we must first understand the religious experience of John Bunyan.

John Bunyan is *par excellence* the representative Puritan. He provides the key to the religious

spirit of his time. He was born in the early seventeenth century. He belonged to the dispossessed classes who had been exploited by the new middle-class capitalists. He describes his family as belonging to 'a low and inconsiderable generation; my father's house being of that rank that is meanest and most despised of all the families in the land.' He fought as a youth in the Civil War in which the social unrest of the preceding century culminated. He, more than any other, was responsible for promulgating in popular form the doctrines of Puritanism and so shaping the conscience of the lower and middle classes of his day. Next to the authorized version of the English Bible his chief work, *Pilgrim's Progress*, has been the most widely read book in the English language. To-day it has been translated into a hundred and twenty languages and dialects.

The particular value of Bunyan, however, is to be found in the fact that he has set down in his journal, *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, the most thorough attempt at religious introspection that we possess in the English language. As a study in the conversion process it is surpassed only by Augustine's *Confessions*. It has the advantage of being written for the ordinary man 'un-lettered and un-Latined': 'I could', Bunyan says, 'have stepped into a style much higher than this, in which I have here discoursed and could have adorned all things more than here I have seemed to do; but I dare not: God did not play in tempting of me; neither did I play when I sank as into a bottomless pit, when the pangs of Hell caught hold upon me; wherefore I may not play in relating of them, but be plain and simple, and lay down the thing as it was; He that liketh it, let him receive it; and he that does not, let him produce a better. Farewell.'

If, therefore, one wishes to know what Puritanism is all about, Bunyan provides the answer. The text with which this essay is preceded gives in the most graphic form the picture of man, weighed down with the burden of his guilt, crying out: 'What shall I do?' Puritanism is one of the most ruthless attempts in religious history to provide an answer to that question. The doctrines of the Reformers, Luther and Calvin, provided a theological answer. Bunyan tells us in simple and vivid language precisely how it worked out in his own particular case.

Although conversion is not the monopoly of any one religion it will be found that when reduced to its constitutive elements the process conforms to the following pattern: (1) Vision. (2) Conviction

of Sin. (3) Absolution. (4) A Sense of Mission.¹ These four elements are illustrated in the following notes on John Bunyan's conversion experience.

(a) From his earliest descriptions Bunyan represents himself as a character morally split and bifurcated: his life is a battlefield of warring opposites. His conflict has its unconscious roots in the father-son relationship. His intense ambivalence towards the father (about whom he has nothing to report) results in a cleavage of the parental image into a 'good' and a 'bad' father which are projected on to the outside world in the forms of God and the Devil.

In the early part of his life, in fact up to the beginning of his conversion at the age of twenty, it is the Devil who is the predominating figure. Speaking of his early childhood he describes himself as being 'taken captive by the Devil and his will.' In his dreams 'devils and wicked spirits . . . laboured to draw him away with them.' It becomes obvious that he is much enamoured of the strong, potent father and begins at a very early age, in such ways as are open to him, to emulate this figure and so justify his subsequent claim to be 'the chief of sinners'. Speaking of the sin of lying he says: 'Some men . . . have a kind of mystical but hellish copulation with the devil, who is the father, and their soul the mother of sin, and wickedness.' Again: 'A lie is the brat of hell, and it cannot be in the heart before the person has committed a kind of spiritual adultery with the devil.' His rebelliousness is expressed in 'cursing, swearing and lying, and blaspheming the Holy name of God'. In this matter he would have us know that he had but few equals. He soon discovers the boomerang effect of his hate impulses, for he says: 'I did so offend the Lord that even in my childhood he did scare and affright me with fearful dreams and did terrify me with dreadful visions.'

Anxieties concerning the Day of Judgement and the 'fearful torments of hell-fire' were among these terrors, which he says occurred when he was nine or ten years of age.

But soon, he writes: 'these terrible dreams did leave me . . . wherefore I did still let loose the reins of my lusts and delighted in all transgressions against the law.' From now on he describes himself as 'the very ringleader of all the youth' whom he led 'into all manner of vice and ungodliness'. In all this (and in much more) it is easy to detect the braggadocio of the would-be rebel and, lest the reader should takes these confessions at their face

¹ These four elements can be illustrated in a very concise form in the classic conversion of Isaiah: (1) 'In the year that King Uzziah died I saw the Lord high and lifted-up.' The beginning of the process is marked by the emergence of the ego-ideal, a personification of what one would like to be. (2) 'Then I said Alas I am undone, man of unclean lips that I am.' The contrast between what he would like to be and what he is is felt in the form of guilt. (3) 'But one of the seraphs flew toward me with a live coal

in his hand . . . he touched my mouth with it, saying, now that this has touched your lips your guilt has gone, your sin is forgiven.' This is the process of absolution. (4) 'Then I heard the voice of the Lord saying Whom shall I send? who will go for us? I answered Here am I; send me.' This is the inevitable corollary: He who has been saved must become a saviour. Having admitted the fatherhood of God his mission is to make all men brothers.

value, Bunyan in later life was very careful, when malicious tongues accused him of 'having two wives and the like', most hotly to deny the charge: 'I am not the man. . . . If all the fornicators and adulterers in England were hanged by the neck till they were dead, JOHN BUNYAN, the object of their envy, would still be alive and well.' He continues: 'And in this I admire the wisdom of God that he made me shy of women from my first conversion until now . . . it is a rare thing to see me carry it pleasant towards a woman; the common salutation of a woman I abhor, it is odious to me in whomsoever I see it. Their company alone I cannot away with. I seldom so much as touch a woman's hand, for I think these things are not so becoming me.'

During this period of adolescence, when the figure of the Devil plays so large a part in his phantasies, he makes one admission that presages the conflict that was to follow: 'In these days the thoughts of religion were very grievous to me . . . it would be as a prison to me . . . yet this I well remember, that though I could myself sin with the greatest delight and ease . . . yet if I have at any time seen wicked things by those who professed goodness it would make my spirit tremble.'

We see the dichotomy between good and evil and the shadow of the emerging ego-ideal which eventually claims his allegiance.

The year 1644 was an important year in the life of John Bunyan. He was now sixteen. In June his mother died; the following month his sister died and in August his father married again. (This was his father's third marriage, Bunyan being the child of the second marriage.) By the end of that year Bunyan finds himself fighting, so the evidence suggests, on the Parliamentary side under Cromwell, who later became one of his great heroes. The fact that nowhere does he refer to the two deaths and his father's precipitate re-marriage reveals the stunning effect these three successive blows had had upon him. It is a common fact that highly emotional states of mind often seek hasty relief in some form of action in order to lessen the tension and resolve the conflict. War most certainly provides an immediate form of psychic relief: civil war more so. When we consider the issues that were at stake, it is obvious that the very nature of that national schism would be a perfect stage on which to act out his conflict. The revolution was the inevitable outcome of an increasing tension between Crown and Parliament, between Puritanism and High Anglicanism. The rising commercial classes in their fight for religious, economic and political liberty were rebelling against the wish of the ruling classes to preserve their prescriptive rights in every aspect of the nation's life. The rebellion ended with the death

of Charles I. Bunyan, who invariably projected his inner conflict on to the outside world, no doubt saw this struggle as symbolical of his own conflict: he, too, was a civil war.

No reference is to be found to his feeling at this time except the brief note: 'I sinned still, and grew more and more rebellious against God and careless of mine own salvation.' His action on the conclusion of the Civil War is much more revealing.

On returning home he immediately married, and it is from this time that the beginning of his conversion can be dated. Apart from the fact that she was poor he has nothing to say about his wife. Her one commendation was that she possessed a pious father. She often told him 'what a godly man her father was and how he would reprove and correct vice both in his house and among his neighbours, what a strict and holy life he lived in his day, both in word and deed.' Although this pious man was dead, he had bequeathed to his daughter two solid reminders of his religiosity in *The Plain Man's Pathway to Heaven* and *The Practice of Piety*, two books which Bunyan immediately began to read and which 'did beget in him some desires to religion'. He attends the Parish Church and speaks rapturously of his adoration for the priests: 'This conceit grew so strongly upon me in little time upon my spirit, that had I but seen a priest never so sordid and debauched in his life I should find my spirit fall upon him, reverence him and knit unto him, yea, I thought for the love I did bear unto them, supposing they were the ministers of God, I could have lain down at their feet and have been trampled upon by them; their name, their garb and work did so intoxicate me.' Here plainly is the language of the lover and we can see the displacement of his libido to his newly discovered ego-ideal imposed upon him in the figures of God and his priests.

Two facts are to be noted at this point. In the first place, it can be assumed that the activity of the Civil War had postponed the conflict evoked by the events in his sixteenth year.² But war is usually followed by a revulsion of feeling against the deeper aggressiveness which has been allowed expression. The Civil War was a particularly bloodthirsty affair in which the blood-lust of the Puritans was expressed in looting, pillage and massacre, all rationalized in the name of religion. Bunyan has nothing to say of the carnage he had witnessed, but as he looks back upon his youth he shudders as he recalls that but for the preventing mercy of God he would have been punished for his 'rebelliousness'. In all these so-called escapes from death (of which he mentions as instances several probably imaginary events) it would seem that the retaliatory effect of his own aggressiveness evokes an anxiety so intense that he feels com-

² It is interesting that Starbuck (1899), from such limited evidence as he was able to collect on the fact of religious conversion, points out that this phenomenon is

predominantly a crisis of adolescence, the majority of male conversions occurring at the age of sixteen.

pelled as a consequence to renounce his aggressiveness and adopt, therefore, a feminine attitude towards the father. This is reflected in his marriage. It is obviously his pious father-in-law who really attracts him and with whom he wishes to be at one.

The second fact to be noted is the part played by women in effecting a reconciliation of the revolting son with the father. Bunyan first marries a woman whose chief attraction is her pious father. Secondly, he ceases to swear at the rebuke of a woman. Thirdly, it is hearing three or four women 'talking about the things of God' that further precipitates his desire for reconciliation with the father now symbolized for him in the figure of God.

The explanation is to be found in the different attitude adopted by Protestantism towards the Œdipus complex. Roman Catholicism tries to effect a sublimation of the father-mother-son relationship, thus converting the triangle of the Œdipus situation into the Trinity of the Holy Family. Protestantism, however, has a different aim. It is not concerned with the mother. The mother is absent from its symbolism except for the very attenuated suggestion contained in the Holy Ghost. Protestantism has concerned itself with the father-son relationship. As Funck-Brentano (1935) writes: 'The masterpiece of Renaissance as of Mediaeval art had been the Virgin in every mood and form, the Virgin of Botticelli, Correggio, Ghirlandaio and a hundred others, the splendid stone Virgins of French Cathedrals which the Huguenots condemned and mutilated.'

"Stabat mater dolorosa
Juxta crucem lacrimosa
Dum pendebat filius. . . ."

All this, and with it the plain-chant or the music of Pergolesi was to be suppressed.'

This may explain why in all the churches of extreme Protestantism the major portion of the adherents are women, in many cases almost exclusively so. They at all events can find a sublimated satisfaction for their incestuous wishes. It is also to be noted that it is no uncommon thing in such churches for the mother to introduce the son to religion. The father often absents himself, maintaining perhaps something of the Protestant ethic but relegating the religious training to the mother, who is therefore the representative of the father. If this be so it would have the effect of pushing the boy still more into a negative solution of his Œdipus conflict.

(b) With the creation of an ego-ideal Bunyan is immediately subject to its demands and sensitive to its strictures. It is on hearing a sermon on the wickedness of Sunday sports that he is forced to the conclusion that the homily is specifically directed at himself: 'At that I felt

what guilt was, though never before, that I can remember; but then I was for the present greatly laden therewith and so went home when the sermon was ended, with a great burden upon my spirit.'

This insight into the mind of Bunyan gives a clear picture of the technique employed by Evangelical Protestantism to secure the 'conviction of sin' which is the essential pre-requisite of conversion. This conviction of sin has to be evoked. Traditional Protestantism has one method: it relies completely on the power of the spoken word. That explains the central position of the pulpit which in the stricter sects has usurped the position of the altar. The whole drama of the service leads up to the 'preaching of the word' as the climax. Everything that has preceded is contributory to that act. Puritanism, relying on that method, has rigorously eschewed all architectural distractions which savour of 'popery' in order that the attention of the hearers may be focussed on him whose function it is to speak in the name of God. Even the most casual perusal of the sermons of the Puritan Divines shows the enormous use which is made of the weapon of denunciation in order to stir up the sense of guilt. The utterances of Jonathan Edwards in America and even the nineteenth-century Spurgeon in England show an unparalleled virtuosity in the art of instilling terror solely by the dramatic use of the voice. Pleadings alternate with threats; the sinner is 'wooed' (a favourite word) and also warned. In short, the whole technique of Evangelical Protestantism rests upon the early parent-child situation where the child is alternately scolded and cajoled. By thus exploiting the ambivalent feeling of the child this mixture of threats and coaxing usually results in the submission of the child into 'good behaviour'.

The Puritan tradition has revived and exploited that parent-child relationship. The voice which conveys the super-ego threats is again heard, in circumstances calculated to heighten dramatically the authority of the voice and so evoke the repressed feelings of guilt. The reasonable arguments of the ego are explained away as pride and self-will. Thus the sinner is reduced to abject dependence on God in the knowledge of his complete worthlessness and guilt.

The sense of guilt having now entered with full force into his consciousness, Bunyan from now on is dominated by the voices of God and the Devil who carry on an interminable debate, arguing with him the pros and cons of submission and revolt. The figure of God represents his ego-ideal ('I loved to be talked of as one that was truly Godly,') and the punishing mechanism. On that same Sunday, after Bunyan had tried in vain to shake off the sermon and the burdening sense of guilt, the threatening super-ego brings the issue to a climax by presenting him with an ultimatum:

'Wilt thou leave thy sins and go to heaven or have thy sins and go to hell?'³

(c) 'The conviction of sin' is not the crisis of the conversion process but the essential prelude to the act of repentance. The consciousness of guilt will not in itself effect a conversion. Its immediate result is to induce a feeling of helplessness and despair. This is Bunyan's first reaction: 'Wherefore I found within me a great desire to take my fill of sin, still studying what sin was yet to be committed that I might taste the sweetness of it; and I made as much haste as I could to fill my belly with its delicacies, lest I should die before I had my desire; for that I feared greatly. . . . And I am very confident, that this temptation of the devil is more usual amongst poor creatures than many are aware of, even to overrun their spirits with a scurvy and seared frame of heart, and benumbing of conscience; which frame he stilly and slyly supplieth with such despair, that though not much guilt attendeth the soul, yet they continually have a secret conclusion within them, that there is no hopes for them; for they have loved their sins, therefore after them they will go.'

The only result of the warning voices was to achieve what he calls an outward reformation, and drive him to study the scriptures and in particular the Epistles of St. Paul. The actual threat that turns the balance is the fear of complete annihilation. To Bunyan's tortured and vivid imagination this threat presents itself as an actual, concrete incident. One of his delights was the ringing of church bells, but having, as he says, a tender conscience, he had abandoned the practice and now only occasionally permitted himself the pleasure of climbing the steeple and gazing upon the bells. But now he is terrified by the fear—how if one of the bells should fall? Changing his position, he finds safety beneath a large beam. But this gives no security, for the falling bell would rebound and kill him. He therefore stands in the doorway of the belfry, but still the threat pursues him—how if the steeple itself should fall? And so he is forced to flee—for fear the steeple should fall upon my head.'

The symbolism is vividly clear. The church bells are again the voice of God. (Compare Anglo-Saxon 'bellan'—to roar, from which the word 'bell' is derived.) The steeple like a minatory forefinger no doubt often reminded the young Bunyan of the punishment that would attend his refusal to recognize and pay homage to God.

The infantile situation is again reproduced. Threats, as the child knows, if repeatedly ignored will be followed by action. Whatever the phraseology of the threat may be, the child has no difficulty in translating its unconscious meaning in terms of castration. The child unconsciously

reacts, not to the manifest content of the threat, but to the latent meaning of that threat which emanates from the parent's unconscious conscience.

In the conversion process, we have here the last resort of the super-ego, which, in whatever language it may be rationalized, means the threat of castration. Once the conviction of guilt is established, the primal conflict, which hitherto has been unconscious, moves towards consciousness. The super-ego has its own rack and torture-chamber for extorting an appropriate reply to its ultimatum: wilt thou leave thy sins and go to heaven, or have thy sins and go to hell? Few are able to retort, like Shelley, that they would prefer to burn with Plato rather than go to heaven with Archdeacon Paley; those brought up in the severity of the Puritan tradition elect only too often to pay the terrible price that is exacted.

(d) The next stage in the conversion process is usually known as 'absolution'. To Bunyan this presents itself as a desire to be re-born. He makes the following note in his chronicle: 'But upon a day I came where there were three or four women sitting at a door in the sun and talking about the things of God. For their talk was about a new birth, the work of God on their hearts.' This represents a new mystery to him, but an experience that he feels he must have. The explanation of the 'mystery' is revealed to him in a realistic birth-dream, in which his wish is fulfilled. He sees the women sitting on the sunny side of a mountain, basking in the sun while he shivers in the cold. Between him and these women there is a wall which acts as a barrier. He tries to find a passage in the wall through which he may pass: 'At the last I saw as it were, a narrow gap, like a little doorway in the wall, through which I attempted to pass; but the passage being very straight and narrow, I made many efforts to get in, but all in vain, even until I was well-nigh quite beat out, by striving to get in; at last, with great striving, methought I first did get in my head and after that by a sidling striving, my shoulders and my whole body; then I was exceeding glad, and went and sat down in the midst of them, and so was comforted with the light and heat of the sun.' 'The passage', he adds by way of afterthought, 'was wonderful narrow, so narrow, that I could not but with great difficulty enter in thereat. It showed me that none could enter into life, but those that were in downright earnest and unless they left this wicked world behind them.'

There is no need to comment upon the imagery of this birth phantasy, but rather to indicate the part played in the conversion process by this conception of re-birth. It was, of course, the centrality of this experience that led William James (1902) to define this type of convert as the 'twice-born' type.

³ Compare Cromwell's conversion: 'Wilt thou join with the dragons; wilt thou join with the Gods?' (*Letters and Speeches*, II, 53-4.)

The importance of the re-birth phantasy becomes clear on considering the essential nature of the conception of original sin in the Judæo-Christian tradition, where it is regarded as consisting of an inherited taint, an '*inquinamentum*' which is transmitted to each individual by the act of conception. The doctrines of the Virgin Birth and the Immaculate Conception thus guarantee the sinlessness of Christ. The re-birth of the Christian convert involves an identification with the sinless Christ. The nature of this original transmitted sin is clearly indicated in the two 'Fall' stories of Genesis vi and Genesis iii (the Adam and Eve story). The earliest myth, however, is the legend of the 'Fallen Angels' of which there are traces in Genesis vi. This legend is the earliest, in the sense that it was the first to be fixed upon as an explanation by the unknown redactor who wove the Prophetic and Priestly strands of the Hexateuch into the single story we now possess. The legend of the 'Fallen Angels' is elaborated in greater detail in the Ethiopic Book of Enoch and other Apocryphal literature. It contains the theory that human sin is due to the revolt of two hundred Watchers (that is, spirits who are conceived as ceaselessly watching the deity in perpetual readiness to obey his commands) who bound themselves by mutual oath to rape the daughters of men. Out of this union of divine beings and mortal women sprang a brood of giants who devoured mankind. The brood of giants was not the only way in which the fallen Watchers introduced sin on to the earth, but they did so also by imparting to men knowledge which the Creator had not meant them to possess. The fallen Angels are exterminated by the Deluge.

In the same way the extra-Biblical versions of the Paradise story bring out the sexual *motif* which is inherent in the Adamic doctrine of sin. The Fall consists in the seduction of Eve by the serpent or by Satan appearing as a serpent. The Slavonic Enoch expresses his view thus: 'On account of this [his expulsion from heaven] he [Satan] conceived designs against Adam; in such a manner he entered the deceived Eve. But he did not touch Adam.' Woman, according to this version, is obviously the transmitter of evil, a view which is bluntly expressed in Psalms, li, 5: 'Behold I was shapen in wickedness and in sin hath my mother conceived me.'

In his Bampton Lectures on Original Sin (which are probably the most authoritative exposition in modern times), Dr. Williams (1927), commenting on the continual reappearance of this sexual *motif* in the history of Christian doctrine, says: 'We shall often have occasion to note resemblances, sometimes slight and superficial, sometimes astonishingly exact, between the idea of concupiscence as it appears in Jewish and Christian thought and the Freudian conception of libido.'

For the Protestant reformers, Luther and Calvin, man was totally corrupt. In the last analysis there is only sin that exists. Sins are symptoms of the original sin; in the language of the Reformers they are merely loathsome emanations of the inward pollution. The sin of Adam ('concupiscence') is regarded by Luther as a perennial fountain of filth which is perpetually manifesting itself in every act even though apparently innocent or virtuous.

The result of this doctrine of total depravity is seen in Bunyan: 'But my original and inward pollution, that, that was my plague and my affliction.' He conceives himself as being 'more loathsome in my own eyes than a toad.' This inward pollution 'bubbles forth in wickedness as water from a fountain.' He is therefore terrified of taking any action, however harmless. He dare not speak for fear of misplacing his words. Small acts were for him the psychopathology of everyday life, revealing the presence of this all-pervading 'concupiscence' which Williams, although writing as a theologian, has identified with the libido.

Again, the difference between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism towards the Œdipus complex is brought out. The attitude of the Roman church has already been noted. But Protestantism, which in essence is preoccupied solely with the father-son relationship, has as its sole purpose not the sublimation of the Œdipus situation but the anticipation of it. That is to say, the doctrines of the Reformers direct their main attack against the pregenital manifestations of the libido. It is concerned not with sins but with Sin; the former are checked, or to use a favourite sermonic word 'pruned', simply because they are regarded as offshoots, symptoms or disguised expressions of the original sin. They are concerned not merely with the fruits of sin but with its roots. Not only, therefore, must every instinctual manifestation be renounced, but the very source and origin must be ruthlessly excoriated. Hence the draconic strictures directed by the Puritans against smoking ('worshipping the Lord with unclean lips'), drinking, gambling, card-playing, dancing and every form of pleasant indulgence down to laziness. Exhibitionism, of course, is especially denounced, as in this passage from Bunyan's *Life and Death of Mr. Badman*: 'But what can be the end of those that are proud in the decking of themselves after their antic manner? Why are they for going with their bull's foretops, with their naked shoulders and paps hanging out like a cow's bag? Why are they for painting their faces? . . . It is rather to please their lusts, to satisfy their wild and extravagant fancies; and I wish none doth it to stir up lust in others, to the end they may commit uncleanness with them. . . . I wonder what it was that of old was called the attire of a harlot; certainly it could not be more bewitching and tempting than are the garments of many professors [i.e. Christians] this day.' Every form of

instinctual escape must be cut off in order that the primary cause may be the more adequately dealt with.

In Puritanism, therefore, the original conflict, it would seem, is enacted on the anal level and only rarely advances to the genital level. This would explain the 'sphincter morality' which makes up the Puritan ethic. Morality is a matter of discipline. 'Method', says Tawney, 'was a Puritan catchword before the world had heard of Methodists.' Self-control is the mark of piety. 'Dirty' and 'filthy' are the adjectives used to describe sin. In view of the accepted nature of original sin nocturnal emissions would, no doubt, be regarded as proof positive of the 'inner pollution' and of 'uncleanness'.

The only solution, therefore, was to be born again, and in such a way that the convert should be free from the *inquinamentum* which was transmitted to the human race by the process of physical birth. But the Reformers' doctrine of total depravity involves more than the renunciation of woman for whose sake mankind rebelled; it involves the impossible task of trying to effect a complete renunciation of instinctual desires. Christ, owing to the theological ingenuity with which his sinlessness is guaranteed by the doctrines of the Virgin Birth and the Immaculate Conception, may be said to have effected that complete renunciation. By identifying himself with Christ (what St. Paul calls being 'in Christ') the convert was assured of a reconciliation with the father.

What this identification actually cost is shown in page after page of Bunyan's journal: 'Wherefore, if my guilt lay hard upon me, then I should cry that the blood of Christ might take it off and if it was going off without it (for the sense of sin would be sometimes as if it should die, and go quite away) then I would also strive to fetch it upon my heart again, by bringing the punishment for sin in hell-fire upon my spirits; and should cry Lord let it not go off my heart, but the right way, by the blood of Christ.' 'Now was I sorry that God had made me a man.'

Gradually, as the figure of Christ the Son takes the place of God the Father, Bunyan's death wishes are directed against Christ in an obsessional temptation to commit the sin of Judas, who by selling Christ for thirty pieces of silver (the price of a slave), was traditionally responsible for Christ's death: 'Sometimes it would run in not so little as a hundred times together, sell him, sell him, sell him. Against which I may say for whole hours together, I have been forced to stand as continually leaning and forcing my spirit against it . . . and sometimes the tempter would make me believe that I had consented to it, then should I be as tortured upon a rack for whole days together.'

Gradually, he is able to repress these death wishes: 'Then breaking out in the bitterness of my

soul, I said to myself, with a grievous sigh, How can God comfort such a wretch as I? I had no sooner said it but this returned upon me as an echo doth answer a voice, This sin is not unto death. At which I was as if I had been raised out of a grave, and cried out again, Lord how couldest thou find out such a word as this? For I was filled with admiration at the fitness, and also, at the unexpectedness of the sentence, the fitness of the word, the rightness of the timing of it, the power, and light, and sweetness and glory that came with it, also, was marvellous for me to find. I was now, for the time, out of doubt as to that about which I so much was in doubt before; my fears before were that my sin was not pardonable; therefore, from this I have encouragement to come to God, by Christ, for mercy, to consider the promise of forgiveness as that which stands with open arms to receive me, as well as others. This, therefore, was a great easement to my mind; to wit, that my sin was pardonable, that it was not the sin unto death. None but those that know what my trouble, by their own experience, was, can tell what relief came to my soul by this consideration; it was a release to me from my former bonds, and a shelter from my former storm. I seemed now to stand upon the same ground with other sinners, and to have as good right to the Word and prayer as any of them.'

The identification with the sinless Christ, by which 'salvation' is obtained, is expressed in the plainest language: 'Further, the Lord did also lead me into the mystery of union with the Son of God, that I was joined to him, that I was flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone, and now was that a sweet word to me in Eph. v, 30. By this also was my faith in him, as my righteousness, the more confirmed to me; for if He and I were one, then his righteousness was mine, his merits mine, his victory also mine. Now could I see myself in heaven and earth at once; in heaven by my Christ, by my head, by my righteousness and life, though on earth by my body or person.'

(e) The inevitable outcome of his religious experience was that Bunyan, who now considered himself 'saved', must become a saviour. His method was, first to condemn in others what he had been forced to condemn in himself: 'Thus I went for the space of two years, crying out against men's sins and their fearful state because of them.' 'I went myself in chains to preach to them in chains; and carried that fire in my own conscience that I persuaded them to beware of.'

Having succeeded in suppressing his own instinctual desires, he was now in a position to demand the same obedience and submission from others. He says: 'In my preaching of the Word, I took special notice of this one thing, namely, that the Lord did lead me to begin where his Word begins with sinners; that is, to condemn all flesh,

and to open and allege, that the curse of God, by the law, doth belong to and lay hold on all men as they come into the world, because of sin.'

But here Bunyan makes the interesting confession, that the condemning of sins in others made enormous demands upon himself, to live up to the injunctions of his severe conscience: 'Whereas sometimes I have been about to preach upon some smart and scorching portion of the Word, I have found the tempter suggest, what, will you preach this? This condemns yourself; of this your own soul is guilty; wherefore preach not of it all; or if you do, yet so mince it, as to make way for your own escape; lest instead of awakening others, you may lay that guilt upon your own soul, as you will never get from under. But, I thank the Lord, I have been kept from consenting to these so horrid suggestions, and have rather, as Samson, bowed myself with all my might to condemn sin and transgression wherever I find it, yea, though therein also I did bring guilt upon my own conscience.'

On the other hand, his homosexual longing to bring all men to the father is made abundantly clear: 'In my preaching, I have really been in pain and have, as it were, travailed to bring forth children to God. . . . If any of those who were awakened by my ministry, did after that fall back, as sometimes too many did, I can truly say their loss hath been more to me than if one of my own children, begotten of my body, had been going to its grave.'

The conclusion that can be drawn from Bunyan's drastic attempt to subordinate his aggressive impulses is that it fails in its purpose. The convert can never rest in the certain knowledge that the conflict is over and that victory is his. 'The sense of guilt', writes Freud (1907), 'in consequence of continual temptation, and the anxious expectation in the guise of fear of divine punishment, have indeed been familiar to us in religion longer than in neurosis. Possibly on account of the sexual elements which are also involved, possibly on account of some characteristic of instincts in general, the suppression active in religion proves here also to be neither completely effective nor final.'

This statement is corroborated by the confession of Bunyan with which he concludes the account of his conversion. He writes: 'Of all the temptations that ever I met with in my life, to question the being of God, and truth of his gospel, is the worst, and the worst to be borne.' He also makes the confession that the old rebelliousness which in his early days was expressed in blasphemy has not left him even though he is now 'set apart' and one of the 'elect': 'Sometimes, again, when I

have been preaching, I have been violently assaulted with thoughts of blasphemy, and strongly tempted to speak the words with my mouth before the congregation. I have also at other times, even when I have begun to speak the Word with much clearness, evidence, and liberty of speech, yet been before the ending of that opportunity so blinded, and so estranged from the things I have been speaking, and have also been so straitened in my speech, as to utterance before the people, that I have been as if I had not known or remembered what I have been about, or as if my head had been in a bag all the time of the exercise.'⁴

The typical Puritan is like a ship's captain with a mutinous crew beneath the hatches: he dare not relax his attention lest they batter down the hatches, overwhelm the captain and take charge of the ship. Repressive measures have to be daily intensified by discipline and asceticism. He is constantly in training, his moral athleticism knows no bounds, yet in the eyes of his dream task-master he is never fit. There is an illuminating sentence at the end of Bunyan's allegorical account of the pilgrim's flight from the City of Destruction to the Celestial City. After a description of the convert's numerous trials and temptations, disciplines and prayers, he discloses in a remarkable sentence the underlying anxiety which never leaves him: 'Then I saw that there was a way to Hell even from the gates of Heaven as well as from the City of Destruction.'

The Puritan's character may be regarded as an integrated system of reaction-formations. Beneath the 'virtues' of humility, the acceptance of one's lot and the spirit of submission which were extolled in the sermonic literature of the time, was concealed the jealousy and envy which are associated with the father-son relationship. This envy was translated into the economic values of the times. Puritanism grew and triumphed in an age which gave unprecedented opportunities to those who were socially ambitious. The Puritan doctrine of the right of private judgement, the emphasis on freedom and the equality of all men, gave an implicit sanction to men of low degree to fight their way up the social scale and displace the landed families and so form a new plutocracy. Such words as 'snob' and 'prig', which make their appearance in the English language at this time, are a commentary in themselves on the unconscious motives that inspired the Puritan.

'Snob' (which is cognate with 'snub') derives from the Icelandic 'sneypa', to castrate. According to Skeat the word 'snob' originally meant a journeyman shoemaker, a vulgar ignorant person. That was its meaning in the seventeenth century. The *O.E.D.*, following its history, points out that

constantly mingling with their prayers and disturbing them.'

⁴ Compare Freud (1909): 'I might suppose that the uncertainty of obsessional neurotics, when they are praying, for instance, is due to unconscious phantasies

at Cambridge a snob was anyone who was not a gownsman. Finally, it came to mean one who affected certain privileges of caste or learning. The snubs which the Puritans received ('steeple houses' and 'hireling ministers') reveal the insight which the privileged classes had into the actual motives which lay hidden beneath the Puritan injunctions to humility and submissiveness.

The word 'prig' has a similar history and also comes into common use about the same time. According to Skeat 'to pryge' (a modification of 'to prick', that is, 'to ride') came to mean 'to ride off', 'to steal a horse', and so generally 'to steal'. The *O.E.D.* further points out that in the late seventeenth century and in the early eighteenth the noun was applied to a puritanical person, a precisian in religion, especially a nonconformist minister.

The 'Nonconformist conscience', so powerful in the nineteenth century, was only too often little more than sanctified awkwardness. The original aggressiveness of the father-son relationship found expression by many devious routes. Theologically the victory over the father is complete: for the intellectual Puritan the fierce anthropomorphic God of militant nonconformity has been reduced to an abstract noun—a fate which is possibly even more ignominious than castration. Having reduced God the father to a vague life principle or a synonym for evolution, the gospel of nonconformity (as one of its leaders has stated) is simply a compound of a sanctified psychology and a little diluted socialism.⁵

Another fact to be noted about the Puritan is his ceaseless activity and restlessness. This restlessness has its roots in the fact that his libido is for the most part organized on a pregenital level. He is therefore condemned to pregenital satisfactions, which means that his life is governed by the 'fore-pleasure principle'. However much he talks of ultimate values he lives emotionally in a world of penultimate values. He never reaches his goal. He journeys hopefully but never arrives, for his destination is always the next station but one.

A further factor in the Puritan's ceaseless activity is to be found in his compulsion to doubt. According to Calvin, God chose certain individuals as his 'elect'. They were predestined to salvation by 'his gratuitous mercy', totally irrespective of human merit. The remainder have been consigned to eternal damnation 'by a just and irreprehensible but incomprehensible judgement'. The work of salvation is, therefore, the gratuitous work of God: there is nothing man can do about it. This doctrine of predestination might be very attractive to a man provided that he were certain that he was

among the favoured few. But he never can be certain. The gnawing doubt is always there. He therefore seeks to reassure himself and those around him that he is one of the 'elect' by outward tokens of worldly success. The anal character, however, is limited in his interpretation of the word 'success'. But within his narrow conception of the word he bends all his energies to achieve it. Success is not a means of grace, but it is a sure sign that salvation has been achieved. And so work becomes sanctified and money the outward mark of God's favour. He is able to demonstrate to himself and the world that he has 'made good'. But as the doubt is always there he cannot rest in the thought of his election; he must perforce continue unceasingly to labour. Time becomes a precious commodity; for time is money. It is, no doubt, this anal attitude to time that explains the enormous increase in the use of clocks in the seventeenth century, the measurement of time by quarter hours and minutes, also the invention of the watch.

It would seem that here, in this effort to earn his salvation rather than receive it as a gift, we have the source of those practical contributions which the Puritan and his descendants have made in every aspect of our social life. In the picture that precedes this essay the guilty man asks: 'What shall I do?' The emphasis is on the verb. It is by action rather than by insight that he hopes to free himself from the burden of his guilt. Your typical Puritan, therefore, is essentially an activist. He throws himself into an eddy of ceaseless activity. But all this industriousness of the Puritan is motivated by a desire to expiate his guilt. This Puritan influence can be seen in British public life. In our international dealings, for example, any effort at national aggrandisement has to be sanctioned by some moral pretext. Imperial expansion has to become 'the White man's burden'.

But it is in the world of commerce and finance that the Puritan has found the most congenial outlet for his activities. The Presidents of the great Trusts had much in common with their spiritual forebears who spent their days in the counting house and their evenings in the prayer meeting. 'If God show you a way in which you may lawfully get more than in another way (without wrong to your soul or to another) if you refuse this, and choose the less gainful way you cross one of the ends of your calling and you refuse to be God's steward.' In those words a contemporary of Bunyan, the Rev. Richard Baxter, addressed his congregation at Kidderminster. His congregation evidently took his words to heart, for Baxter elsewhere relates that his friend, Thomas Foley, 'from

⁵ It was left to W. R. Inge as Dean of St. Paul's to point out (1933) the fate of God in the modern world. If God is simply a synonym for evolution then the modern churchman must accept the appalling fact that this 'emerging, evolving, improving God' is subject to the

second law of thermo-dynamics, which states that this universe is slowly running down like a clock. 'A God under sentence of death', concluded the Dean, 'at however distant a date, does not possess the attribute which religion holds to belong to the idea of God.'

almost nothing did get about £5,000 per annum or more out of his iron-works.' ⁶

It is not surprising in a country where the cultural conscience is so predominantly Puritan that 'charity' plays so large a part in our social economy, even in war time. Charity is a convenient sop to the aggressiveness of the anal character. By large donations to public charities he is able in some measure to allay his feelings of guilt and demonstrate to his fellowmen his good nature and generosity. Charity provides the acquisitive financier with a handy reaction-formation in pity. Hence, too, the strong distaste for 'charity' which is evinced by many of those who are its recipients.

It might be of interest to speculate how far the split in the conscience of modern man is due to the Reformation doctrine of the right of private judgement, a doctrine which, of course, was a cardinal feature of Puritanism. The Reformers to all appearances championed the cause of freedom both civil and religious, but it was a freedom for which they were unprepared psychologically. The Prodigal Son in the New Testament parable demands and obtains his freedom. No sooner has he obtained it than he is anxious to renounce it with the request to his father: 'Make me as one of thy hired servants.' So with the Reformers. In rejecting the ecclesiastical authority which governed the mediæval society, they merely submitted to a still harsher authority, that of their own tyrannical super-ego which demanded the complete and abject surrender of the individual. This, as has been seen, is the essence of the conversion experience which plays such a central part in evangelical Protestantism. Psycho-analysis is also concerned with the subject of guilt, the problems of neurosis being, as Ernest Jones (1931) has said, inseparable from those of guilt. But psycho-

analysis proceeds in the opposite direction from that of the conversion process. Instead of dragooning the patient to submit to the tyranny of his super-ego the psycho-analytical technique aims at mitigating its harshness. The ego is strengthened and freed from the dictatorship of the super-ego. In this way the ego is enabled to achieve that principle for which the Reformers fought, the freedom to exercise the right of private judgement.

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NOTES ON COMMERCIAL MOVIE TECHNIQUE

By JOHN PRATT, LONDON

Not very long ago a film star, Miss Veronica Lake, was compelled for patriotic reasons to alter her coiffure: the hair of American munition workers was being caught too often in the machinery. The voice of a girl as she leaves the Picture Palace may

be modified to the accents of the Bowery, the deportment of a man to that of Mr. Gary Cooper walking 'pixillated' in the rain. These are adoptions on the ground of the same instinctual claim, identifications of hysterical type and tending

⁶ The connection between Puritanism and Capitalism is aptly illustrated by Margaret Mead's (1937) description of the small cultural unit of the Manus of the Admiralty Islands, where an extremely ascetic religion inculcates a deep sense of guilt. Sexual morality is excessively severe. Marriage does not normally take place until the betrothed are over twenty years of age. No sex relationships are allowed to a man before his marriage except with a prostitute. The sense of shame in relation to sex is so severe that sex offences are even extended to include a chance physical contact in a crowd. In this small culture, numbering only 2,000 people, the possession of property is a proof of individual moral character. A man's status is judged by the amount of wealth that passes through his hands. Marriage is completely commercialized and based

upon barter; it is not restricted to a kinship system. Debtor and creditor are the most intimately connected individuals in the Manus. So hard does a man work to keep out of debt that he usually dies in middle age. It is rare for a man to see his first grandchild. Every man is worried and irritable, apprehensive and restless, counting and re-counting his debts, playing one creditor off against another, apportioning his goods among half a dozen different demands. There is practically no art; objects of art have no other value except as counters in a system of exchanges. Every institution is bent to the emphasis of the attainment of personal success through the manipulation of property. The religious life, says Mead, is completely integrated with the economic.

towards a bodily expression. The instinctual claim of the 'fans' is in general exhibitionistic: they would like to be like a movie star, the observed of all observers. In particular it is derived from the special story content of any given film. All this is equally true for the theatre: as in the primal scene the observer identifies with the observed. But here arises a problem of special interest.

At any particularly emotional moment in the cinema the spectator is presented with a 'close-up' of the actor or the actress most immediately concerned. When this technique was first introduced many people regarded it with dislike and disgust, expressing horror at a many times greater than life-size picture of the human face. At the present day, however, the tendency to such a reaction is only experienced in the case of a close-up of a person with whom the audience is not identifying or towards whom it has no very great attraction. Adjustment to technique apart, the sensation of magnification is not nearly so likely to be apparent in the case of a desirable young lady whom the audience would in any case wish to approach more closely and in this way to possess not only in an infantile proximity but also in the sense of adult sexuality. The most commonly given explanation for the close-up is one that must certainly be true. This is that at such special moments the audience wishes to see particularly closely the play of emotional expression. But it would also seem that, apart from an expected increase in the feeling of identification arising out of the dramatic situation, there is some other subjective feeling sometimes associated with the close-up that can perhaps best be described as a sort of empathic understanding not otherwise present, a kind of sharing in the experience. This seems to be something special for the close-up. What is the possible causation?

The first point to take into consideration is that the effect of this technique is to afford a greatly increased possibility for the audience to imitate, as they quite frequently do, the facial expression of the actor, and in this way to affirm an already existing feeling of identification. The second point is that the desire to witness the sexual activities of a man and a woman is a desire to share in their experience by a process of empathy, generally in a homosexual sense. It may with probability be supposed that the close-up may often function in some such way as this. In an exceedingly interesting paper Fenichel (1935) points out the strength of the oral components in the pleasure derived from looking and answers in the affirmative the question of whether there exist such phantasies as of incorporation through the eye. The feeling of sharing-in from the close-up might also be explicable on this ground if it were supposed that the object shown is unconsciously supposed to approach or to enter into and be devoured by the eye.

Naturally this would only hold good for comparatively highly libiditized objects such as an eyeful of Miss Rita Hayworth rather than a purely informative close-up of a railway ticket or of the clue which the Police have overlooked and which is found by Mr. William Powell, since it would only be under such a precondition that the earliest oral object relation would be activated.

Are there any considerations that would lead one to suppose a preparedness for the activation of such experience? What, in other words, is the psychic state of the cinema-goer? He is, it may be agreed, the observer of some highly elaborated, more or less universally occurring, but sophisticated phantasy. Sitting at ease in darkness before a brilliantly illuminated screen, with a minimal expenditure of energy, he is the omnipotent witness of a drama bound in no continuities of time and space but those of thoughts and wishes. The withdrawal of his interest from the outer world—excepting only from the restricted visual and the auditory fields—is accompanied by a diminution in his faculty of reality testing for the events depicted and by an acceptance of their psychic tempo. Without drawing too exact a comparison, it may be safely said that this state of ego closely corresponds to that of the dreamer, or at any rate shows a strong tendency towards it. The question of a preparedness for the activation of archaic oral experience may be left unanswered. But the points to be noted in this connection are the strong oral component in a pleasurable looking re-inforced by the general conditions of the movie and a tendency towards a narcissistic regression.

A comparison of the cinema-goer with the dreamer compels an acknowledgement that the story content of the movie is usually much more like that of the day-dream. But in one respect at least the film itself has to meet a technical problem similar to one encountered by the dream-work—in that of the concrete representation of an abstract idea. For example, an editor on one occasion went out with a camera crew to obtain material for a montage to illustrate the growth of a community that had migrated to another country of great natural resources. For one shot the camera was set up to photograph the base of a tall tree and gradually tilted upwards from the horizontal, in line with the trunk, so that it ended by showing the top of the tree outlined against the sky. The abstract idea of increasing tension is often conveyed in a montage by an increase in the volume or in the pitch of the accompanying sound and by an increase in the rate of the visual presentations (cutting tempo). Such rhythms may be of fore-pleasure or of orgasmic type; an example of the latter is the rhythm of an entire sequence showing the journey of a train from start to destination in Jean Renoir's film *La Bête Humaine*. The partial interruption of a smooth continuity of action by a montage of rapidly changing visual images with

a limited associative content gives one at times the impression of a threatened instinctual irruption. For such an impression of a threat to the ego I would cite from *Citizen Kane* the montage leading to the attempted suicide of the 'singer'. The idea of suicidal intention is generally indicated by a superimposition over the rejected lover of pictorial memories in which the love object also figures, in this way visualizing the re-cathexis of memories during mourning. Of course the montage can be used in numerous other ways, as to represent a dream or a state of mental confusion. But of these I cannot remember any very convincing examples, except perhaps of the latter. So much for the representation of the abstract. There is one other analogy with the dream. The 'Hay's Office' is a body instituted and maintained for the guidance of the Industry by the Industry itself.

Let us turn now to an aspect of the direction of a single scene—for instance, of a dialogue between two actors. It is possible that in the studio this might be photographed successively from three different camera positions of which one would be farther away and would show both the players, and the other two would be at angles left and right of the first and would show each actor separately, from much closer, or sometimes from over the shoulder of his colleague. The construction of the scene as finally shown is accomplished by a carefully timed and selected synthesis from the total available material. This method has little or no advantage in the presentation of scenes where the dramatic tension is of a general nature and sufficient to rivet the attention on the players. At other times, however, if a scene is played in its entirety with the camera in one position only the audience tends to become aware of a disturbing extraneous factor, of the existence of another personage in the invisible camera operator. In the case of an indifferent scene the above technique can have the effect of minimizing deficiency by distraction from the content, or can even be used on purpose so to do, or to overcome some minor discrepancy or other; and when exaggerated or faulty can again produce an awareness of the camera. It does not seem likely that this technique was purposely evolved to deal with any single or particular difficulty. An examination of the effects of the technique does not necessarily entitle one to draw inferences about the causes. But the effects are of sufficient interest. The first consideration of psycho-analytic relevance is that the audience is thus afforded by variety a greatly increased opportunity for the gratification of a more or less unspecific scopophilic pleasure. And on this subject it may be noted that for the photography of 'glamour' in general a 'soft focus' effect is produced by a diffused lighting technique and sometimes even by a gauze over the lens. Glamourization has the effect of impairing an ego function. The second is that an observer in the

audience is, so to speak, granted a measure of exemption from the ordinary spatial limitations of his situation. The unconscious meaning of this exemption will become increasingly clear from the examination of some other aspects of the movie.

Let us consider for a moment the audience's awareness of the passage of time. One writer on the film has here confessed to a certain feeling of timelessness and has compared this to the timelessness of the unconscious. I do not think this is a good comparison. Ordinarily, it is true, the passage of time as shown in a screen-play differs considerably from the standard of physical time without arousing any special difficulty. But the audience's acceptance of the fictive time is derived, I should imagine, through its identification with the characters. And the passage of time in the narrative is conventionally shown by certain optical devices. Apart from being indicated by the general course or nature of the dramatic situation or from being 'planted' by a line of dialogue, a time interval may be represented by a gradual fade-out to a dark screen and a fade-in to a resumption of the action. An interval may equally be shown by a 'dissolve'. But let us take a special case. In a movie we may dissolve from a keel and ribs in a shipyard to the launching of a liner, from the tedium of a winter's landscape to a summer's sun. In the example given, unconsciously we feel ourselves to be omnipotent creators. Is this not true also of the optical effect in itself, which would unconsciously mean an omnipotent destruction of what is seen and an omnipotent re-creation? If this is so, most other types of optical must be so interpreted. Among these would find representation omnipotent phantasies at levels other than the oral and the phallic—the commonly described components of the scopophilic instinct. There are 'explosion' opticals, openings and closings of iris diaphragms, impressions given by a 'wipe', where it seems as though one picture is wiped sideways as another one appears, 'lap' and 'ripple' dissolves and so on. And there are tricks, of course. An omnipotent control may be obtained by showing events in reverse sequence, the splash coming back into place as the diver emerges feet first from the water. Still to be mentioned are some other sources from which a sense of omnipotence may be derived. One has already been noted: the freedom from a spatial restriction. In a sequence about the R.A.F. we are at one moment inside the plane aiming the bombs, the next outside it watching them fall, and two or three seconds later we see the explosion from close to, just as we should have wished. We cut from a gloved hand on the trigger button of a Spitfire to a Messerschmidt disintegrating in the air. The causal logic of the cut is evident, but to the unconscious this is a magical phallic gesture, a part of the 'wizardry' of the 'Spit'. A camera may be strapped to a bomber as it sweeps across

the Channel and the fields of northern France; while in the studio the device of putting the camera on a mobile platform or a crane gives rise again to the sense of an effortless movement through space comparable to the flying-dream and having also that significance. Here also may be mentioned a technique much used by writers and by editors to maintain a rapid continuity of action. We leave a scene in London on the line 'It's a long time since I was in Paris', and dissolve to the Champs Elysées or the Tour Eiffel. A character enquires 'Did you say "Hops"?'; we dissolve to a close-up of a glass of beer; the camera pulls back to show him lift it to his lips, and so on. This technique confirms an unconscious belief in the omnipotence of words. Such conjurations are not uncommon in the Travelogue. 'And now in a FLASH we see sun-drenched Miami. . . .' In all these and in other subtle ways the technique of the screen can be used to heighten the illusion of omnipotence.

I do not care to end these notes on movie technique without a reference, however slight, to story content. The basic stories of the screen have been enumerated and their number is not great. Under the dominance of the profit motive, story content tends towards whatever is regarded as a greatest common day-dream. But there are many commercial films not readily to be classified under such categories as *The Purification of the Local Administration*, or as variations on the theme of *Boy Meets Girl*. The Documentary is not conspicuous even for an employment of the techniques that have been discussed. I do not believe that the commercial film need necessarily deal mainly

in adolescent day-dreams nor its technique in omnipotence. Hopefully one may trace an increasing realism. This is due partly to technical advances. The puppets of the silent days give place to vocal characters, and over-emphasis to the modern technique of restraint. Partly to other reasons, some empirical. The iron dictatorship of novelty demands an ever varied pleasure, and the variations on a basic theme are not illimitable. Custom can cloy the appetite, romantic dialogue may carry without background music. Man cannot live by dreams alone. The giant factories from time to time produce a 'prestige' article. Debunking can become a greater pleasure. But broadly, apart from these, can be discerned increase. A gratification of scopophilic pleasure and of omnipotence inherent in the medium is perhaps a condition under which reality is more tolerable. The Musical is succeeded by the Backstage Musical, interminable parades of glamour by the dramatic usage of the commonplace by Hitchcock. From the social hokum of Capra the movie advances to *The Grapes of Wrath* and *Winter set*. The satire of Ernst Lubitsch and the irony of Sturges must be set in perspective against the era of the *World's Lovers* and of Rudolf Valentino. Headlines are less insistent, and the melody of Broadway fades. 'The voice of the intellect may be a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing.'

REFERENCE

- FENICHEL, O. (1935). (*Trans.* 1937.) 'The Scopophilic Instinct and Identification', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 18, 6.

ABSTRACTS

A. A. Brill. 'The Universality of Symbols.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1943, Vol. XXX, No. 1, pp. 1-18.

Brill confirms Freud's statement that, whereas dream-interpretation is ordinarily done by means of free associations furnished by the dreamer, it can sometimes be done by an auxiliary method of interpreting the symbolism of the dream. And, further, what is to-day symbolically connected was probably related in primitive times by conceptual and linguistic identity. It is therefore 'not surprising to find that an Indian Maharanee and a southern American lady express the same problem by the same symbol.'

Frank Berner.

Edmund Bergler. 'On a Predictable Mechanism.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1943, Vol. XXX, No. 1, pp. 19-32.

To overcome the patient's mistrust at the beginning of the analysis, Bergler offers a mechanism for testing intellectually the accuracy of the

analyst's interpretation. This mechanism consists in the correct interpretation of a specific type of dream which he calls a 'refutation' dream. The content of these dreams express the 'refutation' of the conflict caused by a decisive analytical interpretation. A number of examples are given from clinical histories. Bergler believes that, if this type of dream is 'prophesized' at the beginning of treatment, the patient will be impressed when it actually occurs.

Frank Berner.

Emeline P. Haywood. 'Types of Female Castration Reaction.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1943, Vol. XII, No. 1, pp. 45-66.

The types of reactions to phantasies of female castration are reviewed, particularly Abraham's wish-fulfilment type and the revengeful type. From material obtained in analysis, such women yearned not for their father's large penis, but for their brother's small, impotent organ. The author's cases all had brothers of their own age,

and had been bathed with them when small. The wish-fulfilment type developed penis envy before the castration complex and blamed their mother for their lack of a penis. At an early age such women regard the penis merely as part of the body that is missing, but later in life they see it as a functioning organ. A good description of the revengeful type of woman is presented. Their everlasting injury, bitterness, and sense of unfairness is the open wound of a supposed castration. The wish-fulfilment type of woman has reached the phallic phase of development and identifies herself with her father. Such women consider their illusory penis as a 'bonus' and their penis envy develops after the phallic phase has been reached. The revengeful type develops penis envy at the anal-sadistic level.

Sylvan Keiser.

David O. Young. 'An Anal Substitute for Genital Masturbation in a Case of Paranoid Schizophrenia.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1943, Vol. XII, No. 1, pp. 40-45.

The paper consists of the material obtained from a schizophrenic patient who attributed his sexual desires and nocturnal emissions to the food he had eaten. He was pre-occupied with somatic delusions about his gastro-intestinal tract and flatus. If he were not given what he considered a sufficient amount of food, his thoughts were not held under control and this led to spontaneous emissions. He thought that certain foods caused erections and that his flatus started rumours that he masturbated. Genital impulses were transformed into substitutive anal gratifications.

Sylvan Keiser.

Hugo Staub. 'A Runaway from Home.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1943, Vol. XII, No. 1, pp. 1-23.

A case is presented of a boy who ran away from a home consisting of a mother, a stepfather and a sister. His truancy was an identification with the asocial behaviour of his father and the goal towards which he ran was a representation of his own father. At the same time, he punished his mother for loving his stepfather. A further point is made that the world represented the mother's sexual organ, which the patient felt impelled to investigate symbolically through his pointless trauancies. From the technical point of view, it is stressed that a quick positive transference is essential for good therapeutic results. Though analytic technique is desirable, it should be modified to meet the

exigencies which an adolescent court-problem presents. A plea is made for a dynamic psychiatric approach to the runaway and an indictment is offered of still too common police methods.

Sylvan Keiser.

Benson Carmichael. 'The Death Wish in Daily Life.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1943, Vol. XXX, No. 1, pp. 59-66.

The author attempts to prove that on purely logical grounds the concept of a death instinct is unassailable. He presents productions of a depressed patient in the course of an analysis. The thoughts concern the many forms of death which occur in daily life, such as, natural, homicidal, and suicidal deaths, mass suicides (war), etc.

Frank Berner.

Lydia Oehlschlegel. 'Regarding Freud's Book on "Moses".' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1943, Vol. XXX, No. 1, pp. 67-76.

The sub-title of this paper is 'A Religio-Psychanalytical Study'. A study of Freud's book on Moses leads to the supposition that, though Freud identified himself with Moses on the basis of the unusual powers of leadership which both possessed, he also strongly resented Moses's Jewishness, perhaps unconsciously. Freud's book represents an unconscious attempt on his part to resolve his own religio-racial conflict, an attempt to rationalize his rejection of religion and to compensate his feeling of racial inferiority.

Frank Berner.

Lewis R. Wolberg. 'The Divine Comedy of Dante.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1943, Vol. XXX, No. 1, pp. 33-46.

There are two divergent characteristics for which Dante is outstanding: first, his poetic love for Beatrice and, second, the creation in the *Divine Comedy* of the most hideous Inferno man has ever conceived. Both of these circumstances had a common source in a primal identification with the parents. In the *Divine Comedy* the basic Oedipus theme is elaborated with the ambivalent attitude towards the parents only thinly disguised. 'The need to achieve union with the mother in order to fulfil the craving for love and security is symbolized by Dante's striving to attain to the heavenly Paradise where the mother-symbol Beatrice resides. But the path to the achievement of the incestuous wish is blocked by the threat of castration, symbolized in the poem by the tortures of Hell and Purgatory.'

Frank Berner.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

[Appearance in this list does not preclude subsequent notice.]

A. BOOKS

Apparitions. (Fourth F. W. H. Myers Memorial Lecture.) By G. N. M. Tyrrell. (London: Society for Psychical Research, 1943. Pp. viii + 123. Price, 3s. 6d.)

Convulsive Seizures. By Tracy J. Putnam. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1943. Pp. 168. Price, \$2.00.)

Estudos Neuro-Psiquiatricos. By J. F. Alvim. (S. Paulo: A. Imprensa Ltda., 1931. Pp. 117.)

Foundations of Neuropsychiatry. By Stanley Cobb. (Second Edition.) (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co.; London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1941. Pp. xi + 231. Price, 14s.)

Get to Know Yourself. By Joseph Ralph. (London: Chaterson, Ltd., 1943. Pp. vi + 89. Price, 3s. 6d.)

Hypnotism. By George H. Estabrooks. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1943. Pp. 249. Price, \$2.50.)

La personalidad y el carácter. By Honorio Delgado. (Lima: Editorial Lumen, 1943. Pp. 204.)

Maternal Overprotection. By David M. Levy. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. 417. Price, \$4.50.)

Narco-Analysis. By J. Stephen Horsley. (London: Oxford University Press, 1943. Pp. vii + 134. Price, 8s. 6d.)

Proceedings of the Council on Brief Psycho-

therapy. (Chicago: Institute for Psychoanalysis, 1942. Pp. 71.)

Stuttering. By Eugene F. Hahn. (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1943. Pp. 177. Price, \$2.00.)

Ten Year Report, 1932-1942. (Chicago: Institute for Psychoanalysis, 1943. Pp. 79.)

B. PERIODICALS

Archives de Psychologie (Geneva).

Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry (Chicago).

British Medical Journal (London).

Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic (Topeka).

Indian Journal of Psychology (Calcutta).

Journal of Criminal Psychopathology (New York).

Man (London).

Medical Press and Circular (London).

Medical Record (New York).

Mental Hygiene (New York).

Neurobiologia (Pernambuco).

Psychological Abstracts (Lancaster, Pa.).

Revista de Neuro-Psiquiatria (Lima).

The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (Sydney).

The British Journal of Medical Psychology (London).

The Journal of the American Medical Association (Chicago).

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly (New York).

The Psychoanalytic Review (New York).

OBITUARY

MAX EITINGON

In the first week of August we received the sad news that Dr. Max Eitingon had died on July 30 after a painful and distressing illness. He had for some years suffered from a cardiac disorder, and this culminated in thrombosis and angina pectoris. The news will be received with keen regret by many friends and patients of his all over the world, and especially by those of us who were eagerly looking forward to seeing him again as soon as the separation enforced by war conditions was over.

Dr. Eitingon was born on June 26, 1881, in what was then Austrian Poland, and he retained his Austrian nationality. Early in his childhood the family removed to Leipsic. Perhaps because of his stammer, an affliction from which he suffered throughout life, he left school before matriculating, a fact which proved to be a lasting disadvantage. He commenced his medical studies at the University of Marburg, but pursued the greater part of them at that of Zurich where he acquired the degree of M.D. The missing entry examination,

however, prevented his acquiring a legal medical qualification in any country, so that the choice of psycho-analysis proved to be an external convenience as well as being dictated by the deepest inner motives. It was Jung who introduced him to psycho-analysis, and through him he early made contact with both Freud and Abraham, the latter of whom was indeed in Zurich together with him. Presumably it was the latter contact that made him decide to settle—as he thought permanently—in Berlin at the end of 1908. He was present at the First International Psycho-Analytical Congress at Salzburg in 1908, and was, I think, with the possible exception of Drs. Federn and Hitschmann, the only person who has attended all the fifteen congresses.

One heard little about Eitingon in those early years, but in 1920 he performed the greatest deed of his life, one which will never cease reverberating. It was announced that some unknown donor had provided means to found an Institute of Psycho-

Analysis in Berlin with the double purpose of rendering psycho-analytic treatment accessible to the poorer section of the community and of providing an opportunity of establishing a practical and theoretical curriculum for the teaching of psycho-analysis. It was only a very few of us who knew that the anonymous donor was Dr. Eitingon, and it was some time before this transpired. How much the idea was Eitingon's own, and how much Professor Freud's, with whom he had discussed his project, I have no means of knowing, but the deed was Eitingon's and he certainly perceived with the clearest vision that this was the next, and the most important, step to be taken for the advancement of psycho-analysis. At first when the Poliklinik was opened, on February 14, 1920, stress was laid on the former of the two aims just mentioned, but in 1924 the change of its name to Institute betokened the greater development of the second aim. In all the succeeding years, until Dr. Eitingon left Berlin, he played a central part, ably seconded by Dr. Simmel, in the affairs of the Institute, more particularly in the organizing of the courses of instruction, many of which he himself conducted.

Dr. Eitingon was from early on Secretary of the Berlin Society, but resigned the position after Abraham's death at the end of 1925, retaining only that of Chairman of the Berlin Training Committee. He had been invited to succeed Abraham as President, but declined in Simmel's favour. In April 1925, when Abraham was elected President of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, he chose Eitingon for his Secretary. After the former's death he administered the presidential affairs and presided at the Innsbruck Congress in 1927. There he was elected President and was re-elected at the Oxford Congress in 1929; he thus presided over three congresses.

At the Bad Homburg Congress in 1925 Dr. Eitingon proposed that the Berlin system of training candidates, which was being gradually followed in other centres, should be made universal and standardized under the ægis of an International Training Commission. This proposal was accepted, and he was made President of the Commission, a position he retained until his death. It was the work that lay nearest to his heart, and his name will live in the history of the psycho-analytical movement most of all for the ardour with which he first initiated and then developed the high standards of training that were his life's ideal. Idealists never have an easy time of it, and Eitingon was no exception to this rule. His insistence on uniformity in both the kinds and the standards of training soon made him fall foul of opposition from more independently thinking groups, especially in America. His unpopularity in this respect was increased by his very extreme advocacy of lay analysis, and in some quarters he was unfairly regarded as being both fanatical and

dictatorial: to say the least such charges were very exaggerated, though it must be admitted that with his high standards he never found the path of compromise an easy one.

Second only to this interest, and less conspicuous to the public eye, was Eitingon's devotion to the affairs of the International Psycho-Analytical Verlag. He was one of the small group of Directors officially responsible for its activity, and he was unsparing of both time and money in furthering its interest.

Eitingon, especially in his early years, gave the impression of a shy, reserved, modest, and perhaps inhibited, personality. Later these features were lessened by his innate determination and general development. He was by nature the kindest of men, warm-hearted to his friends and ever ready to help the poor and needy. His kind deeds were done in silence, and one learned of them only indirectly, but many a poor patient will remember him as his greatest friend in need. Eitingon's was a gentlemanly nature, as was betokened by the grace and courtesy of his demeanour. His cultured upbringing made him a connoisseur in many fields of art, and his ample private means—a unique feature among psycho-analysts—gave him the opportunity to cultivate his tastes, as well as to indulge them in the exquisite home which he created for himself and his wife. In adult years he developed a passion for the culture, including the language, of Old Russia, the land of his ancestors, one which he appropriately crowned by marrying a distinctively Russian lady.

Eitingon was among the two or three psycho-analysts most personally devoted to Freud, whom he truly worshipped. Devotion indeed, in all its forms, was perhaps the most characteristic of Eitingon's qualities. Less admirable was a somewhat biblical attitude he adopted in respect of Freud's writings, one which rendered him quite inaccessible to any innovation from other sources. One unfortunate product of his inhibitions was his refusal to make any endeavour even to add to the sacred texts. In other words, Eitingon was unique among prominent analysts in never having published a single scientific contribution; this was so startling as to appear almost like some perverse matter of principle. On the other hand his numerous Reports and Addresses, which displayed fluency and power of expression enough, were full of weighty matter that still retains its value.

When the Nazis triumphed in Germany a man of Eitingon's sensitive temperament could respond in only one way. He immediately removed his possessions from Germany, and, what was more, decided there could be only one home for him in the future—Jerusalem. There he was at once made President of the Palestinian Society, to which and to the furtherance of the Hebrew University he devoted the remaining years of his life.

All in all Max Eitingon was a remarkable and distinctive personality who played a very important part in the psycho-analytical movement. His

absence will be sadly felt. We have lost one of the most ardent, upright and high-minded of our pioneers.

Ernest Jones.

MAX DAVID MAYER

Dr. Max David Mayer died on May 28, 1943. He was one of the few members of the American Psychoanalytic Association whose main interest and energy belonged to another medical specialty, for he was a competent and distinguished gynaecologist and obstetrician as well as an accredited psycho-analyst.

Dr. Mayer graduated from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University in 1917 and, after an internship at Mount Sinai Hospital, entered general practice. In 1923 he decided to specialize in gynaecology and obstetrics and spent a year in Vienna to perfect himself in this field. While in Vienna he underwent an analysis by Dr. Otto Rank and married Eleanor Sanford who, with two children, survives him.

From 1924, when Dr. Mayer returned to New York, he took special interest in those disorders in his specialty which are dependent upon unconscious psychic factors and often his therapy for psychogenic gynaecological manifestations went beyond persuasion and interpretation to deep and prolonged analysis.

In 1937 Dr. Mayer became Associate Gynecologist to the Mount Sinai Hospital which position he held at the time of his death. His main scientific contributions were in the realm of gynaecology—among them we may note *Pregnancy After Bilateral Tubal Ligation* in 1932 and *The Status of Psychotherapy in Gynecological Practice* in 1937.

Dr. Mayer's thinking on many gynaecological problems, the meaning of illness to the patient, and the therapy he advocated were far in advance of some of his more conservative colleagues. In addition to high professional attainments in the field of gynaecology and surgery, he took an active rôle in social movements, such as birth control, pre-natal care and the instruction of young physicians in the broader aspects of gynaecology. A man of warm loyalties, high integrity and deep faith in his work, he had the courage to espouse openly and firmly principles in which he believed, notwithstanding that his views often meant for him personal difficulty and sacrifice.

C. P. Oberndorf.

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EDITED BY

EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

The amount of material for publication at present in hand is so small that it has been decided to hold it over for inclusion in the next issue of the Bulletin, in which it is hoped to print a revised Membership List.
